National Moot Court Finals 2019: Key Arguments

[00:00:04]good evening and welcome to the final round of the 96th annual New York City Bar National milk Court competition this event is co-sponsored by the moot Court competition Committee of the New York City Bar and the American College of trial lawyers my name is Byron Huang co-chair of the city bars national moocore competition committee along with my co-chair Daniel roschild the argument you're about to see is the culmination of an immense competition that spans five months in November 2018 174 teams from 120 schools participated in 14 Regional competitions across the country each region sent its two best teams to compete this week in the National final rounds at the New York City Bar Association we began the national rounds with 28 teams but after four days and 42 arguments here we are down to the final two this year's case captioned Omar little versus Marlow Motors Incorporated involves two distinct and important issues first whether a state may exercise General personal jurisdiction over a corporation based solely on that corporation's registration to do business in that state and two whether the design of a fully autonomous vehicle in light of an ax in which it performed as intended is defective by virtue of being unreasonably dangerous here is a hopefully brief factual summary to help you follow along this case arises out of a car accident involving Marlow Motors level 5 autonomous vehicle the model herc Marlo Motors issued a limited release of the model herc on January 7 2017 marketing it as the world's first fully autonomous vehicle in essence the vehicle is fully automated capable of driving from one destination to another completely unaided by the human in the vehicle the only Direction the passenger need give is the destination prior to its release Marlo Motors performed extensive testing of the model herx underlying programming and logic Network in order to protect the passenger Within as such Barlow Motors designed the internal code to quickly analyze the size and distance of objects so the internal system could determine the best course of action when confronted with dangerous situations however the software and cameras installed in the model herc could not discern the depth of an object or the texture of the surface of an object Marlo Motors determined that it would be financially prohibitive for the company to design and build sensors to determine the density and chemical makeup of obstacles on the road and thus did not do so Omar little is a citizen of the state of Colvin he is an avid follower of the progress of autonomous vehicles and necessarily an avid follower of Marlo Motors Omar purchased a model herc the moment it was released and was so excited that he went to pick it up in California Marla Motors headquarters over the next several months Omar drove his model herc on both fully autonomous mode and manual mode without incident until the night of May 26 2017.

[00:02:48]that night Omar attended a Gala event in the state of icaro celebrating the progress of artificial intelligence as the festivities wound down Omar until this entered his model herc set the system to fully automatic and directed the car to take him home Omar fell asleep soon after the car began driving as the car drove onto a wide four-lane Interstate Road there was an LED traffic sign above that indicated a large sinkhole in the right lane a mile or so down the highway as the model herc drove the weather worsened visibility decreased that began to rain Omar's model herc noted the weather change shifted from the leftmost lane to the second leftmost lane and decreased the speed of the vehicle several seconds later the model herx Frontline sensors detected a large object approaching quickly approximately seven feet by seven feet in that moment the internal system detected the highway divider one lane over to its left several small cone-shaped objects in the lane second from the rightmost lane and found no cars behind it the model Hearts internal system determined that breaking or swerving to the left would resolve in Greater injury and decided to Swerve to the right crashing into the sinkhole and causing severe spinal damage to Omar little the accident report later revealed that the object was a California king-sized mattress that had fallen off the back of a truck Omar brought suit against Marlow Motors in the United States district court for the eastern district of Colvin alleging that Marla Motors should be found strictly viable due to model herc's unreasonably dangerous design The District Court held that Marla Motors registration to do business in the state of Colvin constituted consent to General personal jurisdiction further the jury in that proceeding determined that the model herc was defective by virtue of being unreasonably dangerous the 14th circuit affirmed the trial court on the jurisdictional issue but reversed on the issue of defective design the parties brought this appeal to the Supreme Court we will see argue in a few moments but first Daniel will introduce our teams and our judges advancing to the final rounds of the 69th annual National mood Court competition and representing the petitioner Omar little will be Northwestern University representing Marlo Motors Incorporated the respondent will be the University of Alabama those judging tonight include the following the chief judge for our argument tonight will be the judge of the second Circuit Court of Appeals for the United States Richard Wesley assisting him as associate justices will be the honorable Ellen gesmer New York state supreme court Appellate Division The Honorable Cheryl Chambers United States Supreme Court Appellate Division and The Honorable celian scarpella New York state supreme court commercial division tonight they will also be joined by the president of the New York City Bar Association Roger Maldonado and the president of the American College of trial lawyers Jeffrey Lyon the argument the arguments will begin in just a few minutes thank you thank you all right The Honorable the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court all persons having business before The Honorable the Supreme Court of the United States must draw near and give their attention to the United States and goodness sure that's you only married okay disappear please be seated everyone offer I'm afraid I'm going to disappear behind this lecture we'll manage here there we go all right the case of the day is Omar little versus Marlow matter Motors dishes ready I'm respondents ready see what chief justice associate justices and may it please the court my name is Linda Chu and I along with my co-counsel Mr Clayton Fates represent the petitioner in this case Mr Omar little I will argue the jurisdiction issue and Mr Fates will address the design defect issue your honors we would like to reserve two minutes for rebuttal fair enough the court today should affirm the 14th circuits jurisdiction holding for two reasons first because Daimler simply did not disrupt or affect consent to jurisdiction and secondly because Marlow Motors consented to jurisdiction in Colvin by registering to do business in that state this court has long recognized that personal jurisdiction is an individual waivable right and that is exactly what Marla Motors did when it complied with Colvin sections 317 318 and 3104. you would agree that almost every state has us has a statute like section 318 in order to allow companies to do business in their states correct yes and so doesn't this really the implication of a ruling affirming this ruling would mean that corporations would be subject to suit essentially in every state where they do any business at all no your honor and that is because a majority of States 42 states have already decided either through their state legislature or through their state courts that registering to do business is not consent in fact wouldn't they be likely to change that position now if we were to come out this way those States would be able to your honor I can't speculate as to whether they may want to or not and again that's because States may want to be friendly to defendants and to corporations if every state were to adopt such a rule they would likely be losing a lot of business and a lot of revenue for the state so let me ask you this um judge Ginsburg wrote plaintiffs approved the exercise of General jurisdiction in every state in which a corporation engages in substantial continuous uh systematic course of business that formulation we hold is unacceptable grasping now when you look at the facts of this case and you apply that standard what is what is your thought referring to Justice Ginsburg opinion in Daimler and Daimler is not relevant here because because systematic and continuous contacts such that it is at home in a state that is not relevant in the case before us today because the district court already found in the record at two that Marla Motors had no contacts in the state of Colvin Mr little is not asserting General jurisdiction based on Marla Motors presence or its activities within the state rather based on its consent from registration okay so then the statute that you're citing no foreign corporation shall do any business in this state until it is filed with the Secretary of State a statement executed by an authorized officer setting forth the name and address of its registered agent where does that say and I consent to General jurisdiction by this registration your honor is correct that that provision does not explicitly say no it does not even implicitly does it say it it doesn't say it at all right so how can we impose that burden on a corporation based on that language that gives it really no notice that that's what it would be doing 17 cannot be read in a vacuum the following provision section 318 states that that registered agent may receive all service of process issued out of any Colvin court now those two registration statutes with a long-arm statute did put Marlo Motors and any other registered corporations on notice that it was liable to suit except the states that have found that registration searches like that don't result in jurisdiction have essentially identical statutes so how would a corporation know when it agrees to that which kind of situation they would find themselves your honor is correct that states with similar language have also found the opposite results but there are also many jurisdictions with almost identical language that do hold registering is consent because Marlow Motors knew about this mechanism to jurisdiction and because Pennsylvania fire this Court's case in 1917 that first recognized consent as an Avenue to jurisdiction has never been overruled follow-up go ahead uh can the registration requirement be interpreted instead as providing a practical means of affecting in-state service where the exercise of personal jurisdiction is otherwise constitutionally permitted can you interpret Regis the registration requirement as instead providing a practical way means of affecting in-state service where it's constitutionally permitted that maybe that yeah of course maintaining an agent for service of process in the state does enable plaintiffs to more readily and easily serve those defendant corporations I mean because Marlo Motors isn't everywhere it's but its products are perhaps everywhere and so therefore Marlo Motors could expect perhaps to have be subject to the jurisdiction of the state because of a tortures act that occurs outside the state but injures someone within the state the defective design of a product that then causes an injury within the state but Marlo Motors is nowhere to be found isn't the agency understand to be understood that it just it makes it it makes it easier for those types of claims the long-armed jurisdiction already having been extended to the Constitutional limit yeah you're ought to distinguish the lack of presence of Marla Motors in Colvin again Marla Motors contacts are not at issue in this case the question certified before the court today is whether General jurisdiction is appropriate only in light of Marla Motors registration and it is again because it doesn't matter that Marla Motors has no presence in the state of Colvin the fact that it registered an agent and sure but but sure but how is it no how is it a knowing consent is just the consent to the authorization for service or process it doesn't say and to the jurisdiction of the state like the Pennsylvania statute does it just says an authorization for service they can expect to be sued there for torture sex under the long-arm statute but surely that can't mean that they're consenting to the general jurisdiction of the state does it that's that's a phenomenal leap with regard to to the to the registration isn't it know your honor and because this court has already recognized in Pennsylvania fire and Robert Mitchell furniture that such an affirmative Act of maintaining that agent is a way to consider should it be a knowing affirmative act consent need not be knowing or volume need not be knowing [Music] it may do so involuntarily I don't know how you affect a waiver when you don't know what you're waving how do you do that and because it need not be an affirmative knowledge even if Marla Motors did fully choose to register and and ignore the fact that it could be liable to jurisdiction the court today can still constitutionally hold that it was on sufficient notice from the language of Colvin statutes okay again 3104 while it does not say General personal jurisdiction does include language that it should be construed to the maximum extent possible and states that want to reach its arms out to reach defendants beyond the state borders should still have the option to do so through registration in Robert Mitchell Furniture decided just four years after Pennsylvania fire this Court held that the purpose of such registration statutes is to secure local jurisdiction Marlo Motors being in large International sophisticated company cannot seriously contend that they registered in Colvin maintained an agent for all service of process there and are now surprised that they are being hailed into court but do they have any meaningful choice about whether or not to register if they want to do business at all in your state certainly your honor and it's important to remember that in this record Marlo Motors was found to not have any contacts they registered in Colvin without maintaining a dealership there without having any employees there or any real presence and so the choice of registration should carry more weight than it did for Marlo Motors but isn't the real question wouldn't that if we go with your theory wouldn't that subvert uh the Supreme Court's holding in Daimler no your honored Daimler addressed Daimler the use the word consent is used exactly once and it is to say that the contacts analysis described in Daimler is only necessary where a defendant has not already consented that's why this analysis following Pennsylvania fire and Robert Mitchell Furniture is entirely apart and distinct from Daimler just because Marlo Motors doesn't have a business presence there is irrelevant to this case it submitted itself to Colvin courts by registering to do business and by maintaining an agent permanently there to receive service and process okay and how does that comport with international shoe well an international shoe your honor this Court held that personal jurisdiction must have sufficient notice and could be comport excuse me contacts some contacts right then you're saying there's none here the minimum contacts analysis is different from consent if Marla Motors were to include a forum selection Clause with its consumers choosing a specific forum and waiving jurisdiction rights where it may not be at home it can choose to do so yeah and and I'll give you that that makes some sense to me but but there's got to be a limiting principle to consent and what would the so I have to take it back to this knowing idea the fact that they know that they could be brought into the jurisdiction under a long-armed statute that has a constitutional limitation that says to specific jurisdiction that's not as a general jurisdiction how is the how is the consent some way uh in light of knowing that that the service of process May that they might be called into court in the in the state because they've done a tortious act outside the state that has an effect within the state how does that how does that transmute how does that morph into a general consented General jurisdiction a knowing consent to General jurisdiction it may not have been affirmatively knowing your honor but the language of sections 317 318 and 3104 read together in tandem did put Marla Motors on notice the specific statutory language sure notice that that if they make make a car a bad car in Toledo and it ends up in the in the in the state and causes somebody to injury yes and that they have an agent for service there but not not that a lawsuit involving a contract they had in Argentina with the Argentine government could be litigated in in the United States does it talking about General jurisdiction premising on consent and I get I understand your argument in the context of that consent negates international shoe people can consent to things and my question to you is there has to be a limiting principle to it what is it the limiting principle of consent knowing it does not need to be knowing okay you're saying it's enough to have notice as opposed to no correct yes yes the notice comes first from the explicit plain language of those statutory Provisions as well as the fact that this court and other jurisdictions have found consent from registration to do business where in the statute is there notice that they're subjecting themselves to General jurisdiction jurisdiction your honor but it's not limited to specific jurisdiction either and the final Clause of section 3104 says that the provision is meant to be construed to the maximum extent right so how does that convey notice because Marlo Motors after with Section 318 knowing that its agent may receive all service of process issued out of any Colvin court and the fact that 3104 says that foreign corporations may be reached through those agents to the maximum extent possible was notice the fact that consent from registration has existed for over a century and still been found even after Daimler in district courts in Iowa Nebraska and Pennsylvania finding consent from registration still exists and it certainly exists in Colvin today Mr little suffered catastrophic injuries at the hands of this model heart and he should be able to recover in the state of Colvin thank you okay thank you very much thank you Mr fate very good foreign Mr chief justice and may it please the court I am Clayton Fates and I continue on behalf of the petitioner Omar little and in my time before the court I'll address how and why the fully autonomous model herc is a defectively designed vehicle and that's for two reasons the first is that a jury was already properly instructed on a viable approach to design defect cases and that's the consumer expectations test that traditional approach to products liability is the appropriate test to apply particularly with regard to new products like autonomous vehicles and second because even if the court today chooses to adopt the newer risk utility test the vehicle is still defectively designed now the question certified to the court today is remarkable because it inquires as to whether or not the vehicle is defective by way of being unreasonably dangerous that's a factual question which this court doesn't normally consider but the facts of this case are important the court today should bear in mind that the fully autonomous model herc was functioning as it was designed to do when it needlessly swerved into a cavernous sinkhole that was clearly marked by a brightly lit LED sign and traffic cones warning of the danger well when you say needlessly is wasn't the car wasn't the car in fact designed to prevent going into the wall which was to its left and to avoid the obstruction which is mechanism saw in front of it and the cones which it saw to and as opposed to the smaller much smaller cones to the right so when you say needlessly I'm a little confused where that comes from well your honor in the uh record at page six the jury found that Omar little credibly testified that he would have made a safer Choice than the model hurt made either to drive through the mattress to break since there were no vehicles behind him or to tune into the empty left lane uh uh uh next to him the fact here is the vehicle did not see the sinkhole when it made the decision to Swerve to the right it was unaware of the danger that would have been obvious to a human driver and that is one of the reasons that this design is defective is it proper for this court to take into account the number of lives that this new technology would save notwithstanding what happened to your client yes your honor there's no question that autonomous vehicles show great promise and if that's true then shouldn't we be applying the risk utility test rather than the uh consumer oriented test know your honor and that's for two reasons the first is that the consumer expectations test is manageable for juries it asks a single discrete question it asks whether a product is unreasonably dangerous because it's more dangerous than reasonable consumers but in in judging a run-of-the-mill car the standard of ordinary consumers expectation you could figure that out but could you figure out ordinary expectations with respect to a self-driving car your honor that's one of the reasons the consumer expectations actually should be applied in this case it's true that self-driving cars haven't been around as long consumers haven't had as much time to get used to them the risks that they pose the opportunities that they present for this reason it's important that the core today ask what consumers actually expect about these vehicles so that when Marlo Motors sells a product to a person like Omar little he's not serving as a guinea pig for this large corporation to test out how safe their product actually is the bottom line here is that Omar little owned this car for just a matter of months he drove only a few thousand miles in the model herc before it caused an accident are you saying that in order to sell this car the company has to guarantee that there will never be an accident of course not your honor so where do we draw the line because no vehicle is Crash proof the vehicle doesn't have to be perfect but according to the record there was an upgrade to the sensors and the decision-making software that Marlow Motors could have integrated into the design of this vehicle and they chose not to they knew it could be safer than it was and they released it anyway yeah but that I mean that's a sliding slippery slope because if you spend unlimited amount of money anything could be a little bit better but no one will buy it if you spend a little bit amount of money and that's why it seems like the risk utility test is the right one because who would who would know what would a reasonable consumer expect with respect to whether or not to drive into a mattress or swerve to the rat left because this particular person did it is that is that what a reasonable consumer would have done or expected no your honor and we're not asking today that the court hold Marlo Motors up to a standard of perfection we're only holding them up to the standard of what a reasonable consumer would expect the vehicle to do now here because this is a new type of product reasonable consumers would expect the vehicle to perform as Marlo Motors claimed that it would they told Mr little that this car would carry him safely without intervention from him as the driver from point A to point B no but again again what you're saying is they guaranteed he would not have an accident that's what that sounds like but that's not what they told him right well your honor they claimed that this would have been a a fully autonomous vehicle that could transport him without human interaction and is that true was that if they it could do that right it could on some occasions but not on this one Omar little did not safely reach his destination and if a human had been alert and behind the wheel it's possible that this accident never would have occurred there's another important point you know your honor nods to the risk utility test but risk utility asks a plaintiff to establish that a reasonable alternative design exists well but that would simply require expert testing ammonium we use expert testimony all the time and juries evaluate that all the time why wouldn't that be appropriate for jury to have to evaluate that in something like this that's new and complex well what's critical here is that the autonomous model heart is the first of its kind and what that means is that it's extraordinarily difficult for Mr little to establish that another alternative exists If This Were a common product even a sophisticated product like a computer or a cell phone there are multiple models of cell phone and computer in the marketplace that Mr little could compare one product to another and evaluate whether they were a reasonably safer in this case this is the only vehicle of its kind there is no alternative what that means is that if we imagine a version of the model herc that is 100 guaranteed to cause its driver a catastrophic accident within six months no plaintiff would be able to recover simply because they can't establish an alternative to its design exists that's unreasonable but you just said that the it was possible that the accident wouldn't have occurred well isn't anything possible aren't we dealing with what's reasonable under these circumstances and wasn't the choice that the vehicle made a reasonable Choice given what was happening know your honor and that's because the circumstances that surrounded this accident arise all the time there are obstacles mattresses flying on the highway a mattress specifically your honor but deer will run out into the middle of the road that'll be read by the autonomous model herc sensors is an obstacle in front Okay if that deer runs out into the street on a Mountain Road with a sheer drop off to one side according to the facts in this case the vehicle is going to Swerve off that Cliff well most times when deer run out in the road the car hits the deer in driver's ed student drivers are told to drive through the deer rather than swerve to the side because that's a safer option and the model herc didn't know as much as a 16 year old in a driver's ed class it chose to Swerve into a dangerous situation and plummet into a sinkhole but isn't the question really whether the risks inherent were how you balance the risks inherent in the design against the benefits and we can't really determine that by talking about a random deer or a mattress on the highway that's the stuff of experts which would be invoked by using by instructions involving risk utility and out the the risk utility test so I'm I'm still troubled by why the the consumer preference test the consumer expectation test makes more sense than a test that would involve expert testimony and reasoned weighing of benefits and costs well again your honor that's partly because of the difficulty the extraordinarily High bar of proving an alternative design exists here that would bar plaintiffs from recovering in any such case but it's crucial to understand that the consumer expectations test and the risk utility test aren't really that distinct even in jurisdictions that still nominally maintain the consumer expectations test or jurisdictions that have adopted risk utility in effect they're both factors based fact-intensive tests and they share many of the same factors and consumer expectations jurisdictions evidence of an alternative design is still powerful under risk utility consumer expectations is an important factor that juries will consider and be instructed on here a jury's already heard the factors uh the facts of this case they heard testimony from every witness that Marlo Motors chose to put on they heard Mr little side of the story and they found in his favor and for that reason we should respect that jury's verdict because the two tests aren't so distinct they both get at the same question it's whether or not a product is unreasonably dangerous and again critically Mr little did not own this vehicle for very long this is a limited early release of the model herc should we decide whether a vehicle is unreasonably dangerous based on one accident know your honor but we can look at the many ways in which this car failed and determined that its design is defective as it drove down the highway it failed to recognize a brightly lit LED sign warning of danger down the road a car horn sounded in front of it it didn't know what that sound meant it didn't know that orange traffic owns typically DeMark danger it looked at those and saw an object that would be safe to drive over it failed in a number of ways that a reasonably designed autonomous vehicle or certainly a human driver would have succeeded in ensuring that this driver Omar little remains safe but wasn't Mr little a very sophisticated consumer of this type of vehicle didn't he I mean wasn't this his dream car that he was waiting for that's correct your honor in our opinion that makes it all the more tragic that it had the result that it did however under either tests when we look at consumer expectations it's not about Omar Little's subjective expectations even if he had the highest of hopes for this new technology that's not the inquiry it's an objective question about what ordinary consumers reasonably expect of the product and they expect this vehicle not to crash in the way that it did now this is just one incident and it's also critical that finding this design defective only holds Marlo Motors accountable for the damages that the defects in this design actually cause if this is truly a fluke if this is really such an unusual circumstance that this vehicle is going to be safe a statistical likelihood of the time they're off the hook they won't have to pay damages to very many plaintiffs like Mr little on the other hand if the court finds in Marlo Motors favor today that the vehicle is not defectively designed anyone else similarly harmed when the autonomous driving system causes an accident that it simply didn't have to a needless accident those plaintiffs are going to be barred from recovery and that's one of the reasons it's important that the court find this vehicle is defectively designed under either test well I mean that's for a jury to find correct and if you get the wrong jury instruction then it has to go back doesn't it we would be happy with that results your honor but again it's important to know unusual though it is a factual question has been certified to the court today and so it's a question that the court can choose to answer but as a matter of fact under either tests with the facts presented before it this vehicle was defectively designed so if we and if we found that the utility of uh adding in the sensors that would make the car prohibitively expensive and essentially Doom it from being purchased doesn't didn't outweigh the risk then the we would affirm the 14th circuit correct yes I believe so all right and and your but your position is that it didn't under the risk utility test that it should the the company should have spent that money even if it would have made the car essentially unviable well your honor again under either test there's an interaction between a sophisticated company who is effectively the least cost avoider for this kind of tortious harm who knows a lot about how their product functions and a consumer who is trying to make an informed choice about the risks he assumes when he gets behind the wheel of a car the fact that they made exorbitant claims about the safety of this vehicle is simply an abuse of the power that Marlo Motors has Omar little made an informed choice to buy a vehicle that he believed would carry him safely from A to B and it failed to live up to that expectation based on the claims that Marlo Motors has made not only in advertising with puffery and everything that goes along with that but also in interviews where they're presenting cold facts about the technology they've implemented in this vehicle they've claimed that this car is going to be safe safer than a human driven car when I listen to what you're saying it seems a lot like we was asked before that you're saying they guaranteed this car would never have an accident no your honor we can imagine a circumstance in which an accident wouldn't be avoidable even for a sophisticated self-driving car we would imagine an accident where another driver's negligence caused this vehicle to have a collision there's a number of circumstances in which we wouldn't find this car to be defectively designed but here again because of the many ways in which this car failed to recognize the danger presented by the sinkhole and made an affirmative choice to Swerve to the right and drive where the road effectively ended and plummet the car into this sinkhole that's a design defect I want to ask you about remedy again here what you what you want from us um the fourth circuits remanded for a jury trial for the jury to reconsider an appropriate instruction right Iran the record actually is conflicted on this point in the opinion the court reverses the jury's decision but procedurally we believe well vacation decision of course it does because it remains for a new trial it because of the improper instruction correct again your honor the opinion actually says reverses and that's well of course it has to reverse very good I mean otherwise you don't affirm that you're his verdict and then say the instruction was improper I mean the remedy is reversal but it's it's in essence a vacature the jury verdict and then and then a new trial it ordered a new trial on the appropriate instruction with the appropriate instruction right yes you're wrong and and and so what do you want us to do today tell me what you want not not what other other options are but tell me what you want us to do and why your honor my time is expired I'll let you answer the question that's why I'm in the center [Laughter] go ahead it's been like the court today to reinstate the jury's verdict and find Marlo Motors accountable for the damage their defective vehicle caused and lastly the reason is the reason is that is that jury was properly instructed under the consumer expectations test and therefore its verdict should be respected very good thank you very much thank you all right we'll hear from the respondents there you go Miss Colson thank you chief justice and may please the court request that this court reduced personal jurisdiction and design defect to a one-size-fits-all test Ms Colson I beg your Indulgence I'm a little hard of hearing that's what happens when you become a federal judge so indulge me and yell at me please absolutely your honor I apologize I know well because you won so many times you had to do these many arguments go ahead go ahead but to do so to reduce these questions to a one-size-fits-all test would be to ignore the sophistication of both issues and the facts of this case my name is Ann miles Golson and I along with my co-counsel Corey Church represent Marlo Motors the respondent in this case due process is the Cornerstone of any personal jurisdiction analysis the question in this case is whether this court should abandon due process based solely on a grasping interpretation of vague registration statutes the 14th circuit erroneously found that the district court had personal jurisdiction over Marlow Motors based solely on these vague statutes what if State what if there were State Court law State Court decisions that had interpreted the statute to that uh for example like New York has done interpreted a general statute of registration that it was a consent to General jurisdiction what would your answer be then your honor while that state supreme court interpretation would under the Pennsylvania fire line of cases confer General personal jurisdiction it would not be in line with the reasoning of this court an international shoe and its progeny and most recently in Daimler agv Bauman our corporations capable of willful acts absolutely your honor corporations can consent to things they sign contracts all the time don't they absolutely your honor then why can't a corporation agree to do business when it does business in a particular state to subject itself to the general jurisdiction of that state what's what's wrong or immoral or unconstitutional about that your honor while there's nothing immoral with that it is against this Court's due process jurisprudence which is clearly limited the exercise of General personal jurisdiction well now when I buy it when I buy uh I buy a product sometimes I consent to the jurisdiction of Delaware or I consent to the Jews you know that little thing that comes up on my iPad and says agree yes you know I also agree to arbitrate it now I find out and I have views of that too but in any event I agree to the jurisdiction something that's okay isn't it absolutely you're right I live in Livonia New York I'm I'm a million miles away from Delaware I've never been to Delaware I have no I have no desire to be in Delaware then why how can I consent to it but but General Motors can't your honor because that exercise is consent to specific personal jurisdiction by checking that box you're consenting to personal jurisdiction that arises under that General Motors is organized in Delaware are they not personally present in Delaware your honor absolutely okay then then General Motors is a person correct yes your honor according to this Court's Jurisdiction so then General Motors can agree to personally be present somewhere by consenting to it can't they absolutely your honor honor registration statutes do exactly that going back to this Court's decision and Morris and Company these Scandinavia Insurance Company this court discussed the history of these corporate registration statutes and they were enacted to provide that exact presence because of these pinoya era fictions that a corporation must be physically present in a state for that state to hail that Corporation into court for any transaction arising within the state however those fictions no longer exist and this Court's Landmark case of international shoe this court replaced those era fictions but that that creates a curious anomaly corporations have better protections under the due process clause than I do not I can consent to jurisdiction in Alaska yes but apparently General Motors can't General Motors absolutely can for specific personal jurisdiction your honor but I can consent to General jurisdiction why can't General Motors do the same thing why is General Motors so much more special than me your honor respectfully this court has never addressed consent by a person or by a corporation to General personal jurisdiction in its modern due processors what about uh Pennsylvania fire Pennsylvania fire was a panoa era case in that case this court did we haven't reversed it have we not explicit Justice Holmes wrote that yes next to God yes Ron I would agree however Pennsylvania fire did limit and if this court were determined that Pennsylvania fire was not implicitly overturned by Schaefer V heitner or by the international shoe and its progeny this court would be bound to what Pennsylvania fire stated which is that these statutes must either explicitly state that the corporation is consenting to personal jurisdiction where a state supreme court must have interpreted the statute as stating as much okay and and all right so so your limiting principle is knowing absolutely your honor okay and however Marlo Motors would contend that this court has overturned that line of cases in international shoe V Washington and its progeny and in Schaefer V heitner however if this court were to determine that those panoya era cases still should be relied upon for consent by registration they must be limited to the facts of those cases and the holding of those cases Marlo Motors consented to register an agent for service of process in accordance with Colvin law these statutes present in the record at Roman at five and six merely required that corporations register an agent for service of process in the sedate to do business in that state they do not speak to either personal jurisdiction or to consent well except that given the state of the law prior to Daimler or some would say Daimler um How could a corporation not have noticed that once it's once it decides I'm going to register because I want money from that state I want to sell my product in that state how could it not be on notice isn't it on notice that it may it is consenting to General jurisdiction particularly given the state of the law respectfully your honor no these corporations are on notice that they may be held into court for specific personal jurisdiction but not for General personal jurisdiction this court very explicitly stated in Daimler that the exercise of General personal jurisdiction is limited to those exceptional forums where a corporation is at home or essentially at home but you'll agree that Daimler um if nothing else it it confirms that a consent is a basis for jurisdiction you'll agree to that absolutely okay so and one of the the idea behind the at least the policy that it seemed that Justice Ginsburg spoke about uh suggested that a corporation would not be able to predict where it could be sued by registering that gives you a good heads up that there was a positive especially if you you also determining who your agent is going to be for service of process that in and of itself suggests that you could be sued your honor it does suggest that Marley Motors could be sued for transactions occurring within the state and in fact the text of the long-arm statute section 3104 located in the record at Roman at six specifically puts Marlo Motors on notice that it will be subject to liability for cases arising out of transactions within the state because it is not at home within the state in many respects that long arm statute reflects this Court's modern due process jurisprudence by subjecting at-home Corporation corporations to General personal jurisdiction and at foreign corporations to specific personal jurisdiction but isn't it true that Daimler does not provide that in order to have consent there must be minimal contacts with the state Daimler does not requirements for K it does mention Ed Perkins was the textbook case of personal jurisdiction where a company had not consented to that jurisdiction however this court has made very clear in its reasoning beginning an international shoe and culminating in Daimler that while specific personal jurisdiction is where most cases will be litigated that General personal jurisdiction must be limited according to this cape this Court's wording in Goodyear Dunlop tires operations V Brown because of its sprawling nature to these specific forums where a corporation is at home or essentially at home in Goodyear this court explained that a corporation must be able to determine its primary conduct according to where it will be subject to such a wide sweeping exercise of personal jurisdiction and this reasoning is why in Daimler this court reaffirmed that only where a corporation is at home or essentially at home it's where it should be subject to that General personal jurisdiction but given the decisions in the third circuit in the eighth circuit certainly Marlo motors which is a sophisticated Corporation would have been unnoticed that by registering in the state that it was subject to the possibility that it was agreeing to General jurisdiction so why shouldn't it be held to have done whatever its research was and to decide what the risks were and be subject to that the honor I'd like to address those two cases you referenced in the third circuit in Bain V net link that case Inc included a corporation that had registered under a 1984 statute that did explicitly state that it required consent to personal General personal jurisdiction in the eighth circuit case a previous state supreme court had interpreted the statute as conferring consent to General personal jurisdiction neither of those situations are present in this case there was no state supreme court case that interpreted these statutes as conferring consent to General personal jurisdiction and there is no language in this statute or in any previous statute that confers such consent to General personal jurisdiction rather Marlo Motors was put on notice by the long-arm statute that it may be subject to specific personal jurisdiction and by this Court's jurisprudence that it would not be subject to General personal jurisdiction in Colvin but only where it is at home in the state where it's Incorporated Delaware where it has its principal place of business its headquarters is in California and Marla Motors has never ceased conducting business in California unlike the only case where this court has found a principal place of business where a company was not headquartered which was Perkins in that case this court determined that General personal jurisdiction was appropriate in Ohio merely because that Corporation had to cease conducting all corporate activity in the Philippines during World War II because of that and because the president had moved to Ohio and conducted all activities there during the war this court determined it was fair crickets is kind of an oddball case absolutely they were literally evicted from their home pace and so they had to be some place absolutely your honor and none of those situations have occurred here Marlo Motors has never ceased conducting business in California and as indicated by the district court and on page two of the record Marlo Motors conducts no corporate activities in the state of Colvin this court has consistently held that service of process and personal jurisdiction are two distinct Concepts therefore a statute requiring that a corporation register an agent for service of process does not put that corporation on notice that it will be subject to General personal jurisdiction in worldwide Volkswagen the Woodson this Court held that service of process is not sufficient to obtain personal jurisdiction these are two distinct Concepts therefore Marlo Motors was absolutely on notice that it would must register an agent for service of process to do business in this state so let me just ask you if you're saying if the state legislature amended the statute to say and by registering you consent to General jurisdiction that that would comport with Daimler no your honor that would not comport with Daimler so it doesn't really matter in your view your honor no while consent by registration does not survive this Court's modern due process jurisprudence if this court were determined that it does which it's entirely within this Court's purview to make that decision in this case there still is not personal jurisdiction in this case because there's no explicit language and there's no state supreme court interpretation while Marlo Motors did conform with colvin's law by registering an agent for service of process it did no other business in the state of well is that is that entirely accurate your your client solicited funds from the petitioner cult in Colvin isn't that correct the honor the record does indicate that Marla Motors solicited funds generally but does not speak to whether it was a targeted solicitation the petitioner accepted your client's offer in uh Colvin um your honor again it doesn't speak to where that was accepted but it does speak to Marlo Motors accepting those funds so why aren't those facts sufficient to confer specific jurisdiction to the eastern district of Colvin within the meeting of international shoes your honor because that personal jurisdiction analysis is centered around the Nexus between the contacts and the Forum and here the related contacts the model herc was that issue in the state of icaro where the accident occurred there is specific personal jurisdiction in the state of icaro there is no specific personal jurisdiction in the state of Colvin this court should reverse the 14th circuit's mistaken finding of personal jurisdiction and continue its reasoning that it has made very clear in Daimler that General personal jurisdiction is limited to those exceptional forums where a corporation is at home or essentially at home thank you the long arm statue of Colvin doesn't do any good no your honor very good thank you thank you thank you thank you Mr chief justice and may it please the court my name is Corey Church this case demonstrates the need for uniform comprehensive standards for determining design defects in autonomous vehicles these standards must both protect consumers and encourage manufacturers to create Innovative life-saving technology this court should affirm the 14 circuits application of the risk utility test because the risk utility test appropriately accommodates the complexity and Novelty of autonomous technology but shouldn't jurors have to use a test that corresponds to Consumers reasonable expectations Mr little was given a very explicit um set of Expectations by the salesperson of your client and why shouldn't that be the standard by which this car is judged well your honor it is true that consumer expectations are absolutely valuable but consumer expectations are inappropriate as the exclusive barometer for determining design defects here consumer expectations can be accommodated as one factor within a more comprehensive risk utility framework and certainly the representations of a manufacturer like Marlo Motors here would be relevant in determining those consumer expectations but again within a more Fuller and a more comprehensive picture ultimately the consumer expectations test is not appropriate with products which are highly technical or complex the Tennessee Supreme Court recognized this in ravey bit Corporation when it reasoned that ordinary consumers would have a basis for expectations about coffee pots or can openers but not about fuel injection engines well what about when the company gives you the expectation didn't isn't that what the company did they said here's what you can expect so why why isn't that the expectation what your honor it is true that in their executive interviews and in Miss Kima Greg's representations to Mr little Marlo Motors did make certain affirmative representations about the model herc represented that the vehicle was safer than non-autonomous vehicles and even than fully autonomous vehicles with a human operator but again as you're an honors noted before nowhere did the company represent the vehicle as entirely accident-proof or perfect and thus while those representations are valuable and should be considered in light of Mr little situation they should be considered again only as balanced against a variety of other people but I told Mr little it would do the driving it didn't tell him to to be careful because it could recognize certain arrests did it I'm sorry your honor to continue just a little that it wouldn't recognize certain types of risks did it your honor that the company made no representations about the type of risk that the car would recognize however it is important to note here that the accident and issue occurred at night in inclement weather with a variety of obstacles on the roadway and a lot of people are on the road at night I mean and is that such an unusual occurrence that's where I live excuse me your honor absolutely not however there's no indication that a reasonable human driver faced with the same set of scenarios or situations rather that the model herc was faced with would not have been that Split Second decision also have chosen to Veer to the right instead of driving directly into the object in front of it or swerving to the left at risk of but isn't that a call for the jury and the jury made that determination well your honor it is true that at the trial level the jury did return a verdict that the car or the vehicle excuse me was defectively designed but that jury was perhaps ill-informed or unreasonable because they received inappropriate jury instructions and thus had the jury received a more comprehensive picture and received testimony on the variety of factors that a risk utility analysis necessitates the jury would have returned a different verdict and that verdict that indeed the model hurts so it was not to follow up on the what the chief judge asked you if the vehicle cannot meet ordinary uh consumer expectations should there then be a duty to warn about foreseeable or unavoidable risk well your honor I'll answer your questions in two parts if I may respectfully this is a design defect case and not a failure to warn case those are two distinct causes of action within the realm of products liability law however second it's the all too unfortunate price of admission that would an ordinary consumer enters an automobile autonomous or not that they accept and may even expect that they may be engaged in a collision nowhere do manufacturers to my knowledge represent that regular automobiles are perfect and Marlo Motors certainly did not do that here ultimately the consumer expectations test should be reserved for products like coffee pots with which ordinary consumers are generally familiar on an everyday basis consumers are generally familiar with cars it is true seems to me that the given the design expectations that the Mr little had every right to assume that he could drive the car that he could be driven in the car safely at night and that the design was appropriate for driving at night even in situations where there are LED warnings how why isn't that an appropriate jury instruction given these circumstances why isn't it more like a coffee pot well your honor respectfully because the majority of jurisdictions refuse to apply the consumer expectations test the cases involving regular non-autonomous automobiles in fact the United States district court for the District of Puerto Rico found in Fremont V Ford Motor Company that ordinary consumers were illiquipped to decide what minimum safety to expect from seat belts in car accidents similarly the California court of appeals has refused to apply the consumer expectations test cases involving the deployment of an airbag autonomous vehicles are undeniably more sophisticated than their non-autonomous counterparts development of the model hurt for example involved the integration of advanced cameras specialized sensors and Cutting Edge software and thus as courts have found that ordinary consumers lack consistent experience or a basis to form expectations about regular automobiles it should be even more obvious that this court should refuse to apply the consumer expectations like it I don't know if you're familiar with a case called coddling versus Paglia written by judge Jones Hugh Jones back in 1974 but Pat that's when New York entered the the field of strict products liability and it's it is a consumer expectation test and the premise was is that people don't understand how sophisticated devices work and so we should expect that they should work the way we expect them to work or that we've been told how they're going to work Mr Mr little was told his car would drive itself apparently it didn't I mean I don't know you know it the problem is is that courts have had difficulty with regard to the use of that consumer expectation and and we slip over into design defect all the time because we looking for a reason why of course your honor and I why isn't it when you've got I would think it's just the opposite of what you're arguing is that when you've got a product that's so new and it's put out there and people said look at this this widget is fabulous this widget will do this it'll do that you asked you take the widget and use it that's exactly what Mr little did to his dismay I mean he has given the expectation this car will drive itself the very first time I ever drove my Volvo station wagon with its uh with its cruise control that keeps me three car lengths behind one in front it drove me crazy is I didn't trust it but I learned to trust it okay and that's just what happened to Mr little uh I had an expectation the Carl say three car links back Mr little had the same expectation why isn't why isn't it the more sophisticated devices that the consumer expectation test is more likely or a better use a better a better way to measure liability well your honor I'll answer your question in two parts if I may sure first by honing in on the the word strict liability that you mentioned before and as petitioner may have suggested when he referenced training well that's that that shows you when I got my law school degree okay that because but that's the way it was couched at that time yes if the product doesn't do what it's supposed to be you're liable you don't have to prove negligence that is consumer expectation you're absolutely right your honor that manufacturers are held strictly liable replacing effectively designed products on the market but what petitioner perhaps fails to recognize is a long-standing reality of products liability law that within the realm of products law design defect claims as opposed to manufacturing defects have always occupied a better of a murkier territory Towing that line between pure strict liability and negligence principles a second your honor to your question about why the consumer expectations test would not be appropriate here given a sophisticated product from a policy standpoint the risk utility test and not the consumer expectations test will actually better encourage manufacturers like Marlo Motors to innovate and improve their vehicles with high safety standards actually I was thinking the exact opposite that it would allow a manufacturer to say too expensive to put in something that would the sensors that would have prevented this accident therefore I have no obligation to do it and wouldn't most corporations be looking to do less rather than more and doesn't the risk utility test encourage that rather than discards that well respectfully your honor no it does not it does necessitate on the part of the manufacturer a preemptive cost benefit analysis but that cost benefit analysis does not result in a zero-sum game in which plaintiffs are unilaterally harmed at the expense of a manufacturer's bottom line under the risk utility test plaintiffs have the opportunity to present a prima facie case of defective design if plaintiffs make that showing the burden then shifts to the manufacturer to have to disprove that design and thus under the risk utility test manufacturers aware of the potential for costly designed defect verdicts and equally aware that they may shoulder that heavy burden of disproving defective design claims will engage in this cost-benefit analysis and it ensures that in the aggregate safer products end up on the market but as fairness I'm sorry I don't follow why that would make safer products end up on the market it seems to me that it would mean that products would end up on the market where the balance of safety against cost was what the corporation considered reasonable why does that result in safer products well your honor perhaps one of the beauties of the risk utility test is that it enables fact finders such as this court in the unique role that it is sitting to look beyond the accident and issue and look to the global benefit of this technology manufacturers under the risk utility test aware of the potential for these costly designed defect verdicts if they're unable to disprove defective design claims and perhaps they will be unable to disprove those defective design claims if the plaintiff shows among a variety of other options that an alternative design exists ultimately the risk utility test is actually the more fair test to Consumers and at least two respects it ensures again in the aggregate that safer products end up on the market but petitioner would have the court believe that the risk utility test places a higher burden on the plaintiff and that's simply not true the risk utility test actually addresses one of the key deficiencies of the consumer expectations test that deficiency is that consumers often struggle to prove objective expectations now the risk you utility tests through its instruction especially if a corporation tells them that the product is safe well your honor yes obviously manufacturers representation and they don't realize that cost is a factor in in making the determination that uh whether or not they're going to incorporate some kind of safety device well your honor I'll speak to your question in two parts if I may again through its instruction that juries consider a variety of factors coupled with expert testimony on both sides of the V the risk utility test actually affords plaintiffs more tools and more opportunities to prove their defective design claim now turning to the issue that you raise perhaps of an alternative design and turning specifically to this case this court should find that the model hurt is not defectively designed under the risk utility test and that risk utility test would consider a variety of factors one of those factors would be the presence if any of an alternative design let me go back to the question that chief judge raised with your with your adversary what is the remedy you're asking us for are you asking us to find to are you asking us to make a finding or to remand well your honor is the certified question is presented to the court we would ask this court to find that the model hurt is not defectively designed should this court within its purview decide that that is as it traditionally is an issue for a fact finder it should remain the court to the district Level under the appropriate jury instructions which would be the risk utility test well let me just ask you this in in balancing couldn't one prove uh consumer expectations without expert testimony and doesn't one absolutely have to have expert testimony in the risk utility version of uh design defect well your honor it is true that in the majority of jurisdictions that employ a consumer expectations test not as petitioner would have you believe but expert testimony is is generally precluded entirely as you note from that analysis so how is it less expensive to a plaintiff to have to do to to um or or more or I should say beneficial to the plaintiff to have to hire an expert with the risk utility analysis as opposed to a consumer expectation analysis well your honor perhaps not less expensive but at least more much more expensive in that it would provide that plaintiff with more tools and more opportunities to prove their defective design claim now there would be some circumstances under a risk utility test in which consumer expectations could weigh very heavily in favor of the plaintiff the California Supreme Court recognized this in its sold the General Motors decision when it referenced the fact that ordinary tumors can have expectations about certain aspects of automobiles ordinary consumers expect that automobiles won't roll over and catch on fire in two mile per hour collisions ordinary consumers expect that automobiles won't explode while leaving the dealership and thus if an erroneous or rather if such an extraordinary circumstance like that were to arise a risk utility test would still provide plaintiffs with minimal burden to prove that defective design claim But ultimately the risk utility test again allows this court to look Beyond this one instance and allows it to look at the utility of the product to society more generally as Marlo Motors extensive testing indicates the vehicle is indeed safer I see that my time has expired may I briefly conclude very briefly and not only is the car safer than all other vehicles on the market but it would bring with it a host of other benefits including environmental benefits and the ability to afford elderly or physically disabled individuals a greater degree of self-sufficiency ultimately then this court should find under the risk utility test the model hurt is not defect design thank you thank you very much rebuttal Mr Fates may please the court I have two brief points on rebuttal regarding the jurisdiction issue this court does not overturn precedent by implication or innuendo Pennsylvania fire is still good law which means that consent to jurisdiction by registering to do business in a state is still constitutional it's true that Colvin statute is not as explicit as that of Pennsylvania which specifically identifies General jurisdiction but Iowa Nebraska and Delaware have all interpreted similarly worded statutes to convey consent to General jurisdiction Daimler stated specifically mentioning consent only once that the contacts analysis is only necessary where a defendant has not already consented the fact is that Marla Motors here was on notice regarding the design defect claim the respondents claim that the risk utility test favors plaintiffs or is fairer to plaintiffs Simply isn't true in this case I'm sorry how was it on notice you said it what again you're on a three states with similarly worded statutes have interpreted their own statutes to confer General jurisdiction and so there's certainly the possibility that this language is clear enough and so Marlo motor should have known that it could have thank you the burden of establishing a reasonable alternative design to a cutting-edge product like the model herc is so high that it's an absolute bar to plaintiff's bringing design defect suits for products like this the respondent correctly said that consumers reasonably expect a vehicle not to roll and Catch Fire they reasonably expect a car not to explode as it leaves the dealership similarly consumers reasonably expect a self-driving car not to Swerve into a sinkhole thank you very good um I need some direction are we we're going to go back down and we'll do our scoring and then we'll be back up and announce the results and as I understand it do a little chat with the contestants that's right we stand to recess please be seated everybody yeah good idea well the task Falls to me to deliver a few words um I do the Short Straw um for the members of the panel um uh I'd like the contestants to know that today uh I sat down in Foley square and heard arguments ranging from a major cigarette case to the sensing of two fellows who were charged with selling of a computer software to Russian military agencies and so uh one would expect when you're at Foley square that you would hear uh advocacy at its highest I have to say that the four of you today were the equals if not superior to the arguments that I heard this morning and I made that sincerely the thing that always strikes me when I do these moot Court competitions is how terrific you are um and I teach a class at Cornell Law School on federal appellate practice and the students argue off of the Supreme Court calendar and it always really excites me to see young law students get up and and really display an Acuity to their to the craft of the profession to which they Aspire and your performance here today the four of you argues well that your careers will be successful unfortunately in these matters uh uh we draw distinctions and we'll draw that distinction in a few minutes but let me uh just make a few General comments overall um the the command that you displayed and uh with regard to the law and I think that you're you know I was you could tell I was a little bit more interested in the jurisdictional side you know the feds now you know we're thinking uh jurisdiction all the time and the two of you that had the jurisdictional argument and I think the petitioners have the really harder side of this argument in some ways um and so you know that's the problem with with moot Court the you know there's a there's a hard side and there's an easy side they're all that's the way it always works out by the way that's the way it is in life I had a law professor gray Thorne who once said if you don't have the law on the side and you don't have the facts on your side you're left with trickery and deceit um and that's not always the craft of a good lawyer but occasionally it might be but I do think that the the difficult side uh for the argument to be made and and uh who knows where this consent jurisdiction issue will go into the future and Daimler presents some challenges but I do think that these a bit of at least the easier side at least from the way things are going right now I tend to agree with the way um uh judge Kearney wrote Brown versus the decision in the fourth in the second circuit this past September on the Merit side are on the substantive side you guys really had at it and you know um and I and stunningly so too I think um and but it's it's kind of this nebulous area of products liability you know that's the thing that you beguile me when I was on the New York Court of Appeals um and we had a number of products cases and and we had one called Black and Decker with regard to modifications and and and then another called lyriano which was a duty to Warren case you know we find those to be you know uh they're squishy and and they're hard to fit and I and I but I thought but I thought both of you it was interesting to me that both of you kind of said well you know you've got to argue you've got argue it doesn't really matter we went under both you know that's where you got to go with it because you might you might be headed back anyhow as long as you survive the jurisdictional problem you might be back with both on your side um you caught a lot of flack on your risk utility thing but you had some good arguments about why it's not such a tough burden stylistically I have absolutely nothing to say to you um there I I if I were gonna guess you folks are from the south and now I'm going to tell you why um and and this is this is a Northeastern prejudice and so take it this is not this is not a criticism but I want you to hear it so that you'll know if you ever arguing in New York be careful Southerners say respectfully and mean it northeasterners say respectfully and mean disrespectfully and so you've got three New York judges here and there are four New York judges here and we all heard nah forget it I judge your phone and when we here with all due respect we really hear you're really full of crap judge uh and so so I think it works very very well uh south of the Mason-Dixon line and I think it's entirely appropriate but if you ever come up here be careful you know and that again that's not a criticism I know I I it was funny I thought to myself they got to be from the south you know they got to be for the South so uh because uh folks from from uh from New York would immediately think that and employ it regularly um one final thing before we announce the all the awards um one of the reasons why I like to do this is it renews my faith in the rule of law it renews my faith in the dedication that young people bring to a profession which has been extraordinarily kind to me and to the people on this dice and has been exceptionally rewarding the law will give you the opportunity to stand up in court and to take on someone else's burden to represent their interests whether they be a multinational corporation or homeless individual the law gives you the power to bring the law to bear on the rule of law to bear on the Troubles of those that seek your guidance and your counsel it is an awesome responsibility but it will reward you mightily you will feel the the joy and the comfort of the thanks of your clients for the work that you do for them long into the future and it may lead you to a Time on the bench it may lead you into bar activities and other matters but it will reward you greatly if you put the time and the effort into it and I wish all four of you nothing but the very very best congratulations to all four of them [Applause] okay Daniel go ahead Kevin all right well we'll continue ceremony can everyone hear me very good uh let's just have a quick Round of Applause for our contestants one more time so our appreciation for our judges thank you so much for your we asked the president of the American college to come down to help us present some of the awards thanks finally I noticed I could have lowered this okay we're going to start with the best the brief Awards um Edwin l weisel Jr award for runner-up best brief award goes to the University of Iowa [Applause] the Harrison tweet award for the best brief goes to the University of Montana [Applause] and now for the individual Awards these are awards given to oralis in this debate the first award is presented to the runner-up individual speaker this prize goes to Clayton fates of Northwestern University [Applause] the award for best individual speaker goes to Ann miles Golson of the University of Alabama [Applause] so the bench would like to know the University of where Alabama [Music] Roll Tide oh my God and go cats Ronnie finds out about that she's a graduate of the University of Alabama okay Mr chief judge would you announce the verdict of the Court yes I have in this envelope kept on Funk and Wagner's porch uh here we go and the winner of the round is the respondent we'd like to present the awards we're going to start with the runner-up the best team runner-up best team overall team is Northwestern University [Applause] thank you pretty happy good for her and as we know the Davis award this year goes to the University of Alabama [Applause] or do they get individual items I don't know do they buy these new trophies every year or an award or does it just does it just like your name gets on it and then you put it back in the trophy do you get to take we're wondering whether you take that home or does that inscribe to you okay