Gen. Jack Keane: Why Israel Must Dismantle Hamas

The United States has limited its response to proxy forces in Iraq and Syria while explicitly ruling out strikes inside Iran. This approach removes pressure on Iran by taking potential options off the table, contradicting historical wisdom that effective deterrence requires maintaining ambiguity about possible responses. Around 2020, Iran granted greater autonomy to proxy groups, allowing them to operate independently while still benefiting from Iranian support. This creates a false separation that shields Iran from consequences while enabling continued attacks on American interests.

This segment analyzes why Iran shows no deterrence effect despite American military threats. Iran's strategic calculation rests on three assessments: American action cannot produce regime change because Iranian state foundations are more resilient than assumed; Iranian retaliatory capability (including Hormuz closure) imposes costs that strain American escalation before global economic consequences become politically unsustainable; and the international environment (Russia, China, developing world) limits American campaign duration. This framework was forged over 50 years of failed sanctions, assassinations, and military threats that consistently produced the opposite of intended effects, creating an institutional conviction that external pressure is a problem to be solved rather than a condition to be accepted.

Traditional deterrence theory requires clear communications, credible threats, and positive inducements. The Trump administration's 12-point demands represented compellence rather than deterrence, demanding Iran abandon activities it considers vital to survival. U.S. deterrence posture has been weak and inconsistent, with multiple provocations—including attacks on shipping and the September 2019 drone strikes—going unanswered until the December 2019 killing of Soleimani. Effective deterrence requires balancing punishment, denial, and positive incentives. The JCPOA successfully combined all three elements, whereas current policy lacks this balance and has counterproductively empowered Iranian hardliners.

The United States has demonstrated a complete breakdown of deterrence against Iran. Despite Iran directly attacking Israel, funding terrorist proxies like Hezbollah and Hamas, and targeting Americans and dissidents abroad, the US government has been reluctant to take strong action. This lack of response sends signals to the regime that they can act with impunity, emboldening them to continue aggressive policies.

This segment presents a comprehensive analysis of US strategic deterrence policy toward Iran. The speaker argues that Iran is already at war with the United States, having killed American servicemen, and that continued reactive US policy will lead to escalation across the Middle East and globally. Iran's advanced ballistic and cruise missile capabilities enable strikes on Eastern India and Mainland Europe. The US maintains approximately 3,500 troops in the region to prevent Iran from resupplying allied forces. The speaker emphasizes that deterrence requires strong, decisive responses calibrated to achieve strategic objectives without triggering broader conflict. The same military action would be perceived differently depending on whether it comes from a strong or weak administration, with perceived weakness requiring stronger counter-responses.

In urban asymmetric warfare, the Law of Armed Conflict requires military commanders to take all feasible measures to protect civilians while pursuing legitimate military objectives, including issuing warnings, establishing humanitarian corridors, and implementing proportionality assessments; however, when facing enemies who deliberately use civilians as human shields and prevent evacuation, commanders face impossible moral choices where even well-intentioned operations inevitably cause civilian casualties, and the law distinguishes between conduct-based obligations (which require commanders to demonstrate good faith efforts to minimize harm) and result-based judgments (which recognize that killing civilians, while tragic, does not automatically constitute a war crime if the commander acted reasonably in attempting to avoid civilian harm).

International humanitarian law requires protecting civilians regardless of the origin of conflict. The speaker acknowledges the tragedy of civilian casualties in urban warfare against terrorist organizations that operate from civilian surroundings. The challenge involves alerting civilians, eradicating hostile infrastructure, and enabling return, while minimizing harm to innocent populations caught in the crossfire of asymmetric warfare.

The existing laws of armed conflict remain applicable to asymmetric conflicts against non-state terrorist organizations, as these laws are designed to protect civilians and achieve a realistic balance between military necessity and civilian protection through the principles of distinction and proportionality, rather than relying on reciprocity between state actors; international law evolves through practice and adaptation to new situations rather than requiring entirely new frameworks.

International humanitarian law protects civilians even in asymmetric warfare, but distinguishing between civilians and armed settlers becomes increasingly difficult as settlers become better armed. Settlers may have crossed from civilian to combatant status, supported by the Israeli military as vanguard forces. A survey found over 80% of Israeli Jews support Palestinian displacement from Gaza. The Free Flotilla interception in international waters constitutes a clear violation of international law, involving armed attacks that resulted in casualties and detention of participants.

International Humanitarian Law (IHL) principles—distinction, proportionality, precautions, and military necessity—become exponentially more challenging to apply in urban warfare against asymmetric enemies who may not comply with these rules; however, the obligation to strictly comply with IHL remains regardless of the enemy's behavior, as the central purpose of IHL is to reduce civilian suffering, and the principle of reciprocity does not alleviate this obligation even when the enemy violates these rules.

The Gaza conflict has evolved into a multi-front war involving multiple actors. In addition to the Gaza front, there is a Lebanon front involving Hezbollah, a West Bank front, and involvement from the Houthis in Yemen. Hezbollah has been measured and disciplined in its escalation, using increasingly sophisticated weapons including Buran missiles carrying 300-500 kilograms of explosives. The Houthis have launched ballistic missiles and drone swarms, and have successfully shot down an MQ-9 Reaper drone. This multi-front dynamic complicates military operations and creates regional instability.

The Iran-aligned Houthis in Yemen have declared war on Israel in response to the Israeli military bombing campaign and incursion into Gaza, launching ballistic missile attacks against Israeli positions in the occupied territories; this escalation raises concerns about potential wider regional conflict involving Iran, Hezbollah, and other actors, as the Houthis possess modern weapons including ballistic missiles capable of threatening US bases in the Arabian Peninsula.

The Middle East faces imminent escalation across multiple fronts as Israel seeks to divert attention from internal Western reckoning regarding war crimes committed by citizens serving in Zionist military forces. Following international focus on achieving ceasefires and providing Gaza aid, Western societies face internal accountability movements. To prevent this, Zionist interests benefit from reactivating wars in Lebanon, Yemen, or Iran. Evidence includes Israeli military exercises on the Golan Heights hinting at potential invasion of Lebanon, with new occupation points established near critical highways in Syria and Lebanon. Meanwhile, Syria stands at a precipice of armed struggle as tribes in Daraa province announce they are arming themselves and contacting Iran and Hezbollah to resist Israeli occupation. This represents the emergence of a local Sunni militia—the biggest threat to Al-Qaeda leadership and their Jewish supremacist allies—threatening to quell unrest within the Sunni majority that Al-Qaeda seeks to control.

The Houthis have explicitly cited the Genocide Convention in their Red Sea counter-blockade, arguing they signed this international document stating responsibility to prevent genocide. They are fulfilling international obligations to stop Gaza's genocide. The Axis of Resistance works gradually, not like a classical army. In Iraq, they told Americans: if you don't stop Israelis and cover their back at the UN, you are responsible and we will hit you. In Lebanon, they started bombing only Israeli positions in occupied areas, not inland, with light weapons telling Israelis: 'If we increase attacks, you won't stop the Gaza war but it will cost you anyway.' The Americans continue because they have full UN support and weapon supply.

This extended analysis covers three major terrorist organizations with distinct threat profiles. Hamas, responsible for the October 7 attacks, faces a critical survival phase with depleted resources and concerning European weapons networks indicating plans for attacks outside the Middle East. Hezbollah, the world's most heavily armed non-state actor, has been severely weakened by Israeli strikes and loss of Syrian supply routes, with 70% of its rocket arsenal destroyed and nearly its entire leadership eliminated. The Houthis, controlling large parts of Yemen, have evolved into the most technologically innovative and resilient group within the Axis of Resistance, possessing state-level military capabilities including ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and unmanned surface vessels. The Houthis demonstrated unique capability to disrupt global economic order by sinking merchant vessels in 2025. While showing no interest in attacks on the US homeland or Europe, the Houthis pose an acute threat to global economic security and maritime safety, capable of attacking Israel and Western military installations with considerable precision.