Backward Induction in Game Trees: Sequential Move Game Theory

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Bounded Rationality and Behavioral Game Theory

While backward induction is mathematically elegant, it relies on the strict assumptions of perfect rationality and common knowledge of rationality. Critics, particularly from behavioral economics, highlight that real human players frequently deviate from its predictions due to cognitive limitations and social preferences like trust and fairness. A classic illustration of this is the Centipede Game: backward induction dictates that the first player should defect on the very first move, yet empirical studies show that actual human players cooperate for multiple rounds to achieve mutually beneficial outcomes. Furthermore, if a player makes an 'irrational' move early in a sequential game, the assumption of common knowledge of rationality breaks down, making it logically difficult for opponents to apply backward induction for the remainder of the game. Alternative frameworks, such as behavioral game theory, quantal response equilibrium, and forward induction, offer more psychologically realistic models of how sequential games are actually played.

Fundamental concepts of Game Theory, including players, actions, strategies, and payoffs.
The basic distinction between simultaneous-move games and sequential-move games.
How to read and interpret extensive form representations of games, such as game trees, decision nodes, and terminal payoff branches.
The assumption of player rationality, specifically the principle that players aim to maximize their individual utility or payoffs.
Formalizing the concept of Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) as a refinement of Nash Equilibrium.
Analyzing dynamic games of imperfect information, where players cannot observe previous moves (represented by non-trivial information sets).
Understanding the strategic concept of credible versus incredible threats and promises in sequential interactions.
Exploring advanced economic models of sequential moves, such as Stackelberg competition (leadership models) and sequential bargaining games.
Transitioning to games of incomplete information and the concept of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium.
127.8K views3.3Klikes8:27@AshleyHodgsonOriginal Release: 2021-08-26

Backwards induction is a solution method for sequential move games where you start at the end of the game tree and work backwards, eliminating dominated strategies at each decision node to determine the subgame perfect equilibrium; players make optimal choices based on anticipating future players' rational responses, which may mean they cannot achieve their most preferred outcomes even if they desire them.