Human Freedom & the Self: Roderick Chisholm's Philosophy

Added:

Compatibilism and the Critique of Agent Causation

Roderick Chisholm's libertarian theory of free will relies heavily on 'agent causation' (immanent causation), asserting that human agents can initiate new causal chains completely independent of prior physical events. A major counterpoint to this is Compatibilism, championed by philosophers like David Hume and Harry Frankfurt, alongside physicalist critiques of agent causation. Compatibilists argue that free will and determinism are not mutually exclusive; an action is free as long as it aligns with the agent's internal desires and motivations, even if those desires are ultimately determined by prior causes. Furthermore, critics argue that Chisholm’s concept of agent causation is metaphysically mysterious and scientifically implausible, as it effectively requires human beings to possess a god-like power to intervene in the physical laws of nature. From this alternative perspective, Chisholm's theory fails to explain how an uncaused agent-action can be anything other than random chance, which is just as damaging to moral responsibility as determinism.

An understanding of the basic debate between Determinism (the thesis that all events, including human actions, are ultimately determined by causes external to the will) and Free Will.
The philosophical definition of Moral Responsibility and why it traditionally requires some form of choice or agency.
The core distinctions between Compatibilism (the belief that free will and determinism are compatible) and Incompatibilism (the belief that they are mutually exclusive).
Familiarity with standard event-event causation (transeunt causation), where one physical event causes another, which serves as the contrast to Chisholm's theories.
A deep dive into Chisholm's specific distinction between 'transeunt causation' (event-to-event) and 'immanent causation' (agent-to-event).
Analysis of major criticisms of agent causation, including the 'mystery objection' (how an immaterial self physically initiates a causal chain) and the challenge of physical closure.
A comparative study of alternative libertarian models of free will, such as Robert Kane's event-causal libertarianism.
Exploration of the implications of Chisholm's agent-causation on modern neuroscience and the contemporary debate over physicalism versus dualism.
1.1K views29likes1:29:46@neilpettijohn9618Original Release: 2018-12-01

The problem of human freedom, as articulated by philosopher Roderick Chisholm, is that moral responsibility appears incompatible with both determinism (where every event is caused by prior events) and indeterminism (where some events occur randomly without cause). Chisholm proposes solving this by distinguishing between event causation (where one event causes another) and agent causation (where agents themselves cause events without being caused by other events). According to this view, human agents are 'prime movers unmoved'—they can initiate actions without being determined by prior causes, thereby preserving both free will and moral responsibility.