Nonviolent resistance campaigns are more likely to succeed than violent ones because they attract broader participation, create higher resilience, enable tactical innovation, increase civic disruption, and reduce regime incentives to maintain power, as demonstrated by cases like East Timor's independence movement and the Philippines' People Power Revolution.
Why Civil Resistance Works: Chenoweth & Stephan Analysis
Added:Hey y'all. Today for Devotions with Daniela, introducing Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict by Erica Chennowith and Maria J. Stefen. If you're wondering why you recognize Erica Chennowith's name, she is the scholar who came up with the 3.5% of people is what you need to make a successful resistance. And I think it's relevant to say, especially in Black History Month, that she is a black woman.
This is the winner of the Woodro Wilson Foundation Award from the American Political Science Association. Combining statistical analysis with case studies of specific countries and territories, Erica Chennowith and Maria J. Stefen detail the factors enabling non-violent resistance campaigns to succeed and sometimes fail. They find such campaigns present fewer obstacles to moral and physical involvement and commitment and higher levels of participation contribute to enhanced resilience, greater opportunities for tactical innovation and civic disruption and therefore less incentive for a regime to maintain its status quo and shifts in loyalty among opponents while supporters including members of the military establishment. Chennowith and Stefen conclude that successful non-violent resistance ushers in more durable and internally peaceful democracies which are less likely to regress into civil war. Presenting a rich evidentiary argument, they originally and systematically compare violent and non-violent outcomes in different historical periods and geographical contexts, debunking the myth that violence occurs because of structural and environmental factors and that it is necessary to achieve certain political goals. Instead, the authors discover violent insurgency is rarely justifiable on strategic grounds.
All of us dedicated to peaceful protest as a way to change the world can take heart from this book belongs in all academic libraries. Erica Chennowith is an assistant professor at the Joseph Corbell School of International Studies at the University of Denver and an associate researcher at the Peace Research Institute of Oslo. Maria J.
Stefen is a strategic planner with the US Department of State. Formerly, she served as director of policy and research at the international center on non-violent conflict and as an adjunct professor at Georgetown University and American University. And of course, I remind you that while we can choose for resistance to be nonviolent, the authoritarian government gets to choose to make it violent at any point, as we have already seen, there's no guaranteed safe way to protest or fight back against an authoritarian regime. There's also no safe way to not do so.
We are going to be spending some time with this book, folks. Let's get into the introduction.
She wrote her acknowledgements from Kabul, Afghanistan. Maria J. S. Chapter one, the success of nonviolent resistance campaigns. Nonviolence is fine as long as it works. Malcolm X. In November 1975, Indonesian President Suaru ordered a full-scale invasion of East Teour, claiming that the left-leaning nationalist group had declared independence for East Teour a month earlier. The revolutionary front for an independent East Teour was a communist threat to the region.
Fre fretin is what his names armed wing the foras armadas libertas national I guess they speak Portuguese there I did not know that led the early resistance to Indonesian occupation forces in the form of conventional and guerilla warfare using weapons left behind by Portuguese troops fallental forces waged armed struggle from east teour's mountainous jungle region but fallant would not win the day. Despite some early successes, by 1980, Indonesia's brutal counterinsurgency campaign had decimated the armed resistance along with nearly onethird of the East Teor population.
Yet nearly two decades later, a non-violent resistance movement helped to successfully remove Indonesian troops from East Teour and win independence for the annexed territory. The Clandestine Front, an organization originally envisaged as a support network for the armed movement, eventually reversed roles and became the driving force behind the non-violent pro-independence resistance. Beginning in 1988, the clandestine front, which grew out of an East Teorice Youth movement, developed a large decentralized network of activists who planned and executed various non-violent campaigns inside East Teour, in Indonesia, and internationally. These included protests timed to the visits of diplomats and dignitaries, sitins inside foreign embassies, and international solidarity efforts that reinforced Tim Moriceled non-violent activism.
The Indonesian regime repressed this movement following its standard approach to violent and non-violent challengers from within. But this repression backfired following the deaths of more than 200 East Timarice non-violent protesters at the hands of Indonesian troops in Dilly in November 1991. The pro-independence campaign experienced a major turning point. The massacre was captured on film by a British cameraman was quickly broadcast around the world causing international outrage and prompting the East Torres to rethink their strategy. Intensifying non-violent protests and moving the resistance into Indonesia proper became major components of the new strategy.
Suarto was ousted in 1998 after an economic crisis and mass popular uprising and Indonesia's new leader BJ Habibi quickly pushed through a series of political and economic reforms designed to restore stability and international credibility to the country. There was tremendous international pressure on habibi to resolve the east t-our issue which had become a diplomatic embarrassment not to mention a huge drain on Indonesia's budget. During a 1999 referendum almost 80% of East Tarice voters opted for independence. Following the referendum Indonesianbacked militias launched a scorched earth campaign that led to mass destruction and displacement. On September 14th, 2000, the UN Security Council voted unanimously to authorize an Australian-led international force for East Teour.
The United Nations Transitional Administration in East Teour oversaw a two-year transition period before East Teour became the world's newest independent state in May 2002. Although a small number of fallantil gerillas whose targets have been strictly military kept their weapons until the very end, it was not their violent resistance that liberated the territory from Indonesian occupation. As one clandestine front member explained, the fallant was an important symbol of resistance and their presence in the mountains helped boost morale, but nonviolent struggle ultimately allowed us to achieve victory. The whole population fought for independence, even Indonesians, and this was decisive.
Similarly, in the Philippines, where I was born in the late 1970s, several revolutionary guerilla groups were steadily gaining strength. The Communist Party of the Philippines and its new people's army, NPA, were inspired by Marxist Leninist Mauist ideologies and pursued armed revolution to gain power.
State sponsored military attacks on the MPA dispersed the guerilla resistance until the MPA encompassed all regions of the country. The Philippine government launched a concerted counterinsurgency effort and the NPA was never able to achieve power. In the early 80s, however, members of the opposition began to pursue a different strategy. In 1985, the reformist opposition united under the banner of UNIDO, United Nationalist Democratic Organization with Cory Aquino as its presidential candidate. In the period leading up to the elections, Aquino urged nonviolent discipline, making clear that violent attacks against opponents would not be tolerated. Church leaders similarly insisted on discipline while the National Citizens Movement for Free Elections trained half a million volunteers to monitor elections.
I got to skip this last explanation part because we're running out of time.
Although the Philippines has experienced a difficult transition to democracy, the non-violent campaign successfully removed the Marcos dictatorship where violent insurgency had failed only a few years earlier. The people power movement succeeded. As we can tell, this book is going to be full of great examples and things we can learn for our own resistance. Check out Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict by Erica Chennowith and Maria J. Stefen.
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