Sherbert v. Verner (1963): Religious Freedom & Unemployment Benefits

In Employment Division v. Smith (1990), the Supreme Court established that neutral, generally applicable laws that incidentally burden religious practice do not violate the Free Exercise Clause. This ruling treats religious freedom differently from other constitutional rights, as it allows laws that would otherwise be challenged under other amendments to pass constitutional muster if they apply uniformly without targeting religion specifically.

The Sherbert Test (from Sherbert v. Verner, 1963) provides a three-pronged framework for determining whether government action violates free exercise of religion: (1) government pressure to forgo religious practice, (2) state interest justifying infringement, and (3) no less restrictive alternatives available. However, in Employment Division v. Smith (1990), the Court ruled that laws burdening all religions equally are not unconstitutional, limiting the Sherbert Test. This sparked backlash, leading Congress to pass RFRA in 1993, which reinstated the Sherbert Test. In Gonzales v. O Centro Espírita (2006), the Court ruled in favor of a Brazilian church when the government failed to prove a compelling interest under RFRA.

In 1990, the Supreme Court changed its approach in Employment Division v. Smith, ruling that if a law is neutral and generally applicable, it does not matter if it burdens someone's religious exercise. This caused a massive uproar across the political spectrum. After this ruling, the Supreme Court has interpreted 'neutral and generally applicable' to mean that almost no law government can pass will actually be neutral or generally applicable. Therefore, if a law is not neutral or generally applicable, government must pass the compelling interest test. A law is not neutral if it targets a particular religion. A law is not generally applicable if it has any exception for secular interests—even one exception makes it not generally applicable.

In Employment Division v. Smith (1990), the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that states are not required to accommodate religious practices that violate generally applicable neutral laws, establishing that the Free Exercise Clause does not exempt individuals from complying with laws that apply equally to all citizens regardless of religious motivation.

The neutral and generally applicable test requires that laws apply equally to everyone and do not target specific religious groups. In Employment Division v. Smith, the Court ruled that Oregon's peyote ban was neutral and generally applicable because it applied to everyone. However, in Employment Division v. Smith (1990), the Court ruled that Oregon's peyote ban was neutral and generally applicable because it applied to everyone. In Employment Division v. Smith (1990), the Court ruled that Oregon's peyote ban was neutral and generally applicable because it applied to everyone. In Employment Division v. Smith (1990), the Court ruled that Oregon's peyote ban was neutral and generally applicable because it applied to everyone. In Employment Division v. Smith (1990), the Court ruled that Oregon's peyote ban was neutral and generally applicable because it applied to everyone.

The Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993 is a U.S. federal law that reinstates the Sherbert Test, requiring strict scrutiny when determining whether a law substantially burdens religious exercise; under RFRA, the government must demonstrate both a compelling government interest and that the law is the least restrictive means to achieve that interest, though the Supreme Court later held RFRA unconstitutional as applied to states in City of Boerne v. Flores (1997), while it remains applicable to federal law.

The Free Exercise Clause prohibits laws prohibiting the free exercise of religion. In Sherbert v. Verner, the Court established strict scrutiny for neutral, generally applicable laws burdening religious exercise, requiring compelling government interests and least restrictive means. However, in Employment Division v. Smith, the Court replaced this with a general applicability test, holding that neutral, generally applicable laws receive rational basis review regardless of religious burden. Congress passed RFRA to restore the Sherbert standard, but in Boerne v. Flores, the Supreme Court struck down RFRA as applied to the states, holding that only the Supreme Court can interpret the First Amendment, not Congress. RFRA still applies to federal government actions.

The Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), signed by President Bill Clinton on November 16, 1993, was designed to restore and strengthen religious freedom protections by reversing the Supreme Court's 1990 decision in Employment Division v. Smith, which had limited the free exercise of religion; the Act establishes that the government must demonstrate a compelling interest and use the least restrictive means before interfering with religious practices, reflecting a broad coalition of 68 diverse groups including the National Association of Evangelicals, American Civil Liberties Union, and Traditional Values Coalition working together across ideological lines to protect religious liberty as a fundamental American right.

In Sherbert v. Verner (1963), the Supreme Court ruled that states cannot deny unemployment benefits to someone fired for refusing to work on their Sabbath, establishing a 'compelling state interest' test. In Employment Division v. Smith (1990), the Court overruled Sherbert, ruling that states can deny benefits if there is any 'colorable' state interest. Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) to restore the compelling state interest test, but in City of Boerne v. Flores (1997), the Supreme Court ruled that Congress cannot overrule the Supreme Court's constitutional interpretations. This demonstrates that constitutional protections for religious freedom have been significantly weakened.

The Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) was passed in 1993 by a Democratic Congress and signed by Democratic President Bill Clinton. The Act was intended to reaffirm people's right to free exercise of religion after the Employment Division v. Smith decision. However, the language of RFRA was so broad that it opened up the floodgates for religious privilege claims. RFRA was passed before the rise of the religious right and before the Supreme Court became conservative, and it has been used to advance religious privilege rather than protect genuine religious freedom.

In Hobby Lobby v. Burwell (2014), the Supreme Court ruled 5-4 that closely held corporations have religious freedom rights under RFRA, exempting the Greens from the Affordable Care Act contraceptive mandate. The Court found the government's compelling interest failed because other employers (TRICARE, Medicare, Medicaid, NYC) were exempt. This case sparked intense debate about whether corporations can claim religious objections to anti-discrimination laws. Supporters argue RFRA protects religious liberty, while critics contend it creates a license to discriminate against protected categories. The case illustrates tensions between religious freedom and civil rights protections, particularly regarding LGBTQ+ rights. The outcome raises fundamental questions about whether for-profit businesses can invoke religious objections to anti-discrimination obligations and whether RFRA applies to corporate entities.

The Elliott-Larsen amendments create unresolved tensions between neutral anti-discrimination laws and First Amendment protections for religious exercise. Unlike Title VII, Elliott-Larsen contains no explicit religious exemption. The landmark Burwell v. Hobby Lobby (2014) decision established that closely held corporations may claim religious exemptions under RFRA to deny contraceptive coverage, but this ruling was limited to closely held corporations and based on federal RFRA provisions that do not apply to state laws. Justice Ginsburg warned the ruling's logic could extend beyond closely held corporations. Since Michigan has not adopted state-level RFRA provisions, courts must determine how First Amendment protections apply to Elliott-Larsen, creating significant legal uncertainty for employers.

In 2014, the US Supreme Court ruled in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby and Conestoga Wood v. Burwell that for-profit companies have religious rights to object to providing certain contraceptives to employees under the Affordable Care Act, citing the Religious Freedom Restoration Act; the Court determined that since women can obtain cost-free contraceptives through other systems, companies can seek exemptions from healthcare mandates based on religious objections, though this ruling raised concerns about potential slippery slope implications for other areas like hiring practices and discrimination.

In 2012, Hobby Lobby sued the United States government over the Affordable Care Act's contraceptive mandate, which required employers to provide health insurance covering birth control and contraceptive care. The company argued that certain contraceptive methods (Plan B and the week after pill) were 'abortion-causing drugs' that violated their religious beliefs. After a 5-4 Supreme Court decision in 2014, the Court ruled that for-profit employers with religious objections could opt out of providing contraceptive coverage under Obamacare. This was the first time the Supreme Court granted a company the right to hold religious beliefs. The ruling sparked widespread protests and inspired religious groups to request similar exemptions from anti-discrimination laws.

The Hobby Lobby case involves the Obama administration's attempt to enforce an Affordable Care Act mandate requiring business owners to provide contraception coverage they consider abortifacient. Similarly, the Little Sisters of the Poor, a religious order caring for elderly people, face fines unless they provide employees with coverage for sterilization and contraception they consider objectionable. These cases raise questions about whether the government should compel religious organizations to act in violation of their convictions. The debate centers on whether such mandates constitute government imposition of beliefs on others or legitimate regulatory authority, with implications for the balance between religious freedom and government regulation.