Constitutional History and the Administrative State | Stanford Law

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The Originalist and Formalist Critique of the Administrative State

While mainstream historical accounts view the modern administrative state as a necessary and constitutionally legitimate evolution to handle complex societal issues, originalist and formalist legal scholars offer a sharp counterpoint. Proponents of this view argue that the administrative state is fundamentally incompatible with the original design of the U.S. Constitution. They contend that delegating legislative power to executive agencies violates the Separation of Powers and the Nondelegation Doctrine (Article I), while administrative adjudication bypasses the independent judicial power established in Article III. From this perspective, modern judicial deference represents an abdication of the judiciary's constitutional duty to interpret the law. This critique argues that the rise of administrative agencies has effectively created an unauthorized fourth branch of government that lacks constitutional legitimacy and undermines democratic accountability.

The tripartite structure of the US government (Separation of Powers) and the constitutional roles of the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial branches.
The historical and economic context of the New Deal era, which catalyzed the rapid expansion of federal regulatory agencies.
The concept of the 'nondelegation doctrine,' which addresses the constitutional limits on Congress delegating its legislative authority to executive agencies.
The core principles of judicial review, establishing how federal courts interpret constitutional provisions and federal statutes.
The rise and recent dismantling of 'Chevron deference,' including the implications of the Supreme Court's decision in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo.
The 'Major Questions Doctrine' and how the modern judiciary uses it to restrict agency actions of major economic and political significance.
The 'Unitary Executive Theory' and the constitutional debates surrounding presidential control and removal powers over independent agency heads.
Procedural legal frameworks governing agency action, specifically the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the 'arbitrary and capricious' standard of review.
1.1K views10likes1:41:19@stanfordlawschoolOriginal Release: 2015-05-04

The administrative state developed through a process of constitutional continuity rather than radical break, as New Deal lawyers strategically framed expanded government programs as consistent with historical practices like the spending power and disaster relief precedents, while the constitutional history of administrative law reveals that deference to executive interpretation has roots in 19th-century judicial practices dating back to Edwards v. Darby (1827), where courts respected contemporaneous executive constructions of ambiguous laws.