Infinitely Repeated Games & Grim Trigger Strategies | Game Theory

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Renegotiation-Proofness and Forgiving Strategies

While the Grim Trigger strategy mathematically sustains cooperation in infinitely repeated games, it faces significant theoretical and practical criticisms. The primary critique is its lack of 'renegotiation-proofness.' Because Grim Trigger inflicts permanent, mutually destructive punishment after a single defection, both players have a strong incentive to renegotiate and return to cooperation. This renders the threat of eternal punishment non-credible in realistic settings. Furthermore, evolutionary game theory—pioneered by Robert Axelrod—demonstrates that 'forgiving' strategies, such as Tit-for-Tat, are far more robust and successful. In environments with 'noise' or accidental defections, Grim Trigger inevitably leads to a permanent collapse of cooperation, whereas forgiving strategies allow players to recover from errors and maintain long-term mutual benefits.

Fundamental concepts of static games, including simultaneous moves, payoff matrices, and standard Nash Equilibrium.
The Prisoner's Dilemma framework, specifically why rational self-interest leads to a non-cooperative outcome in single-play games.
The mathematical concept of discounting future payoffs using a discount factor (beta/delta) and calculating the sum of infinite geometric series.
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SPE) and backward induction in finite extensive-form games.
The Folk Theorem, which generalizes the conditions under which any feasible, individually rational payoff profile can be sustained as an equilibrium in repeated games.
Alternative repeated-game strategies with varying degrees of forgiveness, such as Tit-for-Tat and Pavlov (Win-Stay, Lose-Shift).
The contrast between infinitely repeated games and finitely repeated games, including Selten's Theorem on the breakdown of cooperation in finite horizons.
Economic and political applications of trigger strategies, such as tacit collusion in oligopoly markets, cartel stability, and international climate agreements.
35.9K views456likes25:08@selcukozyurtOriginal Release: 2020-11-16

In infinitely repeated games, the One Deviation Property allows verification of Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium by checking only one-period deviations rather than all possible deviations; grim trigger strategies can sustain cooperative outcomes (like mutual cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma) as SPNE when players are sufficiently patient (discount factor δ ≥ 2/3), as the threat of permanent punishment deters deviation.