Nash Equilibrium: Coordination Games and Bank Runs

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Global Games and Fundamental-Based Crises

While traditional Nash equilibrium models of coordination games (like the Diamond-Dybvig bank run model) rely on multiple equilibria and arbitrary 'sunspot' triggers to explain panics, the 'Global Games' framework offers a major theoretical alternative. Developed by economists such as Stephen Morris and Hyun Song Shin, this approach introduces incomplete information and noisy private signals about economic fundamentals. By removing the assumption of perfect common knowledge, Global Games resolve the indeterminacy of multiple Nash equilibria to select a unique equilibrium. This perspective suggests that bank runs and coordination failures are not merely random psychological panics, but are deterministically driven by weak underlying economic fundamentals. Consequently, critics argue that standard Nash equilibrium models overemphasize arbitrary coordination success or failure while understating the critical role of information asymmetry and objective economic health in driving systemic crises.

Basic concepts of Game Theory, including players, strategies, payoffs, and the representation of games using payoff matrices.
The fundamental definition of a Nash Equilibrium as a situation where no player has an incentive to unilaterally deviate from their chosen strategy.
The distinction between simultaneous-move and sequential-move games, and how players make decisions under uncertainty about others' choices.
The assumption of rationality in economic agents, specifically how individuals attempt to maximize their own expected utility or payoff.
The Diamond-Dybvig Model, a seminal economic framework that formalizes how bank runs occur as a Nash equilibrium under maturity mismatch.
The concept of Schelling Points (or focal points) and how cultural norms, historical precedents, or external cues help players coordinate in games with multiple equilibria.
Global Games theory, which introduces incomplete information to explain how unique equilibria can be selected in coordination problems and financial crises.
Policy interventions and institutional mechanisms designed to prevent coordination failures, such as deposit insurance (e.g., FDIC) and central bank 'lender of last resort' facilities.
Macroeconomic coordination failures, exploring how lack of coordination among firms and consumers can lead to persistent economic recessions and underemployment.
155.7K views949likes1:09:14@YaleCoursesOriginal Release: 2008-11-21

Nash Equilibrium occurs when each player's strategy is a best response to the others', meaning no one has an incentive to deviate. In coordination games like the Investment Game, multiple equilibria may exist, including Pareto-efficient and inefficient ones. Unlike Prisoner's Dilemma, communication can help coordinate on the good equilibrium without contracts or side payments, as demonstrated when a persuasive speech shifted class behavior from a bad equilibrium to a good one.