Formal vs. Informal Agency Rulemaking | Administrative Law

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The Neo-Formalist Defense of Formal Rulemaking

Standard administrative law scholarship views formal rulemaking as an obsolete, overly burdensome relic, celebrating informal notice-and-comment as the flexible, modern standard. However, a "neo-formalist" counterpoint argues that abandoning formal rulemaking was a mistake. Proponents of this view contend that trial-like procedures—such as cross-examination and strict evidentiary standards—are actually superior for resolving complex, highly technical factual disputes and limiting agency bias or regulatory capture. Furthermore, critics of the modern informal process argue it has become "ossified" by intensive judicial "hard look" review and executive oversight. Consequently, agencies increasingly bypass notice-and-comment altogether in favor of non-binding "guidance documents" (or "regulatory dark matter") that completely evade public participation and democratic accountability. Therefore, this counterpoint suggests that informal rulemaking is neither as efficient nor as democratic as traditionally claimed, and that formal rulemaking procedures deserve a reassessment.

The separation of powers doctrine and how administrative agencies fit within the constitutional framework of the United States government.
The purpose and origin of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) of 1946 as the primary statutory framework governing federal agencies.
The concept of statutory delegation of authority, specifically how Congress passes 'enabling legislation' to empower agencies to act.
The distinction between quasi-legislative functions (rulemaking) and quasi-judicial functions (adjudication) performed by agencies.
A deep dive into the specific mechanics of 'Notice-and-Comment' rulemaking under APA Section 553, including the 'logical outgrowth' doctrine.
The standards of judicial review for agency actions, including 'arbitrary and capricious' review under State Farm and statutory interpretation in the post-Chevron deference era.
The role of presidential oversight in rulemaking, specifically the regulatory review process led by the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA).
Alternative rulemaking methods, such as hybrid rulemaking, negotiated rulemaking ('reg-neg'), and guidance documents/interpretive rules.
The application of the 'Major Questions Doctrine' and how courts evaluate whether an agency has exceeded its statutory rulemaking authority.
72.9K views61likes3:41@TheFederalistSocietyOriginal Release: 2021-06-29

Under the Administrative Procedure Act, administrative agencies use two primary rulemaking processes: formal rulemaking, which involves holding hearings where parties present their cases like before a judge and is typically required by Congress for specific regulations, and informal notice-and-comment rulemaking, which requires agencies to publish a regulatory proposal in the Federal Register, solicit public comments (typically for 30-60 days, sometimes up to 120 days), evaluate feedback, and issue a final regulation that becomes effective 30 days after publication; both processes allow for judicial review where courts may remand regulations entirely or partially for reconsideration.