McTaggart argues that time is unreal because the A series (past, present, future) is inherently contradictory: while no single event can simultaneously be past, present, and future, every event must at some point be all three according to the A series; attempting to resolve this contradiction by appealing to time's reality creates a vicious circle since one must assume time is real to explain how events can have different properties at different times, thereby begging the question against McTaggart's conclusion that time is unreal.
McTaggart's Unreality of Time: The Contradictory A-Series
Added:The basic distinction between the A-series (past, present, future) and the B-series (earlier than, later than) of temporal ordering.

John McTaggart introduced the distinction between A-series and B-series temporal distinctions. The A-series includes past, present, and future as changing categories, while the B-series includes only permanent relations of earlier, later, and simultaneous. McTaggart argued that time cannot be real because it requires both series, and the A-series involves contradiction. This distinction has become central to contemporary philosophy of time, with contemporary debates largely divided between those who accept A-series distinctions as metaphysically fundamental and those who accept B-series distinctions. The speaker notes that McTaggart's work, despite its controversial spiritualist conclusions, has profoundly influenced analytic philosophy of time. Time travel is a popular topic in philosophy of time, with extensive philosophical literature examining its logical possibilities and implications. The grandfather paradox is a famous thought experiment: if a time traveler goes back in time and kills their grandfather before their parent was conceived, they would never have been born to travel back in time. David Lewis proposed that time travel is possible if the time traveler's actions are part of a consistent history - they cannot change the past but can only act in ways that were always part of history.

Philosophers distinguish between two series characterizing time: the A-series (past, present, future) and the B-series (earlier than, simultaneous with, later than). While everything in time can be characterized by one or both series, nothing eternal can be characterized by either series. An eternal entity cannot be ordered in terms of past/present/future or earlier/later than anything else, including within its own life. This distinction is crucial for understanding how an eternal God can relate to temporal beings without being in time.

McTaggart distinguished three series for understanding time: the A series uses monadic predicates (past, present, future) to describe events' temporal properties, the B series uses relational predicates (earlier than, later than) to describe event orderings, and the C series represents order without directionality; McTaggart argued that while both A and C series are necessary for time, the A series is inherently contradictory, challenging both A theorists and B theorists who attempt to explain time without it.

McTaggart's argument involves two series: the A-series (past, present, future) which is dynamic and changes, and the B-series (earlier than, later than) which is static. McTaggart argues that the A-series leads to contradictions because an event cannot be both past and future simultaneously. This suggests that time as we commonly understand it may not exist as a real feature of reality.

McTaggart distinguished two ways of ordering temporal events: the B series orders events by the 'earlier than' relation (timeless ordering), while the A series orders events by past, present, and future (indexical ordering). McTaggart argued that events must have both A and B properties, and he claimed the A series is incoherent because it leads to contradictions. However, the A and B series are complementary ways of describing the same reality, not competing metaphysical theories. The A series is indexical (depends on when you speak), while the B series is timeless.
Fundamental concepts in the metaphysics of time, specifically the ontological debate between Presentism (only the present exists) and Eternalism (past, present, and future all exist).

Presentism holds that only present things exist; past and future are just expectations and memories. Eternalism (block universe theory) holds that all time is equally real—past, present, and future exist as a block. However, ontologically there is only the now—everything happens in the now. What we label as past, present, and future are just experiential states experienced now. These labels are theoretical abstractions that help categorize our experiential states but are not ontologically real entities outside the present moment.

There is a fundamental philosophical debate about time's nature: Eternalism holds that past, present, and future are equally real (like space), while Presentism holds only the present is real. Physicists argue time flow is an illusion because physics equations are time-symmetric and relativity shows no privileged present moment. Neuroscientists counter that our conscious perception of flowing time reflects reality since we evolved to survive in a time-asymmetric universe governed by physical laws.

Presentism holds that only the present moment is real, while eternalism (block universe) holds that all moments exist equally. This philosophical debate has lasted 2000 years. Presentists argue we can only be certain of the present, while eternalists argue all moments exist in the four-dimensional structure. The debate is not merely philosophical but has implications for physics. Presentists might argue that time travel to the past is impossible because the past doesn't exist, while eternalists might argue it's possible because the past exists as a dimension.

Two major philosophical views of time exist: eternalism and presentism. Eternalism holds that past, present, and future events coexist simultaneously along the time axis, with all moments equally real. Presentism argues that only the present moment truly exists, with past and future being mere concepts. Einstein's relativity supports eternalism by eliminating absolute simultaneity—whether events occur simultaneously depends on the observer's reference frame. This means there is no universal 'now' that all observers share.

Presentism holds that only the present moment exists, while eternalism (the block universe view) argues all times—past, present, and future—are equally real. In eternalism, the past has gone but still exists as part of spacetime, the future hasn't happened yet but already exists, and the present is just a dividing line with no real extent. This creates philosophical tension about whether free will exists if the future is already determined.
The logical structure of a 'reductio ad absurdum' (proof by contradiction), which McTaggart employs to show that the A-series is inherently contradictory.

McTaggart presents the central contradiction: past, present, and future are incompatible determinations—no event can be more than one at the same time. Yet for time to produce change (from future to present to past), each event must have all three characteristics successively. This creates a vicious circle: explaining how events have all three characteristics requires presupposing time, which is what we're trying to explain. Attempting to resolve this by placing the first A-series within a second produces the same problem infinitely, demonstrating that the contradiction cannot be removed.

McTaggart's argument involves two series: the A-series (past, present, future) which is dynamic and changes, and the B-series (earlier than, later than) which is static. McTaggart argues that the A-series leads to contradictions because an event cannot be both past and future simultaneously. This suggests that time as we commonly understand it may not exist as a real feature of reality.

McTaggart distinguished two ways of ordering temporal events: the B series orders events by the 'earlier than' relation (timeless ordering), while the A series orders events by past, present, and future (indexical ordering). McTaggart argued that events must have both A and B properties, and he claimed the A series is incoherent because it leads to contradictions. However, the A and B series are complementary ways of describing the same reality, not competing metaphysical theories. The A series is indexical (depends on when you speak), while the B series is timeless.

McTaggart argues that Series A is contradictory because every event would have to be present, past, and future simultaneously. For any event M, if it is present, it cannot be past or future. But if it is future, it will be present and past. If it is past, it was future and will be present. Since these three determinations are incompatible, no event can have all three at once, making Series A impossible. The reply to this contradiction is that events do not have all three determinations simultaneously—they occupy different positions successively. However, to avoid this contradiction, one must invoke a second-level series of temporal positions (was future, will be past, etc.), which creates nine new positions. Even with this solution, there are still incompatible determinations, requiring ascent to a third level indefinitely. This creates an infinite regress where we can never escape contradictions.

This lecture introduces J.M.E. McTaggart's influential argument that time does not exist. McTaggart distinguishes two ways of ordering events: A properties (being past, present, future) which are impermanent, and B relations (being earlier than, later than, simultaneous) which are permanent. The A series orders events by A properties, while the B series orders events by B relations. McTaggart's argument consists of three premises: (1) there can be no time without change, (2) the A series is necessary for change, and (3) the A series is contradictory. From these premises, he concludes that time does not exist. The argument is logically valid, meaning that if one accepts all premises, one is forced to accept the conclusion.
The philosophical definition of 'change' and why a coherent account of change is considered essential to any definition of time.

Change occurs when one entity has two different properties at two different times. For example, if you change your hairstyle from a floof to a mohawk, that is change because the same entity (you) has two different properties (hairstyles) at two different times. This definition of change is fundamental to understanding the metaphysics of time.

Change is fundamentally a variation with respect to time. When we say something has changed, we mean it has a different property at one time than at another. This requires a temporal reference frame. Without time, there is no way to compare states and thus no way to talk about change. This is why the concept of change is tied to the concept of time.

At its most general level, time can be understood simply as the accounting of change. Reality is not static—it is characterized by events happening and things changing. In this sense, time is not a substance or dimension but merely a way of numbering or sequencing changes as they occur. This ancient philosophical definition remains compatible with modern physics, though it differs significantly from the precise mathematical treatments used in relativity and quantum mechanics. The fundamental equations of physics describe how things change relative to each other, which is essentially what this general conception of time captures.

According to the Real Academia Española, time is defined as the duration of things subject to change. The word 'mudanza' (change) is crucial: if there were no change, there would be no time. Time is linked to movement - we can only measure time by moving from one place to another. This definition establishes that time is fundamentally connected to change and motion in the universe.

One philosophical approach defines time as the fact that something changes, moving from future to present and then to past. This conception of time as change or transition provides a basis for understanding temporal duration. The seminar explores whether this definition captures the essential nature of time.
Prerequisite Knowledge
- Concept 01The basic distinction between the A-series (past, present, future) and the B-series (earlier than, later than) of temporal ordering.
- Concept 02Fundamental concepts in the metaphysics of time, specifically the ontological debate between Presentism (only the present exists) and Eternalism (past, present, and future all exist).
- Concept 03The logical structure of a 'reductio ad absurdum' (proof by contradiction), which McTaggart employs to show that the A-series is inherently contradictory.
- Concept 04The philosophical definition of 'change' and why a coherent account of change is considered essential to any definition of time.
Subsequent Learning
- Step 01The B-Theory of Time (Tenseless Theory) and how its proponents argue that time can exist and be real using only the B-series, rejecting McTaggart's premise.
- Step 02The A-Theory of Time (Tensed Theory) responses, including Arthur Prior's Tense Logic, which attempts to formalize and defend tensed propositions against McTaggart's paradox.
- Step 03McTaggart's 'C-series', which is the non-temporal, static ordering of events that he proposes underlies our illusion of time.
- Step 04The implications of McTaggart's philosophy on modern physics, specifically how his rejection of a global 'present' aligns with or differs from Einstein's Special Theory of Relativity.
Contradiction
0:00- 1
Argues time is unreal due to A-series contradiction.
- 2
No event can be past, present, and future simultaneously.
- 3
Every event must hold all three temporal positions over time.
The B-Theory of Time (Tenseless Theory)
The B-Theory of Time directly challenges McTaggart's conclusion by arguing that time is real and does not require the A-series (past, present, future) to exist. Popularized by philosophers like Bertrand Russell and D.H. Mellor, the B-theory posits that time consists entirely of tenseless relations: 'earlier than,' 'simultaneous with,' and 'later than.' In this view, often associated with eternalism and the 'block universe,' all events across past, present, and future are equally real. Change is redefined not as a shifting 'now,' but simply as an object having different properties at different times (for example, a leaf being green at time t1 and brown at time t2). By dismissing the objective existence of the A-series, B-theorists dissolve McTaggart's paradox of contradiction. This perspective aligns closely with modern physics, specifically Einstein's theory of relativity, which rejects a universal, absolute present.
The B-Theory of Time (Tenseless Theory) and how its proponents argue that time can exist and be real using only the B-series, rejecting McTaggart's premise.
![God Isn't Real! Unless... Come debate! [7/24/2026]](https://i.ytimg.com/vi/nwrxlp85cp8/maxresdefault.jpg)
The B-theory of time (eternalism) is explained as the view that all moments in time are equally real and exist simultaneously, like a block universe. Under this view, the past, present, and future are all actual, just at different temporal locations. This contrasts with the A-theory of time, which holds that only the present moment is real. The debater explains that under the B-theory, a mind could exist necessarily at specific times without existing at all times, which has implications for discussions about God's nature and the nature of reality.

John McTaggart, an early 20th-century philosopher, developed two theories of time. The A-series (tensed theory) centers on the present moment, distinguishing past, present, and future. The B-series (untensed theory) uses time coordinates (like labeling moments from the Big Bang) without reference to past/present/future. McTaggart argued both theories are internally incoherent, concluding that time itself is unreal—a position known as McTaggartian anti-realism.

The B-theory of time (tenseless theory) proposes that time is a static four-dimensional block universe where all events—past, present, and future—exist simultaneously. According to this view, the flow of time and the distinction between past, present, and future are subjective illusions. Temporal relations are defined only by 'earlier than' or 'later than' relationships. This theory challenges the common intuition that time flows in a linear direction.

McTaggart proposed two fundamental ways to organize temporal positions: Series A organizes events according to present, past, and future (or more past, more future), while Series B organizes events according to temporal relations like 'prior to' and 'posterior to' (or 'simultaneous with'). Theory A holds that properties like present, past, and future are fundamental and irreducible to prior/posterior relations. Theory B holds that these properties reduce entirely to prior and posterior relations. For Theory B proponents, present, past, and future are not real classifications of reality, while for Theory A proponents, they are real classifications alongside the temporal organization of events. Theory A implies a real flow of time, while Theory B allows for change but denies the flow of time.

J.M.E. McTaggart proposed that the A-series (our intuitive conception of time with present, past, and future) is logically incoherent because any moment simultaneously possesses contradictory properties. McTaggart argued only the B-series remains—where events are ordered by 'earlier than' and 'later than' relations without any present moment. This theory influenced modern philosophy of time, though contemporary philosophers generally accept that change can exist without requiring a moving present moment, resolving McTaggart's perceived contradiction.
The A-Theory of Time (Tensed Theory) responses, including Arthur Prior's Tense Logic, which attempts to formalize and defend tensed propositions against McTaggart's paradox.

One response to McTaggart's paradox, the tenseless or B theory response, accepts McTaggart's argument that the A series is contradictory but denies that time requires the A series. It argues that the B series is sufficient for real time—that earlier-later relations constitute time, and passage is an illusion, a feature of our temporal perspective. The universe exists as a four-dimensional block, a block universe where all times are equally real and past, present, and future are not objective features of reality but are indexical, relative to a perspective. This B theory has become orthodoxy in philosophy of time, widely accepted as avoiding McTaggart's paradox while preserving the reality of time. Another response, the tensed or A theory response, denies that the A series is contradictory, arguing that McTaggart's argument involves a mistake—that A series properties are not really contradictory because they are indexed to times in a non-propositional way. The meeting being future at t1 and past at t2 is not contradictory—it is just the normal way temporal properties work. A-theorists argue that passage is real, that the present is objectively real, that the future is open and the past is fixed, and that McTaggart's argument fails because it assumes A series properties must be simultaneous to be contradictory when they are not.

Arthur Prior invented tense logic with two diamonds: F (forward-looking, future) and P (backward-looking, past). Corresponding boxes are G (always in the future) and H (always in the past). For example, Fφ means 'at some point in the future φ', while Gφ means 'at all points in the future φ'. Prior realized that the validity of formulas like Fφ → FFφ implied that time was dense (between any two points there was a third), and he recognized that his language couldn't express irreflexivity (no temporal point precedes itself).

John McTaggart, an early 20th-century philosopher, developed two theories of time. The A-series (tensed theory) centers on the present moment, distinguishing past, present, and future. The B-series (untensed theory) uses time coordinates (like labeling moments from the Big Bang) without reference to past/present/future. McTaggart argued both theories are internally incoherent, concluding that time itself is unreal—a position known as McTaggartian anti-realism.

On a tenseless theory, God is the creator of the universe in the sense that the whole spacetime block and everything in it depends upon God for its existence. By a single timeless act, God makes it exist and causes all events to happen at their tenseless temporal locations. God never acquires or loses relations—He timelessly stands in the creator relation to all events at their respective times. There are no tensed facts; linguistic tense is merely egocentric, expressing subjective perspective. There is no objective truth about what is now happening—'now' merely signifies the time relative to which the judgment is made. Arguments for tensed theory: tensed sentences correspond to tensed facts and cannot be translated into tenseless sentences; experience of temporal becoming is veridical. Arguments against tensed theory: McTaggart's paradox results from marrying tenseless ontology with objective temporal becoming; passage of time is a metaphor. Arguments for tenseless theory: temporal becoming is compatible with relativity theory under neo-Lorentzian interpretation; physics time is an abstraction omitting indexical elements. Arguments against tenseless theory: relations ordering events are only gratuitously regarded as temporal; mind-dependent becoming is self-defeating.

The A theory, also called the dynamic or tensed theory of time, holds that time consists of moments ordered by past, present, and future which are real and objective aspects of reality. In this view, the past no longer exists, the present is real, and the future is pure potentiality that has not yet come to be. Things in time come into existence and pass out of existence, creating real objective temporal becoming. This theory uses tenses (past tense, present tense, future tense) to express objective features of reality.
McTaggart's 'C-series', which is the non-temporal, static ordering of events that he proposes underlies our illusion of time.

J.M.E. McTaggart, a British idealist philosopher, proposed that time consists of three series: the A-Series (past, present, future) which he argued contains logical contradictions because events move from future to present to past; the B-Series (before, during, after) which is logically consistent but static; and the C-Series, a non-temporal reality that explains both the A-Series and B-Series as mere appearances. McTaggart concluded that time is illusory, with only the C-Series being real, though he maintained that individuals themselves are fundamental categories of reality, distinguishing his 'personal idealism' from absolute idealism.

McTaggart introduces the C-series as a non-temporal series of permanent relations between events—order without temporal passage. He argues that time requires both an A-series (for change) and a C-series (for permanent order), with the B-series emerging from their combination. McTaggart contends that while both distinctions are essential to time, the A-series is more fundamental because it cannot be defined—it can only be shown by examples. He responds to objections: fictional series aren't really in time, but when believed to be existent, they're believed to be in an A-series; multiple independent time series don't contradict his thesis since the theory lacks positive evidence. The essentiality of the A-series for time remains valid.

J.M.E. McTaggart developed a sophisticated analysis of time distinguishing three series: the A series (past-present-future) which changes as time progresses, the B series (earlier-later relationships) which are eternally true and tenseless, and the C series which represents a non-temporal order underlying both. McTaggart argued that the A series is illusory because facts don't change only in respect to it. This analysis implies that principles applicable to any time—whether past or future—are uniformly applicable across all times. Understanding time as a whole requires a uniform methodology that transcends naive presentism, representing a fundamental shift in how we conceptualize temporal experience.

McTaggart introduces three distinct ways to conceptualize time. The C series describes events through objective betweenness - some events are between others (e.g., Leonard Cohen recording is between McTaggart's paper and the video). This lacks directionality and represents what McTaggart considers genuinely real. The B series adds temporal distance and direction using statements like 'A happened 170 years before B,' which are timeless truths that never change. The A series describes events in terms of their temporal status relative to the present - future, present, or past. McTaggart argues that for time to exist, an A series must be present, but since the A series is logically inconsistent, time cannot be real.

McTaggart's positive account involves a B series, an A series with pastness, presentness, and futurity, and temporal becoming. There is another interpretation where temporal relations are analyzable in terms of the application of the A series to the non-temporal C series. The direction of time is grounded in A properties moving along a non-temporal C series. On the modified A theory, temporal relations are not primitive but depend on A characteristics, and events cannot stand in temporal relations unless they exemplify A properties.
The implications of McTaggart's philosophy on modern physics, specifically how his rejection of a global 'present' aligns with or differs from Einstein's Special Theory of Relativity.

This concluding section presents McTaggart's influential argument that time as we experience it—with present, past, and future determinations—is ultimately unreal. When imagining a world without observers, these temporal determinations lose their meaning. Only temporal relations between events (before, after, simultaneously) seem to have objective reality independent of consciousness. This divides philosophical doctrines: philosophy of concept (Aristotle, Carnap) reduces time to orders of succession and relations, treating temporal determinations as subjective; philosophy of consciousness (Saint Augustine, Bergson) holds that time cannot be conceived without present, past, and future determinations which are irreducible. Einstein himself was troubled by the problem of the present moment, noting that while physics can describe temporal succession, it cannot explain why the present has special significance for human experience—a difference that cannot be demonstrated within physics.

In 1908, John McTaggart published a revolutionary article arguing that time does not exist. He divided time into two series: B-Series (static sequence of events organized as 'earlier than' and 'later than') and A-Series (dynamic experience with past, present, and future). McTaggart argued that while B-Series alone creates a frozen sequence, real time requires A-Series with flowing present. However, he proved this creates contradiction: any event was once future, became present, and is now past—three mutually exclusive properties simultaneously. This infinite regress destroys the concept of real time. The most influential response is the Block Universe theory, which proposes that all of spacetime—past, present, and future—exists simultaneously as a single block. We don't move through time; instead, we are extended objects within this four-dimensional structure. What we call 'now' is merely a slice we experience, while all other slices exist equally. Change is just difference between points in the block, not actual temporal becoming. This theory surprisingly aligns well with Einstein's relativity, suggesting McTaggart may have been partially correct about time's nature.

In Einstein's theory of relativity, there is no universal now. Two observers moving differently through space may disagree about whether two events happened at the same time, and they would both be right. The past, present, and future aren't universal but are smeared across your frame of reference. Philosopher John McTaggart divided time into two models: the A-series (past, present, future) and the B-series (before and after). He argued that the A-series is logically incoherent because it requires time to move relative to something else, leading to an infinite regress. Time may not be fundamental but an illusion emerging from the dance of hidden variables, deeper dimensions, and more primitive rules.

The Einsteinian revolution transformed physics of time completely. Special relativity eliminated Newton's absolute time by demonstrating that simultaneity is relative to the observer's reference frame and that the rate of passage of time depends on relative velocity. General relativity added dependence of the rate of passage of time on the gravitational field. If simultaneity is relative, then the set of events that compose the present of any observer is different from the present of any other observer in relative motion. There is no universal present shared by all observers. Philosophers like Hilary Putnam have argued that this relativity of the present implies that all moments of time, past, present, and future, have the same ontological reality—a view called eternalism or the block universe.

The alternative view of time holds that time does not flow, and that the categories of past, present, and future describe how we experience reality rather than how reality actually is. According to this view, there are no events that belong to the past, present, or future in reality; these are categories we apply to events for various reasons. This view has gained significant support from McTaggart's logical argument (1908, 1925) that the naive view leads to logical contradiction, and from interpretations of Einstein's relativity theory. Einstein's special relativity has been interpreted to support the static view, where past, present, and future are not objective categories but subjective categories describing how humans experience reality. The events in the universe are arranged in a four-dimensional block universe, where all events exist simultaneously, and the distinction between past, present, and future is a matter of perspective rather than objective reality.
Contradiction
0:00- 1
Argues time is unreal due to A-series contradiction.
- 2
No event can be past, present, and future simultaneously.
- 3
Every event must hold all three temporal positions over time.
The B-Theory of Time (Tenseless Theory)
The B-Theory of Time directly challenges McTaggart's conclusion by arguing that time is real and does not require the A-series (past, present, future) to exist. Popularized by philosophers like Bertrand Russell and D.H. Mellor, the B-theory posits that time consists entirely of tenseless relations: 'earlier than,' 'simultaneous with,' and 'later than.' In this view, often associated with eternalism and the 'block universe,' all events across past, present, and future are equally real. Change is redefined not as a shifting 'now,' but simply as an object having different properties at different times (for example, a leaf being green at time t1 and brown at time t2). By dismissing the objective existence of the A-series, B-theorists dissolve McTaggart's paradox of contradiction. This perspective aligns closely with modern physics, specifically Einstein's theory of relativity, which rejects a universal, absolute present.
welcome back to cares.org today we're going to be continuing with the unreality of time looking at MC taggert's famous argument in this video we're going to be looking at the third part of the argument is time contradictory where MCT tager is going to claim to demonstrate that the a series is contradictory and therefore since from the previous arguments the Aeries is necessary to time and therefore something that's necessary to time is contradictory and so time is unreal let's take a look so the second half of MCT Tag's argument is that time is unreal because the a series is contradictory MCT tager will claim that since no one event can be past present and future but also every event must at some time be past present and future time is unreal he will further demonstrate that using time to attempt to resolve this problem will only create a vicious Circle one way to formulate this argument might be as follows no one event can be more than one of past present and future all events are at some point past present and future according to the a series therefore the a series that uses past present and future is contradictory because every event can't be any more than one of past present or future and yet all events are past present and future since time relies from the previous argument on a contradictory series therefore time is unreal premise two should be clear all events are at some point past present and future start of World War I is past and was present and it was future you watching this video is present will be past and was future and the Heat of the universe is Future and will at some point in the future be present and then past so each moment in time is going to pass through future present and eventually past this might in turn lead you to doubt premise one you might claim that no event is PR past present and future at the same time but they are past present and future at different times but the problem with this is according to MC tagert you must assume that time is real to escape the problem basically you have to assume that time passes to state that this is going to work and the reality of time is exactly what is at question here to do so is going to be to beg the question against MCT taggert's position according to him we take for granted that events and objects can have different properties at different times but in order to do so we must assume that time self is real and yet to prove that time is real we must posit it that events and objects have different properties at different times according to MC tager this creates a vicious circle therefore time is unreal in the next video we'll be looking at objections to the unreality of time in all of its forms watch this video and more here at cares.org and stay skeptical everybody
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