Political decay occurs when modern state institutions become captured by elites through sophisticated forms of corruption that differ from traditional clientelism; in the United States, this manifests as a 'state of courts and parties' where the combination of veto-rich institutional structures (checks and balances, judicial review, fragmented federalism) with highly organized interest groups and deep political polarization creates systemic gridlock that prevents collective action on policies that would benefit the public interest, even when broad consensus exists.
Institutional Corruption and Political Decay | Francis Fukuyama
Added:welcome to it's so sad to say but the final lecture of the final conference of the final year of the Edmund J saffas Lab on institutional corruption um and I for the final time get to say I am Larry leig and I am the director of the center and I'm grateful that you're here to celebrate um this conference and the work of the lab and uh to hear from our speaker uh Francis fukiyama is the Olivier nelli senior fellow at the Freeman spoggle Institute for in international studies resident in the FSI Center on Democracy development of the rule of law professor of political science at Stanford he has written widely on the issues of development and international politics his book The End Of History and the last man published in 1992 captured Ed the debate of a world for many years defined the way we debated and talked about that incredible period in world history but it's his most recent book political order and political Decay that Drew me to ask him to close this project on institutional corruption as those ideas from that perspective I think have so much to inform and complement and critique the work that we have done here uh Frank received his ba from Cornell in Classics his PhD here at Harvard in political science he was a member of the political science department at Rand and of the policy planning staff of the US Department of State he has taught at Johns Hopkins and George Mason um and he is a public intellectual in the very best sense of that term serious and engaged but most striking to me is the practiced humility of his engagement not just with uh academics but with a committed public a committed public eager to understand our place in our history all of us have learned an extraordinary amount from his contributions and I'm so grateful that he would fly across the country for the single purpose of closing this conference and this lab so please please join me in welcoming Frank [Music] fukan well thank you very much Larry it's really a pleasure to be here I'm actually on my way from San Francisco to Korea and uh I decided to stop off in Cambridge which means that I'm actually going to be going all the way around the world in the next few days uh but it is a pleasure to be here and I'm really very honored that Larry uh invited me uh I want to join in all the people last night uh in congratulating him for his leadership over the last uh several years of uh of this lab and I'd like to congratulate all the participants in the lab for uh what um uh has been a really uh terrific uh uh burst of creativity and intellectual energy so I want to thank uh all of you uh uh as well uh so let me begin uh the the title is a state of Courts and parties and it's a story about the United States but I need to explain how I got into this issue because I'm not a specialist in American politics uh and I came to this subject by a a rather circuitous route so for the last 10 15 years my main focus has been on governance in developing countries I've done a lot of Consulting work at places like the World Bank uh and I think that one of the realizations that many uh development economists have come to in recent years is that the source of poverty in the world really is not a lack of Human Resources natural resources physical capital uh it is actually bad governance uh and that corruption is one of the single most uh uh deeply rooted and difficult obstacles to overcome uh in turning poor countries uh into rich ones and that that's why that whole development Community has undertaken uh the study of corruption in efforts to combat it and I would say unfortunately uh with relatively meager results for reasons that I will uh that I will uh get into uh and so uh I think that in many ways uh I was led to this subject by thinking about poverty and Corruption but then when turning to the United States began to recognize that although certain types of corruption that exist in very poor countries uh have been eliminated in the United States we've actually replaced it with a uh different and in a way more sophisticated version and in many respects history is simply repeating itself but in a slightly uh different form uh and I also think that um so there's a there's going to be a couple of bottom lines to the the message that I want to leave with you today uh the first one is is that corruption is very much shaped by the nature of Institutions and if you look comparatively around the world at different societies there are different levels of corruption and part of that is shaped very much by the kinds of Institutions that they uh they have and so the institutional rules of the game while not determinative uh play a big part and I think they play A Part uh in uh the United States and then the second uh uh uh takeaway is that actually history matters a lot and that the sequence by which different societies put different institutions into place has shaped very much the present day outcomes and uh in some sense they are uh to this day uh uh prisoners U uh of that uh and I think that one of the countries that is a prisoner of its own uh particular institutional path of development uh is the United States with its uh state of Courts and parties now let me begin just with my general conceptual framework for thinking about what a liberal democracy is I think that a well-functioning liberal democracy is actually a collection of three actually heterogeneous institutions so the first institution is the state the state is about uh as Max vber said a legitimate Monopoly of force over territory I think that's still the best definition of a state because it really distinguishes States from other kinds of social organizations states are about power it is about the power to enforce laws to protect the community against internal and external threats to deliver uh services like health education infrastructure and so forth the second important institution is the rule of law uh to be true rule of law law has to apply not just to Ordinary People but to the most powerful Poli political actors in the system if they are exempt so if the president or the Prime Minister the king whatever can make up the rules as um as they go along then that is not the rule of law and so the rule of law actually is a is an institution for limiting power and it pushes in the opposite direction of the state the state tries to increase and use power and the rule of law is fundamentally a constraint on power the third set of Institutions has to do with Democratic account ability which we understand today as a set of uh free and fair multi-party elections these procedures are intended to produce substantive accountability meaning that the political system ought to respond not just to the elites that happen to be running the system but to the whole Community uh in as representative uh a way as possible and so if you think about the structure of liberal democracy it requires a balance it requires a balance on the one hand between the state which is the in which is the power generating and utilizing institution and the rule of law and Democratic accountability on the other hand which are the power limiting and the power constraining uh institutions and if you get out of balance you're not going to have a happy situation so obviously if you have only a modern State uh but no instruments of constraint no rule of law no democracy you're basically where China is today you've got a a dictatorship that can get pretty nasty on the other hand if you don't have a state and you only have the institutions of constraint or you have some of the institutions of constraint you're also not in a good place because you could be Syria and Libya where the state has broken down completely or you could be a place like Nigeria where you've got a semblance of a state and You' got a semblance of Law and a semblance of uh democracy but such high levels of corruption that you can't even do something like fight boo Haram on your own uh on your own territory and in fact I think a lot of the global instability that we are seeing uh is really related to the fact that you've got a very wide band of countries that now includes a very large part of the Arab world but much of subsaharan Africa Afghanistan Pakistan and so forth where you basically don't have coherent states that cannot guarantee uh Security on their own territories now there's one more important distinction which is between a traditional or a patrimonial state and a modern state so a patrimonial state is a state in which the political system is regarded as a Ser as a species of private property uh it's patrimony and therefore you know and in the days when you had kings and queens uh you know the king could actually give a province to his daughter as a wedding present because he owned that territory and all the inhabitants and he could give it away to somebody else if he wanted so today nobody dares to say I own this country uh they have uh what political scientists now call neopatrimonialism in which you've got the out outward form of a modern state but in fact uh everybody is in it uh to get rich uh that the the state is basically a rent sharing Coalition by which Elites Dole out uh economic favors to one another and that is their motivation for being in politics and a modern state by contrast is one that is imp personal that treats citizens equally on the basis of their citizenship uh and not whether they have some kind of a personal uh relationship friends or family uh with uh the person that happens to be in power and I think actually in looking around the world that the transition from a patrimonial state to a modern state is actually a much more difficult transition uh than from an autocracy to a democracy I mean I've spent most of my life wanting to promote democracy and thinking that elections are good things and if you think about Iraq and Afghanistan you know we actually held elections that or election likee events that produced governments that had some degree of uh actual Democratic uh legitimacy the one thing we completely failed at doing was to make uh modern States in these countries states that were uncorrupt that could deliver services that could uh provide security over their whole territory this is the big uh uh political de development failure So This Modern state that is impersonal uh is really uh I think the thing that that uh has undermined uh many societies caused poverty and is one of the weaknesses in uh in in Democratic systems I just give you a couple of examples so uh in um Ukraine where you know it's been in the news considerably there was a rose revolution in 2004 where all these young ukrainians came out on the street after a stolen election they forced out um Victor yanukovich there was a new election you have the orange Coalition put into place but they absolutely could not deal with the problem of corruption they were corrupt themselves they squabbled they failed to deliver basic services and as a result yanukovich was reelected in 2010 and you had to do it all over again uh in in U uh two at the end of 2013 those same young people had to come out again and force out and the real issue uh between us and uh and and the Russians at the moment is not democracy because you know yanukovich was elected fair and square Vladimir Putin if he were to be uh if there was an election in Russia uh tomorrow would probably be reelected with a very substantial majority so the issue is not democracy it is the fact that both the old Ukraine and and actually unfortunately a lot of the current Ukraine and Russia and many of the states in that region are neopatrimonial they are rent sharing Clicks in which Elites basically are padding their own nests and the struggle in Ukraine that all these young people you know were willing to die over was not so much democracy as the fact that they didn't want to live in that kind of a a kleptocracy that they wanted to live in a in a state where there was a clear distinction between public and private and where public officials acted in uh in the public uh interest and so I think that that's actually the big dividing line uh in the world right now uh I mean of course democracy versus uh authoritarian government matters a great deal there are many governments that violate the rights of of of their citizens that aren't democratically uh responsive but actually uh this ability to um deliver State services in this modern uh uh impersonal way I think is at the core of many of the world's uh problems today so that's the general uh windup so let me go over a couple of definitional matters I'm a political scientist I'm not a lawyer or an ethicist and uh I know that Larry has used a definition of in institutional corruption that is uh quite Broad and applies not just to public institutions but to private ones as well and these are the topics that you've been talking about but I think that there's a couple of other uh issues that are important so one has to do with the question of economic rents which economists you know worry a lot about so an rent is any kind of a service over the the cost of calling a good into production that uh can be allocated basically through a political process or many of them are allocated through political processes and economists for good reasons don't like rents uh and they uh see a lot of political activity as essentially uh rent seeking I would um just point out that there are good rents and there are bad rents uh and that we actually uh socially approve uh any number of uh of rents uh but the distinction between the good and the bad is an important one to keep in mind so the most obvious kind of good rent is a patent or a copyright by which we allow creators of uh of intellectual property to benefit I know Larry again has written on this that you know maybe the definition of copyright is too uh restrictive and uh and so forth but uh I don't think anyone would contest the fact that copyrights play a basic role in uh stimulating Innovation and creativity and so on and so forth the other uh important uh distinction has to do with the distinction between uh patronage and clientalism uh and again even the political scientists are not agreed on on what I'm going to tell you but I think it's an important one nonetheless so a patronage relationship I would Define as one between a superior and an inferior in which political support is traded for some kind of an individual benefit usually on a face-to-face basis now uh it is my belief that this is biologically rooted that there are two biological human proclivities one is what William Hamilton called uh the principle of Inclusive fitness that it's not just human beings but all sexually reproducing species uh favor genetic uh uh relatives over strangers and the other one is what Robert triers called reciprocal altruism which is the exchange of favors again on a face-to-face basis and patronage in that sense uh the either uh either this kind of genetic you know nepotism to to call it by its name uh or reciprocal altruism are Universal they exist in all societies and they exist in rule of law societies uh so uh you know Hillary Clinton if she gets elected president is not going to give jobs to Simply the most qualified people she's going to give jobs to people that worked with her over the years and that she trusts and knows and has exchanged favors with and so forth and so this kind of structure exists you know it exists in the Communist parties of North Korea and China and you know in a lot of other uh circumstances clientalism uh is slightly different and I think that is U I would say I would Reserve that for electoral democracies that face the problem of mass voter uh mobilization and the distinction I would make is that uh when you have to do Mass mobilization you cannot have this direct face-to-face kind of Patron client relationship and you need a whole series of intermediaries and so classic clientalism is really the political machine that gets the vote out on Election Day uh on a mass uh on a mass basis but the important definition is it's the exchange of political support for an individualized benefit not for a targeted let's say a targeted public good that applies to class of people and that's an important distinction because what I'm going to tell you shortly is that the United States had a really big problem with clientalism uh in the 19th century and we largely got rid of it but that we've got a different kind of uh problem right now which is not clientalism in that sense but it is the reciprocal uh exchange uh of favors in terms of interest group politics and it's different but it's different in in in in certain ways that are important to note now clientalism is a I would say a feature of virtually every um poor democracy that has ever existed in the world so if you go to Brazil or Mexico or Indonesia or India clientalism uh and the associated forms of corruption are practiced very broadly this is how political machines get uh ordinary voters to vote for them uh I however ever uh would argue that it should not be regarded as a pure form of corruption you know where comparable to say a an education Minister pocketing you know $50 million and just putting it in a bank account in Switzerland for the benefit of his family because clientalism actually does involve a reciprocal exchange of favors so that the politician actually has to give something back to the voters uh even if it is in effect uh an individual bribe so there is a degree of reciprocity and I think what I'm going to argue is that clientalism actually arose uh and and should be more properly regarded not simply as a form of corruption but as an early stage of democratic mobilization that in societies with low levels of education and wealth uh that this is actually the most efficient way to get people to the polls because most voters in such societies actually aren't you know they're care about global warming or you know trade talks with Japan or you know kinds of public policy issues that uh more developed countries uh worry about they worry about am I going to have food on the table for my family and if the politician can give them the Christmas turkey or to get out a jail card for their cousin or whatever that's the basis on which they're going to they're going to vote and um we tend to look down on uh countries with these clientelistic systems and say say well they just don't understand how a proper democracy you know that you're supposed to vote on programmatic issues for candidates that lay out you know general public policy positions and and you know Define them themselves more uh by ideology and less by uh these personal exchange of favors but we don't understand that this is exactly the way that American politics work through the better part of the 19th century so here starts the the uh history lesson so if you look at what the American government looked like in the years after the signing of the uh uh Constitution the ratification of the Constitution you could describe it basically as government by the friends of George Washington meaning that the V so the federal government to the extent that it existed at all there were mostly Customs inspectors some postmasters you know some leaders of local militias this sort of thing uh to the extent that it existed at all uh most of the leaders were actually Elites of that time and a lot of them graduates at places like Harvard and Yale and um uh and Princeton uh but the principle of equality uh was deeply embedded in the Declaration of Independence and the United States was one of the first countries in the world to open up the franchise and many states uh began to do this in the 1820s and the critical election was really the election of 1828 that brought Andrew Jackson to power because this was the first election in which a majority of of States voted you know with with a universal male franchise this is really the first uh country anywhere in the world that implemented a universal male franchise uh and this led to the need uh first of all for political parties because all of a sudden uh instead of these Elite factions you know that's basically what the Federalist Party was uh you had these new parties that had to come into being in order to get people to the polls and there was this recognition that the easiest way to motivate people to vote was actually to bribe them uh bribe them individually so in the 1828 election it featured Andrew Jackson against John Quincy Adams uh this was a classic polarity in American politics uh John Quincy Adams was a har Harvard graduate he had traveled in Europe he could speak many European languages his father was the second President of the United States so a classic Boston Brahman uh Andrew Jackson was a Frontiersman he was a Scotch Irish you know brawler drink Indian fighter he had almost no formal education uh he made his name fighting uh the Cherokee and seol uh drove the seals out of Northern Florida won the Battle of New Orleans and as a result of his military successes uh ran for president uh and uh won in 1828 and when he won he said two things he said first of all I won the election so I should get to choose who runs the US government and second he didn't put it quite in the these terms but he said it doesn't take a genius to run the American government and this was a period in which you know the average level of Education in the United States was probably somewhere you know third or fourth grade I mean it it wasn't even you know you couldn't at this point not even a majority of Americans even had an elementary school uh education and so that meant that if an ordinary American was put in a position of postmaster Customs official or so forth they didn't have a whole lot of skill and this inaugurated this period that is alternatively known as U you know the spoil system or the patronage system that lasts for about a hundred years in American history and with every passing year after the 1828 election both the emerging Democratic and repu Republican parties uh begin to use this as a means of uh voter mobilization so that by the time of the Civil War virtually every um uh uh official uh appointed official from the federal government all the way down to local postmasters and and you know uh Indian Reservation managers were all there as a result of a payoff by a politician to some uh political supporter and if you read uh Abraham Lincoln particularly after he was reelected uh in uh 1864 he is just in tears and tearing his hair out at the fact that he has got to deal day after day after day with with office Seekers who say I supported you in the election so you owe me a job and what are you going to what are you going to give me and in fact a lot of the early battles that The Union lost uh was because uh Lincoln felt compelled to appoint people like Dan sickles or other political generals who are essentially politicians that could you know bring political support in an election but were completely incompetent uh military leaders and it's really only uh as the war dragged on at huge cost that he realized that Merit was actually an important principle uh for recruiting a general and that's you know finally um it took him several years to find ulyses Grant and and uh and and and promote him to the top uh and this is really the system uh that existed in the United States uh into the second half of the 19th uh Century okay so that's the first part of the American story but we got out of this system and I'm going to get to that in a second but here's the point at which a more comparative analysis I think is very helpful so this kind of clientalism trading of uh political support for individualized benefits does not exist equally in all developed countries and in fact if you look at the European Union right now one of the big divides between countries that got into trouble during the Eurozone crisis and those that didn't is precisely due to clientalism the survival of clientalism particularly in Greece and in Italy uh clientelistic politics ICS is still a feature in both of those countries so for example Greece uh the the regime of the colonels the dictatorship with the colonels ended in 1974 but after that the two Greek political parties peso and new democracy Center left and center right they they traded positions as they're supposed to in a competitive democracy uh repeatedly in in the in the decades following but every single time that they traded positions they used their power to fill the Civil Service with their own political supporters you know the Central Bank teachers you know uh so forth to the point where by the time of the Euro crisis the Greek government had something like seven times a per capita number of civil servants that Britain did and one of the reasons uh that they could not control their wage bill was that they could not back out of these commitments and even now after all of the pressure that's been put on them by the troa uh they have still not really uh kind of admitted that this is a bad principle of politics and that in the future political parties that win elections should not try to fill the civil service with their own uh with their own political supporters right so that exists and then southern Italy uh you know under the Christian democrats in in the postwar period practiced exactly the same kind of politics so why is it that in Scandinavia in the Netherlands in Germany uh you don't have this kind of clientalism uh and yet you do have it in in in in Greece and Italy it's not a cultural thing because it it exists in uh I mean you know there it it doesn't correspond to like a Protestant Catholic or a you know Protestant Orthodox kind of cultural division but it does have to do with the historical sequence by which um uh institutions were adopted uh in Germany and Sweden for example the charm Tilly hypothesis that war makes the state and the state makes war was the explanation for how they got to relatively good clean meritocratic government so beginning in the late 17th century with the rise of the henal family the great elector Germany or Prussia rather decides that it's going to survive by building a permanent Army to get the Army it needs a bureaucracy it needs taxation it needs centralization of bureaucratic Authority so it goes through all of the stages that China went through uh at the time of the Chin Dynasty in the 3rd Century BC and creates a relatively modern U merit-based government uh that is relatively free of patronage this process really doesn't get completed until the Stein hardenberg reforms after the defeat at the Battle of vien in 1806 but by the 19th century you have a classic insulated autonomous bureaucracy uh that is law-based and is uh highly meritocratic and in fact when Max vber wrote his famous definition of modern bureaucracy he was thinking about the German bureaucracy of his time he was not thinking about uh the American bureaucracy which he believed to be uh hopelessly corrupt and this is an argument that Martin schfer has made uh which is that the survival of clientalism into the present really has to do with the sequence and that those countries that develop these kinds of modern States under autocratic condition and then democratized later uh retain them and so the current German bureaucracy is really the heir of this organization originally created by the great elector and and the H henal and in fact there's a tremendous amount of bureaucratic continu same thing happened in Japan after uh after 1945 another country whose um clean government was really shaped by military competition uh on the other hand Greece and Italy uh had the opposite SE they democratized before there was any consolidation of the state and therefore and and in fact uh a lot of people don't realize this but Greece was uh I believe the earliest country in Europe to open up the uh a complete male franchise they did this uh in the 1860s and uh they basically um shifted from a a rural patronage based system to a modern calistic one as their democracy uh developed and that is in a certain way the same situation that they are in uh uh they are in today and the reason that southern Italy and Greece you know in a sense uh retain this kind of system had to do I think ultimately with State weakness this is a subject that Bob putam has written on but I don't think he's quite right about some of the historical details about this because I think that the Greek State and the Italian state in the South were both foreign dominated and foreign controlled and lacked legitimacy and therefore the habit of not paying taxes uh was deeply deeply engrained Greeks were not paying taxes to the Ottomans when the you know when when Greece was an ottoman uh Province and so therefore the legitimacy of a public sector that served public interest in a transparent and impartial way never took root uh in either of those places and I think a lot of their continuing problems uh have to do with that now I do not want to leave you with the impression that the only way you get to clean modern corruption-free government is to replicate prussia's route and turn yourself into a militaristic uh aggressive conqueror that then gets defeated and says okay we're going to have a democracy now that's not that's not a good uh that's not a good route although I think Japan in certain ways uh did that as well and I think China many many Millennia ago actually went through went through something like that I mean they haven't got to the Democracy stage but but that's how they got got their modern state but I think that the experience of the United States in the Progressive Era is really the model for how do you get out of this this kind of a bind of pervasive uh pervasive clientalism so the Story begins with economic change and with social change by the 1880s the United States was being transformed from a primarily agrarian society into a Modern urban industrial one the Agent of Change was the railroads railroads were the internet of that day they created National markets this is the way that farmers in the midwest could get their crops to International uh markets and for the first time you got uh an extensive division of labor people moving to cities uh uh the emergence of a middle class and so forth and under those conditions you developed a lot of social groups that did not have an entrenched interest in the old patronage uh system but the problem with iCal reform and the reason that you cannot get rid of these old corrupt systems that easily is that all of the incumbent stakeholders have a very powerful interest in maintaining it it is a political issue it is not a technical issue it's not that they don't understand what good government looks like and no amount of lecture I this is the world bank's problem I mean they sort of thought that they would just lecture these countries about good governance and they'd say oh okay that's how you do it so let's the reason that you can't get to good government is it is not in anybody's self-interest at least of the existing political stakeholders and so therefore you've got to engage in political struggle and you also need a lot of uh good luck the luck I don't know if you call it luck but the triggering event in the American story was the assassination of Garfield uh in uh he was elected in in uh 1882 and shortly thereafter he was shot by a guy named Charles Kito who thought he should be the consult to France he was a disappointed office Seeker uh Congress which had been unwilling to vote for something called the Pendleton Act prior to this uh were so embarrassed by the fact that the president of the United States had been assassinated by one of these patronage job Seekers that they voted for for uh an act that created the Civil Service Commission and enshrined the principle that federal employees ought to be hired on the basis of having uh taken and passed a civil service examination rather than as a payoff uh to a politician uh given the American political system it took uh another two generations to really extend uh classified offices to 80% of the federal bureaucracy and even today we have many many more political appointees I mean in the case of ambassadors it's just embarrassing you know it doesn't matter which party is in power we still have about four or 5,000 U appointees to turn over with every you know change of administration between uh parties which is way way more than almost any other democracy but uh we still managed to get the number down to 4,000 um uh in this uh in this period uh and I think that this is the pattern that any country that wants to get rid of this kind of pervasive clientalism is going to have to adopt as a result of economic and social change you restack the social deck you get new actors that do not have an interest in the old system that wanted changed and so in the late 19th century you had you know the business the the railroads were uh they had learned to play the corruption game very well in fact Stanford un so Leland Stanford you know was one of these ra Rail Road Barons that basically own the California uh State Legislature but there are a lot of people that were being screwed by this kind of behavior you know shippers and smaller businesses and so forth and they form part of a progressive coalition that included Midwestern Farmers uh Urban uh uh Urban reformers uh you know intellectuals uh people like Frank good now woodro Wilson who at that time was a professor of public administration at uh at John's Hopkins uh and then went on to Princeton and so forth and so you had several things that had to come together first you had a Grassroots movement you had a Grassroots movement and this is one of the things that we don't appreciate about that time all of these grandmothers around the United States were really upset that their fourth class postmaster was some political hack and they thought this was terrible and that this ought to change and they organized and they wrote letters and they demonstrated in favor of this kind of change the second thing was you needed an idea and at that time uh actually it was people like like Wilson and good now and so forth that brought these ideas of modern government from Europe to the United States and made them uh respectable and made Americans feel kind of bad that they didn't have this kind of a modern uh government you needed leadership uh one of the most important leaders was Teddy Roosevelt you know who was assembled this uh you know he was actually at one point the the chairman of the uh US Civil Service Commission he believed that civil service reform was an incredibly important uh issue and that he made a centerpiece of his own uh his own uh presidency and so it's this combination of Grassroots mobilization leaders ship and ideas I think that created that kind of Coalition that made that possible and I think that that's what's going to happen in places like Brazil and India in the next decade or two and you already see the beginnings of this you already see Grassroots mobilization mostly of middle class people that don't want the old corrupt system it's not going to work in the short run it's it you know it took 4050 years for the United States to get rid of this system uh in our own history so it's not going to be a quick process process but as far as I can see if you don't approach this thing politically it's it's you know it's not going to it's not going to happen so let me now just get on to the question of the actual state of Courts and parties and what I think our uh problem is right now because I think that we don't have that classic except in certain municipalities we don't have that classic clientalism anymore but we've got a much more uh deeply rooted and and harder to extricate a form of corruption which Larry and other people have I think very nicely explicated and it's all based on this biological principle of reciprocal altruism uh so that we've managed to Define Corruption in such narrow terms as a transaction you know that that involves a quidd proquo and we leave completely you know legal the exchange of favors uh over time where the explicitness is not you know is not built into the system and that's the U present day lobbying industry now why is this a bad thing because there is a pluralist tradition that actually in a certain sense begins with James Madison in Federalist 10 that says the diversity of interest groups is actually a good thing because they'll all cancel each other out uh and um as long as no no single interest group can dominate the whole system uh we preserved uh we preserved freedom and I think the problem uh exists really in the failure of certain kinds of collective action and the problem I think is is is the following there's two things that have been going on in American society that have laid the groundwork for that so one is polarization uh there's um there's a big debate you know whether polarization is more in the political system or it's in society itself I think the evidence you know indicates that it is pretty much out there in society so people have been sorting themselves residentially uh if you so it's not just a matter of of Jerry mandering in the house which in any event wouldn't explain why you know why the Senate is so polarized uh so you have this situation in which the two political parties do not overlap at all uh if you look at like the DW nominate scores it measures where you are ideologically there's no overlap between uh the Democrats and the Republicans uh whatsoever second uh social uh development is the rise of very well-funded and extremely well organized uh interest groups across the Spectrum and you know the kind of order of magnitude rise and the amount of money that has gone into politics and so forth now those two things by themselves would not necessarily lead to a political crisis if they did not interact with the nature of American institutions uh but America is a very unusual kind of democracy when we compare ourselves to other uh democracies in advanced industrialized countries around the world founding fathers uh placed a great deal of emphasis on freedom and protecting individuals from the overweening power of a centralized State and so they created a very anti-majoritarian system in which a lot of um parts of the system were given essentially veto power over uh the rest and so that's the system of checks and balances uh you got two houses of Congress a very powerful uh Upper House which is actually added to its own powers through uh you know the uh the use of the filibuster and and senatorial holds and this sort of thing you've got a supreme court that can invalidate uh legislation you've got Devolution to uh States and municipalities uh you've got a constitution that allocates budgeting authority to Congress rather than to the government uh and the combination of all of these things gives interest groups many many more points of access uh to the political system so when you combine these things when you combine the institutional structure of check and balances with the social trends towards polarization and the evolution of uh well organized and well-funded interest groups you get what I call vitrac meaning rued by veto in which many many parts of the system are able to stop things that are bad for them that's the real negative impact of a lot of these well-organized interest groups but they are not powerful enough to dominate the system but there's no there's still a huge Collective action problem so many things that are collectively desirable and in the public interest uh as a whole cannot get done uh because you cannot generate you know you can't get past the individual vetos and and and and and the way that's used so there's just many examples of this uh so you know budgeting I mean Congress has not passed a budget by its own uh rule since 2008 uh uh because they simply can't agree on what collection of tax cuts and uh uh or uh tax increase and spending cuts uh are appropriate bad legislation you know I was in favor of both Dodd Frank and ObamaCare the two uh signature pieces of legislation of the Obama administration because I think both Universal Health Care and um uh Financial regulation are extremely uh important but if you actually look at the actual pieces of legislation they're they're just horrendous you know they are hundreds of pages long there's one actually um kind of big data study that a political scientist did of Obamacare in which he traced every single clause in this 900 page Bill to a prior piece of legislation that at some point in the last 10 years had been written by some lobbyist right and the people that voted for this thing you know none of them knew what they were voting for really and it turns out that one part of it is badly drafted and the Supreme Court may use that to invalidate you know the whole legislation so this is not a good way to do this is not a good way to make sausages you know this is really not a good way to make uh sausages you know the tax code got a 35% uh corporate tax rate is much higher than the oecd average be much better to get rid of all of the special exemptions because very few corporations actually pay the nominal rate uh then you'd bring home a lot of money that's being kept abroad you know because of that tax rate uh so everybody on the right and left agrees that that kind of Reform where you trade all the special privileges and exemptions uh in favor of the lower rate would be a good thing and you can't do it you can't do it because of the institutional uh structure of the US government finally uh I do want to mention courts we are in a law school but this is another uh respect in which uh America uh uh creates uh more vetos than other um other uh developed democracies so the basic problem uh with and why we've in a sense returned to what Steven scon called a state of Courts and parties is the outsize role that the Judiciary plays in uh a lot of ordinary political decisions and by that I don't mean things like roie way I think it you know what I'm thinking of is actually the expansion of standing that accompanied a lot of the social legislation you know there's 12 or 13 really major bills that were passed in the 1970s regarding environment equal opportunity disabilities you know so on and so forth and in most of them Congress saw fit to expand the standing of ordinary AR citizens to bring suit against the US government to either enforce the law or to desist from enforcing it uh and this is part of what's Driven this explosion uh of litigation and this is one of the reasons that the United States really has a huge amount of problem doing uh infrastructure projects because you know the moment that you announce a big engineering plan uh you get sued uh uh by all sorts of groups that have a very very uh marginal uh relationship to the you know to the actual uh uh the actual project uh so I mean you can multiply examples of this the Americans with Disability Act there's a whole uh industry devoted to suing small businesses in particular jurisdictions for non-compliance with the Ada because you know you can actually make uh money doing this sort of thing and so I mean that's just another kind of retail level example of vrac where the system privileges you know relatively small but well organized and and determined groups within the Society in a way that I think collectively doesn't necessarily add up to uh public interest so I'm going to stop uh I think that this is a problem of political decay in my view political Decay happens when modern State institutions are captured by Elites and I just don't see any other way than of understanding what's happened to American the American political system over the last uh 20 20 30 years other than you know decay of this sort I don't think it's Unique to democratic systems because I think an authoritarian system can be uh captured as well but our democratic system has permitted uh capture in a way that probably wouldn't happen in a parliamentary system and this is I suppose uh well two closing thoughts so one is institutions still really matter the institutional rules of the game uh the United States provides many more access points for interest groups to exert corrupt influence than most uh European parliamentary systems do in Europe it makes no sense to go to an individual Member of Parliament in Germany or Britain uh or France and Lobby them for a tax break it because they just have no you know they they have no uh they don't write the tax laws uh and therefore they don't do it I mean they Lobby the Bure bureaucracy they Lobby other uh uh other parts of the system but there are many fewer uh points of entry and furthermore we Americans love continuing this political fight even into the implementation stage so you know look at what's happening to Obamacare which you know is now people are trying to I mean they couldn't win the legislative battle so they're now trying to defeat the bill in the implementation and you know and block it at that uh at that retail level and again this doesn't happen in most parliamentary systems uh final thing I would final point I'll close on is that this matters for Global democracy as I said the reason I got into this issue of American politics and American Decay is that I've been noticing around the world that compared to 25 years ago actually when I first wrote the end of history that America is simply not regarded as the leading model of a modern well-functioning democracy it's just not you know you go to Eastern Europe or to Russia or to China and the people struggling there for democracy you know when look at Washington they don't say yeah that's what we want you know we want deadlock and you know we we we we want you know the the we want one party to hold up the whole government by threatening to default on its sovereign debt yeah that's that's really what democracy is really about and I think the projection of the idea of democracy is really heavily dependent on how well it it appears to be working in the United States and that's something that I think has really changed in the present world and I'm really disappointed about it and that's why I think you know the stuff that Larry and all of you have been working on is uh is God's work and I wish you success and and uh I hope the Fight Continues so thank you very much
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