Professor Tom Regan on Animal Rights Philosophy: An Academic Lecture

Added:

The Cat's Plight
Defining Advocacy
Three Paths
Damascus Moments
The Muddler's Path
Seeking Answers
Rights Defined
Asking Questions
Consistency Test
Subjects of Life

The Cat's Plight

0:09
Playing Section
  • 1

    Describes a disturbing video of a cat being killed for food in China.

  • 2

    Explores the speaker's shock and the universal human compassion for the cat.

  • 3

    Uses this reaction as a foundation to define animal rights advocacy.

Introduction to Deontological Ethics (Kantianism), specifically the distinction between treating beings as ends-in-themselves versus mere means.
The fundamental difference between Consequentialist ethics (such as Utilitarianism) and Non-Consequentialist (rights-based) ethics.
The philosophical concepts of 'Moral Agency' (beings capable of moral reasoning) and 'Moral Patienthood' (beings to whom moral duties are owed).
An understanding of the traditional philosophical views on animal minds, such as René Descartes' view of animals as mindless automata.
A comparative study of Tom Regan's deontological rights theory versus Peter Singer's preference utilitarian framework for animal liberation.
The Abolitionist Approach to animal rights, pioneered by Gary Francione, which focuses on ending the property status of non-human animals.
The legal philosophy of non-human personhood and the practical efforts of groups like the Nonhuman Rights Project to secure habeas corpus for animals.
Relational and care-based critiques of Regan's rationalist rights framework, such as those found in Ecofeminist animal ethics.
Political philosophy applications of animal rights, notably the concept of animal citizenship as proposed in Donaldson and Kymlicka's 'Zoopolis'.
23.1K views394likes49:55@rainerebertOriginal Release: 2016-11-12

Animals have moral rights because they are 'subjects-of-a-life'—beings who are aware of what happens to them and for whom what happens matters to them, making their lives valuable in themselves regardless of their utility to humans; this moral status is determined by their capacity for conscious experience and welfare, not by traits like moral responsibility, self-awareness, or language ability, which would inconsistently exclude beings like human infants from moral consideration.