Dynamic Matching in College Admissions: Theory & Experiment

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The Cognitive Burden and Strategic Instability of Dynamic Matching

While dynamic matching mechanisms aim to improve efficiency through real-time feedback, market design researchers highlight significant drawbacks compared to static, strategy-proof mechanisms like Gale-Shapley Deferred Acceptance. First, dynamic matching vastly increases cognitive load, requiring applicants to constantly monitor updates and make rapid strategic adjustments. This disproportionately disadvantages lower-income or less-informed students who lack the resources or guidance to navigate complex, real-time environments. Second, dynamic systems often sacrifice strict strategy-proofness. Instead of simply reporting true preferences, participants must engage in strategic timing, hedging, or speculative behavior to avoid being locked out of preferred options. This susceptibility to strategic manipulation can lead to coordination failures, panic-driven decisions, and ultimately, less equitable and stable outcomes in practice than theory predicts.

The Gale-Shapley Deferred Acceptance (DA) algorithm and classic two-sided matching theory.
Fundamental concepts of market design, specifically stability, Pareto efficiency, and strategy-proofness.
Basic game theory principles, including Nash equilibrium and strategic manipulation of preferences.
An introduction to experimental economics, including how laboratory experiments are designed to test theoretical economic models.
Analysis of real-world dynamic matching systems, such as the Chinese college entrance examination (Gaokao) parallel recruitment system.
Advanced dynamic mechanism design, exploring how markets clear when agents and options arrive sequentially over time.
Behavioral game theory, focusing on cognitive biases, bounded rationality, and why participants misrepresent preferences in dynamic environments.
Algorithmic market design and the computational complexity challenges of scaling dynamic matching systems to large-scale populations.
216 views3likes21:54@economicscienceassociation5357Original Release: 2020-11-26

Dynamic matching mechanisms for college admissions, which provide continuous feedback and allow students to revise their choices iteratively, can achieve near-optimal stable and efficient outcomes when revision opportunities are frequent enough, and they demonstrate behavioral advantages over static mechanisms like the Boston and deferred acceptance mechanisms, particularly in complex environments with high preference correlation.