The Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), Italo-Turkish War (1911-1912), and Balkan Wars (1912-1913) collectively demonstrated that modern warfare could be won through decisive naval victories and strategic planning rather than prolonged attrition, while simultaneously destabilizing the Balkans and shifting European power dynamics in ways that contributed to the outbreak of World War I.
Pre-WWI Conflicts: Russo-Japanese, Italo-Turkish, Balkan Wars
Added:A group of Japanese warships slips silently through the night towards their unsuspecting prey. The Pacific fleet is at anchor, not realizing that Japan is about to launch a sneak attack to wipe out their main naval base and expand Japan’s influence in Asia. But it’s not 1941 – it's 1904, and the fleet in danger is Russian. The war that is about to break out will see dramatic sieges, the largest land battle in history up to that time, machine guns and modern artillery slaughter thousands, and one of the most crushing naval victories of all time. Japan will be vaulted to Great Power status, while Russia will quake with revolution. It’s World War Zero, the Russo-Japanese War.
Hi, I’m Jesse Alexander and welcome to The Great War. By the late 19th century, Japan had emerged as a modern power after centuries of isolation. Under the Meiji Restoration, the government prioritized the adoption of western science, dress, and military technology. The pace of change astonished outsiders like journalist George Rittner: “In less than twenty years Japan has acquired the knowledge it has taken us centuries to learn.” (Paine 49) Japanese leaders decided to put the country’s new advantages to use and defeated Imperial China in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894. Japan was the now the strongest power in East Asia, and this new status led to rivalries with the European Great Powers – especially Russia. After its defeat in the Crimean War in the 1850s, the Russian Empire turned its attention to further expansion in the Far East. The city of VladivostOk was founded in 1860 and its very name made Russian intentions clear: “Lord of the East.” From 1894, Tsar Nicholas II tried to increase Russian influence in Manchuria and Korea despite the opposition of some ministers. After the Sino-Japanese war, Russian and the other European powers forced Japan to give up the strategic naval base at Port Arthur, which Russia then forced the Chinese to lease to it.
Russian troops also participated in suppressing the Boxer Rebellion in China in 1900-1903, and stayed in Manchuria afterwards. To Japanese leaders, the situation was intolerable. In their eyes, Russia was threatening Korea and Japan itself – a so-called “dagger pointed at the heart of Japan.” So Japan went looking for allies, and found one in Great Britain. The British were worried about potential Russian expansion towards British India, so in 1902 Japan and the United Kingdom formed an alliance. This agreement meant that Russia and Japan would face each other one-on-one if it came to war. The weak emperors of China and Korea decided it would be best to remain neutral even if fighting broke out on their soil.
So by 1904 Russian and Japanese ambitions in the Far East had reached breaking point.
After brief negotiations failed, Japan began to prepare its new army and navy for war.
In 1904, 82 percent of Japan’s national budget went to the military, which had grown to around 400,000 men. The army modelled itself on the Prussian General Staff, prioritized education, leadership, and morale. They also tried to replace old clan loyalties with Japanese patriotism: “The principal duty of soldiers is loyalty to Sovereign and Country.
It improbable that anyone born in this country will be wanting in patriotism; but for soldiers this virtue is so essential that unless a man is strong in patriotism he will be unfit for service… [Remember] always that duty is heavier than a mountain […] while death is lighter than a feather.” (Hamby 344) The Imperial Japanese Navy modelled itself on Britain’s Royal Navy and boasted state-of-the-art, British-built capital ships. In 1904, it had the fourth biggest fleet in the world, including 6 battleships and 6 battle cruisers. Britain also cooperated with Japan in intelligence, and the Japense built an effective network of informants in the Russian Far East. Meanwhile Russia’s military was stagnating. There were some quality units in its 1 million strong army, but only 150,000 of these were in the Far East. The vast majority of the conscripts were poorly trained, motivated, and led. The officer corps was still the product of aristocratic favoritism, and non-noble officers were rare since they were considered politically unreliable . The situation was no better in the navy – many sailors came from landlocked provinces with little maritime experience, and they complained that the officers didn’t even know their names. In Port Arthur and Vladivostok it had 7 battleships and 11 cruisers, but these ships were of an older design than those of the Japanese.
So the Japanese set out to plan the coming war, and their strategic thinking was dominated by the navy. Its first strike would be planned in minute detail.
Japan’s war plan was to defeat the Russian fleet, win decisive battles on land, and then achieve a favorable peace deal. Russia’s financial and manpower resources were far greater than Japan’s, so the Japanese wanted to win a short war to force the Russians out of Korea and China’s Liaodong Peninsula. The Japanese high command planned to land troops in Korea, and push north into Manchuria. Further landings would cut off Port Arthur and open another line of advance from the Liaodong Peninsula. Japanese troops would then join forces for a major battle and push the Russians back to Harbin. The Japanese hoped that at that point the United States would intervene diplomatically and broker a peace treaty.
But for any of this to work, Japan’s maritime supply and logistical routes must be secured, this meant crippling the Russian navy in a surprise attack.
The Russian government, on the other hand, didn’t plan on war with Japan – in spite of encouragement from the German Kaiser. Saint Petersburg was convinced of its racial superiority and the Tsar assumed war would break out only if he decided to start one.
The Russian chain of command in the Far East was equally unprepared. Minister of War Aleksey KuropAtkin was in charge of the military, but in Manchuria he was subordinate to Viceroy YevgEni AleksEyev, and the two did not get along. In case of war with Japan, Kuropatkin wanted to retreat and wait for reinforcements from Europe. Alekseyev wanted to stand and fight, and his opinion counted for more since he was the Tsar’s favorite uncle.
Japan was ready, and declared war on Russian on February 8, 1904. Before the declaration arrived in Saint Petersburg, the Japanese Combined Fleet arrived at Port Arthur.
The Russian Pacific Fleet was not overly worried about a Japanese attack. The ships had anchored outside the main harbor and some torpedo nets had been laid, but few ships were on full alert and many sailors were ashore in Port Arthur’s bars – there was even a party on the flagship PetropAvlovsk. Admiral Togo was worried that Russian coastal batteries might put his irreplaceable battleships at risk, so he planned a night-time sneak attack.
The capital ships waited at some distance while 10 destroyers armed with torpedoes crept up on the unsuspecting Russian ships in the darkness. At 11:30PM, the first four Japanese destroyers launched their torpedoes from a distance of 650 meters. 6 missed their targets, but 2 hit the cruisers PallAda and RetvizAn. The Russians opened fire on the second group of destroyers, forcing them to fire their torpedoes from 1.5 km away. A Russian sailor recalled the moment the battleship TsesarEvich was hit: “At 11.38 p.m. the commander heard the order “torpedo defense” in the cabin. To get dressed and on deck was a matter of two minutes. During this they opened fire (…). Barely on deck, the commander recognized two Japanese torpedo boats at the rear (…) and a torpedo aiming at the ship from port. A second later the explosion occurred.” (Jacob 29) Togo ordered his fleet to close in, but the Russian coastal batteries soon forced the Japanese vessels back. No Japanese ships were lost, but only a few Russian ships were damaged and all could be repaired. Psychologically though, the attack had shaken the Russians and achieved its strategic goal, since the cautious Russian commanders ordered their fleet to stay in Port Arthur. This gave the Japanese a free hand to continue landing troops as planned. In fact before the Port Arthur attack, the Japanese started landing 3000 troops at in Korea at the international port of Chemulpo. Two Russian warships watched closely but couldn’t intervene in a neutral port. Eventually, in contravention of international law, the Japanese told the Russian ships they had to leave the harbor or face destruction. The Russians faced impossible odds, but hoisted their battle flags and engaged the Japanese. British captain Captain Lewis Bayly witnessed the scene: “Here were 694 Russian officers and men going to almost certain death - for no one expected them, or at any rate many of them, to survive the most unequal conflict - and yet they had their bands playing and were cheering, and their cheers were heartily returned by about four hundred British officers and men, who felt very sorry for them, and admired their pluck in giving battle.” (Warner 192) The waiting Japanese defeated the Russians in the Battle of Chemulpo Bay, and the Russian commanders scuttled their ships.
The Russo-Japanese war began at sea, but without a decisive engagement. Instead, the focus of the war now shifted to the land.
The Japanese First Army landed 42,000 men in Korea, and planned to land more at DAlniy to cut off Port Arthur. For the additional landing, First Army would have to push back the 19,000 men of the Russian Eastern Detachment along the Yalu and Ai rivers. The first clashes pitted Russian Cossacks against the Japanese in wintery conditions. Despite the Cossacks’ fierce reputation, military translator Usa Ogihiko was unimpressed: “The Cossack army is an army in name only. In fact they are nothing more than trick riders. There are several hundred thousand Cossacks, but if all of them were to come together, what would they be able to do? They are useless soldiers in a war.” (Hosokawa Gentarō, pp.141-2) The fast-flowing Yalu river was a natural defensive position, but the Russian chain of command was disorganized. Kuropatkin ordered local commander General Mikhail ZasUlich to retreat if attacked, while Alekseyev told him to stand firm. Zasulich chose to stay and fight. The Japanese dug artillery pits to hide their guns, and scouts disguised as Korean fishermen reconnoitered Russian positions. The Russians, on the other hand, moved around openly and didn’t camouflage their large artillery carriages. Japanese engineers also built a large bridge in plain sight of the Russian artillerymen, who opened fire and exposed their gun positions even further. Japanese counter-battery fire from concealed guns then knocked out many Russian positions before the main attack began.
Zasulich expected the Japanese to attack near the wide, shallow mouth of the river, within range of their naval guns. Instead, the Japanese used what would become a common tactic in the war: 12th Division crossed the Yalu quite some distance from the Russian flank. Zasulich thought this was a feint and held his position, which allowed the 12th Division to capture the high ground and cross the Ai river after fierce fighting. Japanese Captain Takemine recalled: “The fierce battle lasted three hours, and all of those who fell were killed or wounded when crossing the Ai River. It is said that the soldiers, standing in the midst of the smoke and bullets, were in high spirits, and with a vigor that could never be seen in ordinary training, they chanted military songs in one voice and kept pace as they advanced. All is as it should be.” (Hosokawa Gentarō, p.102) With the Russian left flank collapsing, on May 1 the Japanese launched a general assault in the center across the Yalu. They drove the Russians from their trenches, where the Japanese artillery fired on them from the heights. Russian forces retreated to the gorges behind the river, which was also a defensible position if it weren’t for the confusion in the Russian command. Japanese poured fire onto the Russian columns and the 12th Division began to surround them. Lacking clear orders, some Russian units surrendered. The Battle of the Yalu river cost around 2000 Russian and 900 Japanese lives. Most Russian forces had escaped, but their most important positions in Manchuria were lost. The Japanese landings at Dalniy went ahead, and it seemed the war was going Japan’s way – foreign banks began to loan Japan much-needed cash as well.
After the battle on the Yalu, the Japanese were in position to move on the Russian naval base at Port Arthur from the landward side.
The arrival of Admiral StepAn MakArov at Port Arthur seemed to give the Russians some hope as he led aggressive naval sorties against the blockading Japanese fleet. But in April 1904 the flagship Petropavlovsk hit a Japanese mine and sank with all hands – including the admiral. To make matters worse, the Japanese Third Army moved up from Dalniy and besieged Port Arthur from the landward side. Japanese commander General Nogi, had captured the town in one day in the Sino-Japanese War, but in 1904 it would be a harder nut to crack. With concrete defences, barbed wire, machineguns, and hand grenades, the Russian garrison inflicted heavy losses on the first Japanese assaults. Nogi ordered suicidal human wave attacks, known as nikudan kogeki, or ‘human bullets’. In a single assault, the Japanese lost 16,000 men. Buddhist chaplain Mamiya Eijū recalled the carnage: “Some of them were missing half of their bodies, some had one arm and one leg removed, some had their heads torn off with only the skin attached, and some had their shoes filled with the flesh of their feet and were abandoned. When burned, they look like blackened rotten fish, and you couldn't know whose son or husband they once were. No illustration of the Buddhist hells has ever portrayed such cruelties.” (Takagi Suiu, Jinsei hachimenkan, 940) The Japanese government hid the scale of the losses from the public. With Port Arthur under threat, the Tsar ordered Admiral WIlgelm VItgeft (Wilhelm Withoeft) to take his ships and make a run to join the cruiser force at Vladivostok. Vitgeft was not happy about the order, but on August 10 the Pacific Fleet steamed out with 6 battleships, 4 cruisers, and 8 destroyers. Admiral Togo’s Combined Fleet had 4 battleships and 2 cruisers and smaller ships. Togo had previously lost 2 battleships to mines so he was reluctant to take risks, but he could not allow the Russian fleets to join. The Japanese first tried to sail across the front of the Russians in a maneuver known as “crossing the T,” but ended up behind the Russian ships. The Japanese chased the Russians while the fleets exchanged fire, and a heavy Russian 12-inch shell hit Togo’s flagship Mikasa. The Mikasa withdrew, but just as the Russians seemed to be slipping away, two Japanese 12-inch shells smashed into the Russian flagship TsesarEvich. Admiral Vitgeft was killed and the ship jammed in a port-ward turn. The Russian fleet panicked and lost cohesion, but was saved from disaster when the battleship RetvizAn charged at the Japanese. Pacific Fleet limped back to Port Arthur and decided to wait for reinforcements. Those reinforcements were the Baltic Fleet, which was re-named the 2nd Pacific Fleet and set off on an epic 8-month journey around the world in October.
So the Japanese had bottled up the Russian Pacific Fleet in Port Arthur and had the town surrounded. The Baltic Fleet was on the way, but before it arrived the fate of Port Arthur and the Pacific Fleet was decided.
In a series of battles throughout the summer of 1904, the Japanese army gradually drove Russian forces away from Port Arthur to defensive positions around the Manchurian town of Mukden. Then in January 1905, Port Arthur capitulated and Japanese artillery sunk the Russian Pacific Fleet in the harbor. The string of defeats caused much tenson amongst the Russians, including between Generals Samsonov and Rennenkampf, whose relations would not improve by the time they commanded at the Battle of Tannenberg in 1914. Interestingly a German military observer of this campaign was Max Hoffmann who later helped met the Russian generals again at the same battle during the First World War.
Japan had won a string of important victories so far, but they had suffered heavy casualties.
Russia’s much larger reserves meant it could replace its losses by sending fresh troops east on the Trans-Siberian Railway. Now that Port Arthur had fallen, five Japanese armies could join for the decisive battle their army staff had envisioned to avoid a long war. Japanese commander General Ōyama Iwao knew the Russians were planning a counterattack, so decided to strike first at Mukden. For the coming battle the Japanese concentrated 200,000 men, 7,300 cavalry and 1000 artillery pieces. The three Russians armies had around 275,000 men, 16,000 cavalry and 1,200 artillery pieces. The Japanese however, had about twice as many machine guns as the Russians. Ōyama planned to once again outflank the Russian position, and trap them in a pincer movement so that this time they could not escape. On February 17, the Japanese Army of the Yalu began to move through the hills of the Russian eastern flank. A strong artillery barrage pinned the Russian center and Kuropatkin assumed the main Japanese thrust was in the east. He shifted units across the 100km-long front, which weakened his western flank. And it was in the west that the Japanese Third Army launched its primary effort. General Nogi swung around Mukden to threaten the Russians’ lines of retreat. German military observer Captain von Beckmann recorded the Japanese use of machine guns in the advance: “The Russian fire was silenced, but broke out again whenever the machine gun fire slackened. The Japanese infantry used these pauses in the enemy’s fire to press forward to close range under cover of their own machine gun fire.” (Ivanov & Jowett 10) Russian troops began to panic. Officers tried to organize counterattacks, but the chaos turned into a rout. Fleeing Russian troops burned supplies and looted supplies of vodka. Colonel Anton Denikin, who would later lead the Whites in the Russian Civil War, recalled the chaos: “Individual soldiers, sometimes in small groups, then scattering again, helplessly looked for a way out of the trap […] The whole field, as far as the eye could see, was littered with abandoned boxes and heaps of luggage – even from the commander-in-chief's baggage train. Wagons and carts, ambulances, and riderless horses all rushed about in different directions […] For the first time in the war, saw panic.” (Деникин 197-198) Despite the disaster, Kuropatkin was able to put together a rearguard to prevent total defeat. The fighting had been hard, and the Japanese were once again too exhausted to pursue the weakened Russians. The Japanese had won, but most of the Russian army had escaped and Japanese casualties were an unsustainable 25%.
The battle of Mukden was likely the largest in history up to that point in terms of troop numbers and ammunition expended. The Japanese fired as much ammo at Mukden as the entire German army in the 6-month-long Franco-Prussian War – and the Russian used even more.
The Japanese were again victorious at Mukden, but the land war had turned into a meat-grinder they could not continue for long. It was up to the navy to bring the victory that Japan so desperately needed.
The voyage of the Russian Baltic Fleet had taken it around the world, but by the time it reached the theatre of war in May 1905 it was in a poor state. Its 29,000km journey had seen it accidentally fire on British fishing trawlers and face mutinies, refuelling problems and mechanical issues. Its commander, Admiral ZinOvy “Mad Dog” RozhEstvensky, even referred to some of his older ships as “self-sinkers.” The Japanese fleet was well informed of the Russians’ journey, and used the time to make repairs and train. Admiral Togo planned to ambush the Russian ships as they passed through the 50-km wide Tsushima strait on their way to Vladivostok. Torpedo boats would harass the Russians at night, and the main Japanese Fleet would strike the next day. When the Japanese sighted the Russian fleet early on May 27, the sea was too rough for torpedo boats, so it would be an all-or-nothing attack with the main fleet. That afternoon the Japanese fleet centred on 4 battleships, 8 armored cruisers and 4 protected cruisers crossed in front of the Russian force led by 8 battleships and 10 cruisers, and performed a bold u-turn on its port side.
For Admiral Akiyama Saneyuki this was the culmination of years of preparation: “The navy had been built up through many years of painstaking [work], but it all came to a head in a mere 30 minute maneuver. The decade I spent training in tactics and strategy was also all for the sake of those 30 minutes. […] It could not have happened without a decade of preparation, so we could think of it as a decade-long war.” (Akiyama Saneyuki, 79-81) The Japanese ships steamed obliquely towards the leading Russian vessels and opened fire on the battleships. Both sides scored hits, and the Mikasa was badly hit. The Russians had the heavier guns, but the Japanese had a superior rate of fire and better fire control. The angle of attack also meant the Russians could also fire from their foreturrets while the Japanese could fire broadsides using all available guns. The effect was devastating, as Admiral RozhEstvensky recalled: “The paint burnt with a clear flame on the steel surfaces; boats, ropes, hammocks and woodwork caught fire; cartridges in the ready racks ignited; upper works and light guns were swept away; turrets jammed.” (Corbett Volume II 249) In the first hour of battle, the Russian flagship SuvOrov was hit and Rozhestvensky wounded. Shortly afterwards Japanese shells sank the battleship OslyAbya - the first modern ship to be sunk by gunnery alone. A Russian sailor on a nearby destroyer watched his comrades abandon ship: “The whole of the starboard side as far as the keel was laid bare, her bright plating looked like the wet scales of some sea monster; and suddenly, as if by command, all the men who had crowded to the starboard side jumped down upon these scales… Most of them were dashed against the bilge keel and fell crippled into the sea. In the water they formed an unimaginable mass… and the enemy’s shell never ceased the whole time from bursting over them. A few more seconds and the OslyAbya disappeared beneath the water.” (Corbett Volume II 253) The battleship AleksAndr TrEtyi charged the Japanese line with all guns blazing, which brought a temporary reprieve for the hard-pressed Russians. At 7:00PM the battle started up again, and damaged Russian ships were easy prey. The Japanese sank the Aleksandr III, then the battleship BorodinO. As night fell, Togo sent in his torpedo boats.
The next morning, only 2 Russian battleships remained and the Japanese had surrounded the remnants of the Baltic Fleet. As there was no hope of reaching Vladivostok, the Russian fleet surrendered. The Japanese victory at Tsushima was staggering. 34 of 38 Russian ships were sunk, captured, or interned in neutral ports, including all the battleships.
About 5000 Russian sailors were killed. Japanese losses were three torpedo boats, and 110 dead.
The Russian navy was all but gone, and Tsar Nicholas II agreed to negotiate peace terms.
The United States mediated the peace talks in New Hampshire, and President Teddy Roosevelt was heavily involved. Both belligerents needed to end the war quickly: Japan was victorious but militarily exhausted, and revolutionary unrest was brewing in Russia. Japanese troops occupied SakhalIn Island in July to pressure the Russians, while the Russians sent fresh divisions to Manchuria to pressure the Japanese. Eventually, the Treaty of Portsmouth was signed on September 5, 1905. Russia would withdraw from Manchuria and the Liaodong Peninsula, and grant most of the railway concessions to Japan. South Sakhalin would remain Japanese, while Russia recognized Japanese dominance over nominally independent Korea. Russia, however, refused to pay a war indemnity to now-bankrupt Japan. President Roosevelt received the Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts, with the citation referring to Japan as “one of the world’s great powers.” In Japan, shock at the supposedly lenient treaty led to riots and martial law – but the public was not aware of how tenuous the Japanese position had become. The treaty was not as controversial in Russia, but the defeat strengthened opposition to the autocratic regime and helped spark the 1905 revolution that nearly toppled the Tsar.
The Russo-Japanese War was a deadly conflict: about 50,000 Russian and 80,000 Japanese soldiers died in combat or of disease. It also had a global impact, hence the nickname World War Zero. Colonized peoples took inspiration from the defeat of a European power, while western military observers noted the destructive power of modern weapons like the machine gun. It weakened Russia, made Japan into a major power, and caused some to conclude that modern wars could be won relatively quickly and decisively – developments that would cast a long shadow in the years leading to 1914.
Mass use of artillery, a grinding strategic stalemate, the first use of combat aircraft and naval operations in the Dardanelles! I am not talking about the First World War, but a war just before it that marked a major turning point in European geopolitics and in the history of warfare. I t destabilized the Balkans, and moved the Great Powers of Europe further down the road of rivalry, distrust, and militarization. It’s the Italo-Turkish War of 1911-1912.
Hi, I’m Jesse Alexander and Welcome to the Great War. Following Italian unification in 1871, nationalist movements in the new Kingdom continued to call for further expansion. Under the banner of “New Italy” nationalists dreamed of the reconstitution of the Roman Empire through imperial expansion in the Mediterranean. But it was Britain and France who ended up expanding their influence in the region in the late 19th century. Italian imperialists looked on with dismay in 1882 as France took control of Tunisia and Britain occupied Egypt. The Moroccan crisis of summer 1911 was a clear sign that imperial competition in the Mediterranean was still alive and well. This left Ottoman Libya (the provinces of Tripolitania, Cyrenaica and Fezzan) as the one viable Italian target in North Africa, and some Italians worried the French or British might take it before they had the chance. Italy did expand its soft power via banks, schools, and hospitals in Libya, but diplomats like Tommaso Tittoni called for military action: “Tripolitania is necessary to Italy for the Mediterranean balance. We could wait if there were not the danger that we might lose it, and indeed we waited patiently until such danger appeared on the horizon. Today this danger begins to take shape, and with the passage of time it will grow more severe. Thus the occupation of Tripolitania imposes itself upon us as an unavoidable necessity.” (Caccamo 28) The Ottomans knew about Italy’s ambitions and tried to avoid the worst by granting Italy economic concessions. But these offers couldn’t hide the empire’s weakness: it had suffered decades of economic and military decline, and political divisions caused by the Young Turk revolution of 1908 and failed counter-coup by the Sultan in 1909. Ottoman Minister to Rome Seifeddin Bey understood things with Italy were unlikely to end at the negotiating table: “The concessions that we make to the Italians in our African provinces will do nothing but increase their appetite and offer them occasion to intervene… Italian appetite is not satiable, and whatever concessions or facilitations will be fatally followed by others. In this way, the sacrifices that we might undertake will have no outcome but to represent temporary satisfactions, without lasting effects.” (Caccamo 24) With tensions rising in 1911, Italian Prime Minister Giovani Giolitti and Foreign Minister Antonio di San Giuliano went on a public relations and diplomatic offensive to win over nationalist support. The press reported on Ottoman supposed insults to Italian commercial interests and citizens in Libya, which were grossly exaggerated.
Giolitti though, was still cautious: “The Nationalists imagine that Tripoli is the territory of a poor black simpleton whom a European state can dethrone as he wishes. But Tripoli is a province of the Ottoman Empire and the Ottoman Empire is a great European power.” (Vandervort 14) Despite his hesitations, Giolitti felt he was running out of time. Not only was there the danger of British or French action, but Italy’s allies were against weakening the Ottomans. Austria-Hungary wanted stability in the Balkans, and Germany wanted a strong Ottoman Empire in case of war with the Entente. So the Italian government struck a deal with the French: France wouldn’t interfere in Libya, and Italy wouldn’t interfere in Tunisia and Morocco. Meanwhile the Ottomans had actually moved troops away from Libya to deal with a rebellion in Yemen, though they did bring in weapons to arm the locals in Libya in anticipation of the coming conflict. On September 27, 1911, Giolitti gave the Ottomans an ultimatum based on supposed bias against Italian business interests: agree to Italian occupation of Libya within 24 hours, or face military action.
So Italy had thrown down the gauntlet in its quest for imperial glory in Libya. The Ottoman government offered some further concessions, but the Italians rejected them and the ultimatum expired on September 28 – it would be war.
The Italo-Turkish War began with a somewhat reluctant-sounding announcement from Giolitti: “The Italian Government, therefore, finding itself forced to safeguard its dignity and its interests, has decided to proceed to the military occupation of Tripoli and Cyrenaica. This solution is the only one which Italy can accept…” (Hindmarsh, 112) The Italian military now had to arrange an invasion on extremely short notice, since they weren’t fully aware of government plans until September. All the same between October 3 and 21, 1911 25,000 Italian troops landed along the coast and captured Tripoli, Tobruk, Berna, Benghazi and Homs. At first, Ottoman resistance was generally light since they were outgunned and outnumbered.
The Italian landings had been successful, but advancing into the Libyan hinterland would prove far more difficult. The Italians knew so little about the interior, some of their planning documents even used ancient sources like Caesar for topographic and demographic information.
Italian leaders hoped that by seizing the towns, they could force the Ottomans to surrender.
Instead, the Ottomans simply withdrew in good order beyond the range of Italian naval guns.
As Italian soldier Innocenzo Bianchi wrote, the invasion barely seemed to be a war at all: “I believe that it is not real war but little attacks and soon we shall overcome... Overall I’m very happy and you’ll see that it will be finished very soon.” (Wilcox - The Italian Soldiers' experience in Libya, 1911-12 - 45) Bianchi was killed in action just six days later.
One factor the Italian plan had not taken into account was the local Arab population. Italian planners assumed the Arabs would welcome them as liberators from Ottoman oppression, and did not expect local resistance – which turned out to be a mistake.
So by late October, the Italians were feeling confident – they had captured the coast, and the Ottomans had seemingly fled the field. But instead of capitulating as the Italians expected, the Ottomans and Arabs made common cause.
Militarily, the Italians seemed to be in a strong position. The Italian conscripts brought with them several new pieces of equipment, like their modern grey-green uniform and the Modello 91 magazine rifle. Both of these pieces of kit, with some modifications, would continue in service until 1945. The Italians also had the support of the large naval guns of the Italian ships offshore, as well as Maxim machine-guns and German-built Krupp artillery.
Estimates on the number of Ottoman troops vary greatly: there were probably somewhere between 2500 and 5000 Ottoman regulars and 20 to 35,000 Arab tribesmen under the command of local Sheikhs of the Senusi Sufi order. They also had German artillery but had no heavy naval guns to back them up. Their Model 1893 Mauser was considered superior to that of the Italians because of its larger calibre. British doctor Ernest Griffin was with the Turkish Red Crescent in Libya and explained why: “The injuries produced by the small [6.5 mm] conical bullets used by the Italians were scarcely ever severe, and if the wounds had not been infected … we had the satisfaction of soon sending our Arab patients back to their duties in the field.” (Griffin 62) Ottoman forces identified what they felt was a weakness in the fortified Italian line near Tripoli. Italian trenches in this area did not run through the usual scrubland, but directly through an oasis, which could provide cover for advancing Ottoman troops. Additionally, the Italians had not built many fortifications around the settlement of Shar al-Shatt.
On October 23rd, supported by diversionary attacks to the south, Ottoman forces attacked a 6-kilometre stretch of front between Fort Sidi-Messri and the sea. Around 1,800 men of the 11th Bersaglieri Regiment were awakened at 7am by the sound of gunfire and dogs barking. As the Italians scrambled to man their positions, local Arabs came out of Shar al-Shatt and attacked them from behind. Italian soldier Evangelista Salvatore recalled the shock: “The Saraceni seemed to rise out of the earth on every side of us:” (Stephenson) Italian reinforcements arrived late and eventually beat back the Ottomans – but Italian losses were heavy. At least 21 officers and 482 men were killed, including 250 who were massacred in a cemetery after they’d surrendered. Some of the bodies had been mutilated. Officially, the Italian General Staff downplayed the setback: “Our losses were not light, but justified by the result, and showed that the morale of our troops was excellent:” (Tittoni, 29) The Italian response on the ground was swift and brutal, as they executed around 4,000 Arabs by firing squad in the following days. Shar al-Shatt and other guerilla raids caused the Italian government to increase the expeditionary force to 100,000 men, far more than planned – they even brought in askaris from Eritrea. Giolitti also escalated the war politically, and announced the full annexation of Libya on November 5th. This was mostly a symbolic gesture, since the Italians only controlled the coast, but historian Bruce Vandevort argues it ensured that the war would continue: “In retrospect, [the annexation] appears to have virtually assured that the Turks would have no option but to continue fighting.” (Vandervort, 20) The Battle of Shar al-Shatt was a major psychological blow for Italy. They had held their position, but it was a defeat that showed the war would not be as quick as they’d hoped.
By the late fall of 1911, the Italo-Turkish War had ground to a stalemate. The Ottomans couldn’t expel the Italians, but the Italians couldn’t force a decisive battle because the Ottomans and Arabs began to wage a full-on guerilla war. Italian naval supremacy also meant the Turks couldn’t send reinforcements, but they did manage to sneak in shipments of arms and a small group of volunteer officers, including Enver Bey and Mustafa Kemal. Kemal made it to Libya by sailing to Egypt on a Russian ship and disguising himself as a journalist. Despite the previous struggles the Arab tribes had with the Ottomans, the two now worked together against the Italian invaders. Ottoman commander Enver Bey and tribal leader Sheikh Omar al-Mukhtar committed to the guerilla strategy: keep the Italians pinned in the coastal towns and exhaust them through attrition. Kemal, who was wounded in the eye, operated in the Derna sector and used his 9000 men to keep 15,000 Italians busy. The Ottomans wanted to continue to dominate the Arabs, but also saw much value in their allies, as Enver Bey expressed: “I have become the master of the situation. Into my hands has fallen a power [the Sanusiya], a force for which the various powers of Europe, the Italians, the French, the English spend millions to have in their hands. Even the Khedive had tried to appropriate and employ them against us. And thus, this force has come to me without my spending a dime.” (McCollum) Arab leader Farhat al-Zawi made the somewhat different Arab motivations clear to a French reporter: ‘[Our men are] patriots in bare feet and rags, like your soldiers of the revolution, and not religious fanatics […] if the Turkish government abandons us we will proclaim that it has forfeited its right over our country. We will form the Republic of Tripolitania.’ (Stephenson) Italian commanders wanted to push into the desert, but they lacked the intelligence and logistics, had poor desert equipment, and were vulnerable to the guerillas. So instead they advanced little by little, digging trenches as they went – sometimes as often as every 100 meters – one British journalist called it “purely imbecile.” In December, the Italians tried to bring the Turks and Arabs to a decisive battle at Ain Zara, an Ottoman base on the high ground with commanding views around Tripoli. The Italian attack opened on December 4th with around 15,000 men supported by heavy artillery and naval guns. Two assault columns of Italian infantry advanced on the rudimentary Ottoman trenches, with one running into some difficulty. The defenders were forced to abandoned the trenches and were then hit hard in the open by Italian artillery fire. The Ottomans withdrew 40 kilometres to the south, but the Italian cavalry failed to surround them. This allowed the Ottomans to escape once again, but they did leave much of their artillery behind. The Italian authorities and government-friendly newspapers trumpeted Ain Zara as a major victory, while journalists from neutral states were quick to point out Ain Zara was only a few kilometres from the Italian lines.
Even though the Ottomans lost at Ain Zara, they were becoming more confident. Time appeared to be on their side, and there was always more desert to withdraw into if need be. Meanwhile, as the Italians advanced, their morale dropped and disease spread, as Enver Bey well knew: “... Sometimes there come deserters who say very interesting things of the Italians. Almost everyday Italian losses from “dysentery” are about 20 men. The hospitals are full. The morale of the troops is low and all want peace.” (Childs 135) From December to March, the Italians made a few more landings to consolidated their position and intercept Turkish gun shipments, but these actions were simply meant to boost public support back home.
As the war dragged on, Italian media interest did not weaken. In fact, press coverage was unprecedented for a modern conflict and one aspect grabbed headlines more than any other: the war in the air.
ADDITION "On October 23rd, supported by diversionary attacks to the south, Ottoman forces attacked a 6-kilometre stretch of front between Fort Sidi-Messri and the sea."
The Italo-Turkish War saw the first significant wartime use of airplanes for reconnaissance and bombing. The Italian First Aeroplane Flotilla had nine machines including Blériot and Nieuport monoplanes plus 11 pilots. On October 23rd, Captain Carlo Piazza made the first ever official combat flight when he reconnoitered Ottoman positions along the coast. And on November 1st, Italians made the first ever bombing raid when pilots dropped Cipelli grenades into Ottoman camps. On October 25th, Ottoman gunners became the first to hit an enemy combat aircraft with anti-aircraft fire. Although such fire was usually inaccurate, Captain Giuseppi Rossi experienced a close call: “We flew at an altitude of 600 metres and had covered 15 kilometres when we spotted the first group of Arab tents. These welcomed us with such a volley of accurate fire that I had half a mind to give up continuing the mission... At 100 metres away from the centre of the camp I gave the second signal […] It was a wonderful sight: the bomb had erupted with the intended effect. But the joy of this perception was severely impaired by the incessant crackle of the volley of fire aimed at us…. I tried to climb but was unsuccessful, and so was passing over the left side of the camp when my companion shouted that he was wounded. I had turned around to look at him when the engine stopped and we began to descend. Happily it started again, but we were struck by two more bullets.” ( Stephenson) Although aerial bombing grabbed public attention, its military effects were relatively minor. Reconnaissance, whether from fixed-wing aircraft or balloons, was far more valuable to Italian operations. The photos they took supplemented the limited maps of the region, and on several occasions planes were able discover and disrupt attempted Ottoman ambushes. But above all else, the Italian effort showed aircraft were robust and reliable enough to be used in war.
As the conflict dragged on into 1912, the Italians now looked not to the air, but to the sea to bring the conflict to an end. But as the war expanded, it inevitably clashed with the interests of the other European Great Powers.
The first targets of the Italian naval strategy to defeat the Ottomans were in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. Italy had already attacked Ottoman ports in the area in fall 1911, but in January 1912 the Italian navy sank several Ottoman ships and delivered weapons to rebellious anti-Ottoman groups in Yemen and Saudi Arabia. In February, Italian and Ottoman ships fought a pitched naval battle in Beirut harbour, resulting in a decisive Italian victory and 66 Beirut residents killed.
In April 1912, the Italians also sent a flotilla to the Dardanelles straits, a vital international shipping lane giving access to the Ottoman capital of Constantinople.
Following some inconclusive duels between the Italian navy and Ottoman shore batteries, the Ottomans closed and mined the straits to prevent a threat to the capital. This drew the attention of Britain and especially Russia, whose economy depended on shipping passing through the Dardanelles. This put pressure on both the Italians and the Ottomans, but it was the Ottomans who were forced to reopen the straits to shipping. Austria-Hungary was also worried about the war since they wanted to keep the status quo in the Balkans, which was also enshrined in the Triple Alliance with Germany and Italy. If the Ottomans lost too badly, the Balkans might erupt.
The Ottomans though were not able to take advantage of the divisions among the Europeans.
The Empire was diplomatically isolated, and the Young Turk regime was badly divided between those who were still loyal to the Sultan and those who supported the revolutionary committee of Union and Progess. In 1911 and 1912, there were 3 different Grand Viziers and 3 different Foreign Ministers.
Despite the political risks, Italian leadership still felt in May 1912 that naval operations were the key to victory – so much so that operations in Libya were suspended in favor of a series of amphibious landings on Turkey’s doorstep.
The Italian command now turned to the Ottomans’ island possessions in the East Mediterranean. If they took Rhodes and the Dodecanese, Ottoman routes to Libya and naval options would be further reduced. Admiral Carlo Rocca Rey was also thinking of the diplomatic advantages as early as October 1911: “[…] I think it might be useful for us in the current war to occupy some part of the Ottoman Empire that will compel them to accept peace.
Unfortunately we do not have a free hand and so we cannot act, for example, on the west-coast of the Balkan peninsula, or, by forcing the Dardanelles, go to Constantinople […] But we can […] take some island, as a bargaining counter at least. Strategically the island of Rhodes would be most valuable...” (Stephenson) This was another risky move, since the islands were covered by the same Triple Alliance status quo agreement as the Balkans. The Italians tried to calm Austrian fears, and eventually Austria-Hungary agreed to a temporary occupation of the islands. And the Austrians only allowed even that under pressure from Germany - who wanted to strengthen the triple alliance before it came up for renewal in 1912.
Between April 28th and May 21st, 1912, the Italians seized 13 Ottoman islands in the Aegean with nearly no opposition, except on Rhodes. The Italian gamble worked, since the occupation of the islands increased Ottoman internal divisions between those who wanted to continue the struggle and those who wanted a negotiated peace.
So in the summer of 1912 it seemed there might be a road to the peace table, but there were obstacles: the Italians were reluctant to compromise and had already announced Libyan annexation, while the Ottomans expected major concessions since they had not been fully defeated.
Russian-led peace talks in May failed, and a new round of talks began in Switzerland in June. The Ottomans were willing to accept Libya becoming an independent state within an Italian zone of occupation. Italian demands were far more substantial, so the Swiss talks also fell through. One Italian diplomat put the blame on his Turkish counterpart: “[The Ottoman delegate] had in his baggage only.... one word: autonomy” (Childs 163) But internal pressure in Italy was also growing. The war was becoming less popular, especially among the working class, and rumours of talks increased demands for peace. Italian soldiers were also tired of the war, and there was unrest in the trenches and even desertions.
The fact that the war was costing Italy 47% of its total expenditure was also helping to turn the formerly pro-war newspapers against it. On July 18, the Italians tried one last action to force the Ottomans to the negotiating table. 5 specially camouflaged Italian torpedo boats snuck into the Dardanelles to attack the Turkish fleet at anchor – not unlike the Italian motorboat attacks against the Austro-Hungarian navy a few years later. Ottoman sentries spotted them and drove them away, but the Italian press exaggerated the raid to make it sound like a bold strike against the heart of the enemy state. Journalist Giuseppe Bevione was not present during the attack but waxed poetic: “The water boiled around the torpedo boats from stem to stern, and jets of water flew high as shells fell with horrible thuds, as if volcanic eruptions were flashing inexhaustibly beneath the water […] The air was full of flashes, of flames, explosions, and splinters. Convulsive, foaming, full of glare and reflections, the sea seemed to become a huge fiery furnace. But at the zenith shone always the star of Italy.” (Stephenson) The Dardanelles raid marked the height of Italian naval adventures, and peace talks started up again in August. The new Ottoman government under Gazi Muhtar Pasha was willing to negotiate, partly because of pressure from other Powers and the outbreak of the First Balkan War in early October. The Ottomans still wanted to avoid any peace deal that gave the impression they’d abandoned the Libyan Arabs, since that might cause problems in other Arab regions of the empire.
The peace treaty ending the Italo-Turkish War was signed on October 18, 1912. The Ottomans declared Libya independent to avoid accepting Italian sovereignty over it, but they would not object when Italy then declared that sovereignty. The Sultan would continue to be recognized as the religious head of Libyan muslims. The Italians promised to return the Aegean islands and pay some reparations. The other European Powers quickly recognized Italian control over Libya.
So Italy had won the Italo-Turkish War and taken Libya from the Ottoman Empire. When peace was announced, the Italian elites, like popular contemporary historian Cesare Causa, were overjoyed: “Praise be to God. We are longer “nothing”: We are an old people that has found its youth and strength; we are a great nation.” (Vandervort 23) The majority of Italians were less enthusiastic. The war had not brought the impressive victory they’d been promised, and proved costly in blood and treasure. 3,500 Italians had died, mostly from disease, and 4,250 were wounded. The victory did little to improve Italy’s military reputation with the other Great Powers, and its new possession was not easy to govern. Libyan Arabs would go on to resist Italian rule for years, and the Italian authorities brutally repressed them in response. Italy would also refuse to give up the Aegean islands on the grounds of the increased costs of the Libyan occupation. For the Ottomans, losing their last African province reinforced their reputation as the so-called “sick man,” but they managed to save some face with the complicated arrangement in Libya, and losing control of the region actually improved their finances. They suffered a similar number of military killed and wounded as the Italians despite Italian military superiority. The suffering of Libyan people was, however, significant, and special refugee offices were set up in Constantinople for those fleeing Italian repression. The Italo-Turkish War was the last typical 19th century imperial small war, but it also hinted at what was to come in 1914. It featured trenches, machine guns, airplanes, the first tactical use of armored cars, Italian torpedo boat attacks, and a stalemate – though actual combat was not comparable to the First World War. The war also saw a guerilla force successfully resist a larger and more powerful conventional force, which forced the stronger power to seek victory by means other than a decisive battle. In fact the very same Senussi Arabs would also fight with the Ottomans in 1914-1918. The war in the air influenced military thought - the war was referenced in the founding charter of the British Royal Flying Corps, and the Dardanelles would be a key objective of the British in 1915.
The Italo-Turkish War, just as Austria had feared, did indeed destabilize the Balkans and helped bring about the Balkan Wars. Giolitti himself had worried about just such a scenario in 1911: “The integrity of the Ottoman Empire is a condition for Europe’s balance and peace. Is it truly in Italy’s interest to shatter into pieces one of the corner-stones of the old building? And what if, after we attack Turkey, the Balkans move as well? And what if a Balkan war causes a clash among the groups of powers and a European war? Could we take upon ourselves the responsibility for igniting the gunpowder?” (Caccamo 24-25) The Italo-Turkish War alone did not start the First World War – but it was one of the sparks that lit the long fuse of 1914.
In 1912 and 1913, the Balkans were torn apart by not one, but two wars that radically changed the map, nearly dragged Europe into a general war, caused untold suffering, and helped set the stage for the First World War. The armies of the Balkan League marched together against the ailing Ottoman Empire, only for alliances to change and all turn against one – it’s the Balkan Wars.
For centuries the Ottoman Empire controlled the multi-ethnic and multi-religious Balkan peninsula, but the 19th century brought dramatic change. As the Empire grew weaker and nationalism among the Balkan peoples grew stronger, new states emerged: Montenegro, Greece, Serbia, Romania, and Bulgaria gained first informal, and later formal independence.
This did not happen without bloodshed, including uprisings, Ottoman repression, independence wars, and Great Power intervention to protect their own interests. The decisive Russian victory in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78 ensured the independence of the Balkan states, but also provoked the suspicions of the other powers by creating a large Russian-friendly Bulgaria. A concerned Austria-Hungary occupied Ottoman Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Sanjak of Novi Pazar in 1878, and Britain worried Russia might get too close to the Straits.
So the Powers met in Berlin to modify the borders of the preliminary peace of San Stefano to limit Russian influence. They returned most of Macedonia to the Ottomans, which angered Bulgarian leaders like Ivan Geshov: “When we read […] the agreement in which a short-sighted diplomacy in Berlin partitioned our homeland, we were left crushed and thunderstruck.
Was such an injustice possible? Could such an injustice be reversed?” (Hall) The peace of 1878 did not stabilize the region, as no state was satisfied with the resulting borders.
Serbia and Bulgaria even fought a brief war in 1885, as did Greece and the Ottomans in 1897.
By the start of the 20th century, local and Great Power tensions in the Balkans were running high.
The new states hoped to expand their territory at the expense of the Ottomans and each other, and the Great Powers were still nervous about the balance of power in the region. Austria-Hungary worried that Serbia was a danger since some in Serbia also wanted closer ties with their fellow Serbs and other south Slavs in the Dual Monarchy, and Serbia had close relations with Russia. Russia was glad to have new allies in the Balkans, and wanted access to the Turkish Straits – but worried that someone else might get their hands on Constantinople if the Ottomans collapsed completely. The Ottoman Empire was in a state of crisis externally and internally. Its defeats had cost it much of its European lands, and brought violent instability at home. 1908 though, would be a decisive year. The Young Turk revolution in July brought a fresh constitution and a desire to modernize the empire and army, create a stronger Ottoman identity, and preserve Ottoman territories – in particular Macedonia. But in October, Austria-Hungary shook the Balkans and Europe by annexing Bosnia after 30 years of occupation, and withdrawing from Novi Pazar. Russia was outraged, and Bulgaria used the opportunity to sever all formal ties to the Ottomans. The result was more international tension, and more chaos in Constantinople. Conservative forces tried to overthrow the new Ottoman constitution in 1909, which led to a counter-coup, yet another constitution, and a new sultan, Mehmet V. The next year even formal control of Crete was lost, and Albanians revolted in favour of more autonomy, with Montenegrin support.
The Balkan states also had their share of problems, with Serbia and Greece suffering coups of their own and all nations having difficulty exerting political control over their influential and nationalistic military leadership. While the Balkans and the Ottoman Empire were in turmoil, in 1911 Italy decided the time was right to expand its empire. Traditionally Britain, France, and more recently Germany, had supported the Ottoman Empire to prevent a total collapse, but now they allowed Italy to attack and occupy Ottoman Libya and the Dodecanese islands. The Italo-Turkish War of 1911-12 ended with defeat for the Ottomans, who tried to limit their losses at the negotiating table. But the Balkan states had been watching closely, and planned to take advantage of Ottoman troubles – with Russian encouragement.
The Serbian and Bulgarian governments began alliance talks in fall 1911 just after the Italo-Turkish War began, and in March 1912, they agreed on a defensive alliance – which changed to an offensive alliance in May. Soon after, Montenegro and Greece joined with separate agreements, and the Balkan League was born. The League resolved to make war on the Ottoman Empire to gain what they felt were lands that belonged to their peoples, but they had conflicting claims they all said dated back to medieval times. Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece wanted Macedonia, while Bulgaria and Greece both wanted Thrace. Montenegro and Serbia wanted the Sanjak of Novi Pazar, the area around the port of Scutari on the Adriatic, and Kosovo. The Albanians hoped for autonomy which would include Scutari and Kosovo. In most of these regions, the mix of nationalities and religions did not align with political plans: Turks, Albanians, Bulgarians, Serbs, Montenegrins, Greeks, Jews, and other groups lived in communities that overlapped over the centuries.
The League wanted to take territory from the Ottomans, but made few formal agreements on how it would be divided. Serbia and Bulgaria agreed on how to divide part of Macedonia, but part was considered a disputed zone that could be assigned after the war with Russian arbitration.
So the Balkan League determined to make war on the Ottomans without a clear post-war plan to divide the spoils. But first, they would have to defeat the Ottoman army just as the Italians had done.
The First Balkan War began on October 8, 1912, when Montenegro attacked the Ottomans ahead of schedule to get the jump on rival Serbia. The rest of the Balkan League members quickly gave the Ottomans a pro forma ultimatum. Hard pressed Ottoman Grand Vizier Muhtar wanted to save the peace, and even demobilized part of the Ottoman 3rd Army in Thrace, but the influential Young Turk party called the Committee for Union and Progress wanted to fight.
The Empire was again on the brink of civil war but declared war on the Balkan League October 16.
Most European observers expected the Ottomans would win. The Empire’s population of 24 million was more than twice the League’s combined 10 million, and on paper the Ottomans could field 600,000 men. The regular troops also gained experience fighting the Italians and rebels in Albania and Macedonia. But the Ottomans also faced problems: many of their best officers, like Mustafa Kemal and Enver Bey were stuck in Libya, and the reserve troops were badly trained, and equipped with a mishmash of weaponry. The Ottoman navy was weak, and the army only had 315,000 men in Europe. The Balkan League could count on 825,000 soldiers: 350,000 Bulgarians, 230,000 Serbs, 200,000 Greeks, and 45,000 Montenegrins. Most of the soldiers were peasant conscripts, equipped with a variety of European weapons, including French and German artillery and a few observation aircraft. The Greek navy, with 16 destroyers and an armoured cruiser, ensured control of the Aegean sea. (McMeekin) When the Great Powers issued a statement on October 10 saying they wanted to keep the territorial status quo if it came to war, what they really meant was they would not allow the Ottomans to expand if they won.
All over the Balkans, families saw their young men off to the front, including Bulgarian Nedko Kableshkov’s 21-year-old-son Anton: ‘By noon, [Anton’s] chest was overflowing with flowers [from well-wishers], and we sent him off to the train station. On the way, we ran into a crippled Greek. This meeting was a bad omen - I feared that my son would also be crippled; I wanted us to go back. But I didn't want to discourage him, so we continued on towards the station."
https://bulgarianhistory.shop/product/-poslednata-krepost/4/241 In Eastern Thrace three Bulgarian Armies faced the Ottoman 1st Army. The Ottomans thought the Bulgarians would move on Macedonia, so that’s where they had most of their troops – but the Bulgarians send the bulk of their units towards the fortress towns of Edirne and Kirikkilise, aka Adrianople and Lozengrad, on the road to Constantinople. Bulgarian troops surrounded the Ottoman garrison at Edirne, and Deputy commander in Chief Mihail Savov said that he was ready to sacrifice 100,000 men to storm it. The Bulgarians did not storm the fortress, but young Anton Kableshkov was killed just outside its walls.
East of Edirne, Ottoman 1st Army commander Abdullah Pasha thought he outnumbered the enemy, so he sent his troops forward in a hasty advance on October 21. At the Battle of Kirk Kilise, the outnumbered Ottomans fought for three days before the Bulgarians break their lines. The Bulgarians could probably have completely smashed the Ottoman army if they had pursued, but instead they rested while the Ottomans rushed in reinforcements, and restored discipline. Ottoman senior officer Muhtar Pasha reflected on the disaster: “The causes of our defeat are to be found in our bad military organization, and in the lack of discipline of our reservists, but the principle cause was the rain, which had continued for a week, completely destroying the moral of our army, and for 3 days, rendering impassable the roads and fields to our trains and artillery.” Hall 27 On the 29th, the Bulgarians attacked the fresh Ottoman defensive positions at Lyule Burgas. At first the Ottomans were able to hold the line, but when their logistics couldn’t furnish the guns with enough shells, the Bulgarians again defeat them thanks to determined infantry attacks and superior artillery. Each side suffered 20,000 killed and wounded in the largest battle in Europe between 1871 and 1914. On November 2, reeling Ottoman forces retreated to the Catalca line, just 30 km from the imperial capital of Constantinople.
The Ottoman government requested an armistice, but Tsar Ferdinand refused and did not inform his allies. On November 17, the Bulgarians tried to break through the Catalca line and fulfil Tsar Ferdinand’s dream of reaching the old Byzantine capital, but fierce Ottoman resistance, stretched logistics, and a cholera outbreak stopped them. Still, with Bulgarian advance on land and the Greek navy off the coast, Ottoman forces in the rest of the Balkans had been cut off.
Some of the towns and villages captured by Bulgarian troops in Thrace were populated by Bulgarians, many of whom considered themselves liberated. Elena Bizeva later recalled when Bulgarian irregulars, among them poet Peyo Yavorov, entered her town: “When the people entered the church, they took off their fezzes and held them in their hands, and Yavorov sat on the [priest's] chair and began speaking. He said we were free, and that we needn’t fear Turkish prisons anymore. Then he asked “What will you do with those fezzes?” And they all tossed them to the ground and trampled them. It was like they were taking out all their anger at the Turks on those fezzes.” ( Ilinchev,) Meanwhile in Macedonia, Serbian forces came up against Ottoman resistance quicker than General Putnik expected at Kumanovo. The Serbs outnumbered the Ottoman Vardar Army 100,000 to 58,000, but the Ottomans under Zeki Pasha launched the first attacks on October 23. In the driving rain and mud, the Serbs counterattacked at great cost that observers compared to the Japanese attacks in the Russo-Japanese War – but the firepower of modern artillery and machine guns meant soldiers dig trenches and foxholes to keep out of harm’s way. Serbian medic Dragoljub Radojković was in the midst of the fighting: “I look out of the trench and see a wounded man on the parapet […] I shout to him, but he doesn’t hear me. He’s hit again and faints. Some men carry him in, and blood is gushing from his neck. I wrap one bandage, then another. We get him onto a stretcher, but the man dies.” (Paunic) In the end the Serbian artillery carried the day and the Serbs won the Battle of Kumanovo.
The victory earned Putnik the title Vojvoda, left the Serbs in possession of the part of Macedonia disputed with the Bulgarians, and routed the Ottomans, who fled south.
Another result was chaos amongst the local Muslim population, and many dead and wounded on both sides. Radojković was at the train station a day after the battle: “In the morning […] we went down to the train station in Kumanovo. Captured Turks, the Turkish people, - women, children, everything was crowded there. The trains were not running. One train, freight wagons, a train full of wounded, bot moving, a train full of dead Turks. Blood dripped from the wagon onto the rails.” (Paunic) The Serbs pursued and pushed the Ottomans back at the Battles of Prilep and Bitola, while the Ottomans withdrew to southern Albania.
They also move forces west towards Scutari and the Adriatic coast, where they join Montenegrin forces besieging the town. In the north, the Serbs also capture the Sanjak of Novi Pazar and the town of Prizren, which the Montenegrins had wanted. Serbian troops also entered Kosovo, but faced resistance from local Albanians. In the south, the Greek Army of Thessaly made straight for Salonika. Greece was also interested in Macedonia, but they prioritized the drive for Salonika to reach it before the Bulgarians could. Greek troops pushed the Ottomans aside at Sarantaporos Pass and with more difficulty at Yanitsa. The way to Salonika was open, and the Greek army surrounded the city on November 7. A Bulgarian division rushed south, and the commander sent a message ahead asking the Ottomans to surrender to him instead of to the Greeks, but it was too late. The Ottoman commander replied that he only had one Salonika, and he had surrendered it to the Greeks on November 8. This was a critical League victory as Ottoman forces were now completely cut off from any hope of reinforcement. It was also a personal tragedy for Ottoman officer Mustafa Kemal, as it was his home town, and fueled his anger at Constantinople: “Then one day I heard, my homeland [Salonika], my mother, my sister, my relatives and acquaintances, were handed over to the enemy, by the very [Ottoman leadership] who expelled me for unveiling the truth about them.” (Kemal 121) Kemal also said he would have every Ottoman officer above the rank of major fired. After taking Salonica, Greek and Bulgarian troops began an uneasy joint presence in the city. In the west, Greek troops also made progress and besieged the Ottoman fortress at Yanina. As the Balkan League armies advanced, the Christian and Muslim civilian population suffered from atrocities committed by all sides. This was made worse by the presence of irregular forces of locals who supported their countrymen’s armies, but also blurred the line between soldiers and non-combatants for enemy soldiers. Some Christians turned on Muslim officials who had repressed them in the past, or on Muslim - and sometimes Christian – landowners before seizing their lands. A British journalist with the Bulgarian army reported: “The track of the Bulgarian army [in Thrace] is marked by 80 miles of ruined villages.” (Mcmeekin 72) Greek commander Crown Prince Constantine ordered Muslim villages destroyed since he claimed Muslims were shooting at his troops, and Greek soldier Stratis Myrivilis later included his experience in his writing: “All male prisoners [in the village] were to be executed. I was opposite an old [Turk]. His grandfatherly face was bruised, he whispered prayers, and his silky beard moved in the wind. […] I pulled the trigger and he fell into the mud like he was struck by lightning.
[After the executions we set the village on fire]. Suddenly, a frenzied crowd rushed over, children and women freed from the mosque [where we had imprisoned them]. They run to the corpses screaming, to look for their loved ones. [This memory] lives and circulates inside me like an anguished virus.” Myrivilis 26-27 Constantinople was filled with hundreds of thousands of Muslim refugees, with the old city turned into a camp, including the famous Blue Mosque, and the Hagia Sofia mosque turned into a cholera hospital.
The British consul at Salonika was blunt: “The result of the massacre of Muslims at the beginning of the war, of the looting of their goods in the ensuing months, of the settling of Christians in their villages, of their persecution by Christian neighbours, of their torture and beating by Greek troops, has been the creation of a state of terror among the Islamic population.
Their one desire is to escape from Macedonia and to be again in a free land.” (Ungor 82) The Powers sent warships to Constantinople, to protect the city’s Christian population from what they feared might be revenge killings by Muslims.
In just a few weeks, the Balkan League had put together a string of decisive victories. Nearly all of Ottoman Europe was now under their control, except for the fortresses of Edirne, Yanina, and Scutari. As a result of the Ottoman collapse, an Albanian group, supported by Austria and Italy, declared independence on November 28, 1912. On December 3, the Ottomans signed an armistice with Bulgaria, Montenegro and Serbia - but Greek military operations continued.
So the Balkan League was victorious on all fronts – but despite the armistice the war was not over, and the Great Powers were on the cusp of getting involved.
Even though the Ottoman armies were beaten in the field, and the fleet bottled up by the Greek navy, militarily the Empire might have had a chance to recover. It still held important fortresses, it was holding on the Catalca line, had more reserves in Asia, and the Balkan League was divided over the possible spoils. But the Ottomans had no allies. This time, the Great Powers would not support the Empire as they had in the past, and even Germany, declared the war was a “free fight with no favor.” The Powers now said that they would go back on their declaration about the territorial status quo and accept border changes in favour of the League. Even Austro-Hungarian foreign minister Leopold von Berchtold said Vienna would not oppose Serbian expansion except for an Adriatic port. Russia was now worried the Bulgarians might actually get to Constantinople before them, and they urged restraint.
The events in the Balkans had also pushed Europe to the brink of war. On November 21, Austria-Hungary acted to, in its view, prevent Serbia from permanently occupying the Adriatic coast. Vienna mobilized 6 army corps – three facing the Balkans and three facing Russia.
Kaiser Wilhelm secretly assured the Austrians that if Russia mobilized, Germany would support Austria – just as he would do again in July 1914. In response to Austrian moves, the Tsar held a meeting with his war council, and the army drew up plans for a partial mobilization.
But the council decided not to mobilize, partly out of fear of provoking Germany, and partly because some ministers didn’t want to risk war over Serbian access to the sea.
The German government did not know how close the Russians had come to mobilizing when they held their own infamous war council meeting December 8. Chief of the General Staff von Moltke felt that Germany should declare war now, before Russia got any stronger, but in the end the council decided against it. Following the war scare and December armistice, two parallel conferences took place in London on December 16 and 17, 1912. At the first conference, Ottoman delegate Reshid Pasha said that his government would give up Macedonia and Salonica, but not Edirne, Eastern Thrace, or the four islands at the mouth of the Dardanelles that Greece was demanding. The Ottomans also insisted on an independent Albania rather than it being split between the Serbs, Montenegrins, and Greeks. The Bulgarians made a new demand for Edirne, to compensate for lands they might lose to the Serbs, but this was a particular sticking point because the fortress city was important for the safety of Constantinople. Reshid Pasha put it simply to the Bulgarian representative: “[Edirne] is a window into our harem.” (Mcmeekin 76) The Greeks and Bulgarians argued over who would get Salonika, while the Serbs and Bulgarians argued over Macedonia. Meanwhile at the separate Great Powers’ conference, the main topic was the borders of a Albania, of critical importance for Austria-Hungary to limit Serbian power.
But events in Constantinople overtook diplomacy. On January 23, 1913 a Young Turk government took power again after yet another coup and the murder of War Minister Nazim Pasha. Supported by influential Turkish officers like Enver Bey, many of whom came from the Balkan lands that were now lost, they decided to continue the war to prevent the loss of Thrace. New Ottoman Foreign Minister Noradounghian Effendi was defiant: “If Adrianople continues to resist, we shall fight to relieve her. If Adrianople falls, we shall fight to retake her.” Hall 80 Ottoman troops including Mustafa Kemal landed at Gallipoli on February 7, and at first they pushed the Bulgarians back around Bulair. But the Bulgarians rallied and the Ottoman attack failed with the loss of 6000 dead to just 114 Bulgarians. Elsewhere, the Greeks took Yanina on March 6, and the Bulgarians and Serbians finally capture Edirne on March 26. French journalist Gustave Cirilli described the state of the people in the starving city: “It was like a scene out of a fantastical tale […] to see these human rags, with protruding teeth, devouring a sort of [bread] - black lava in which the barely ground seeds fell out in yellow spots. Those who did not get their share of the fought-over morsels watched the others savour them with envious tears in their eyes.” (Scott 49) At Scutari, Serbian troops arrived to help the Montenegrins, who ignored warnings from the Great Powers and assaulted the city. A combined fleet of the Powers blockaded Montenegro, causing the Serbs to leave, but the Montenegrins managed to take the city April 24 only to agree to give it up to a future independent Albania just days later.
The Ottomans had no choice but to accept a peace deal, and the belligerents sign the Treaty of London on May 30, 1913, which reduced Ottoman Europe to a small strip of land outside of Constantinople and created the Principality of Albania.
The First Balkan War came to an end in May 1913, and the Ottoman Empire in Europe seemed to be a thing of the past. But the borders between the victorious Balkan League members are another matter altogether.
Even before the First Balkan War had come to an end, further conflict was brewing. Not only did the Balkan League members dispute where the new borders would be, but Romania had also begun to make demands for Southern Dobrudja, which was part of Bulgaria. In May 1913, the Powers awarded the town of Silistra to Romania, which angered both sides, and made some Bulgarians doubt Russia as a reliable ally. Bulgarians were also frustrated because in their view, they had won the strategically important Thrace battles, but the Serbs were left in possession of most of Macedonia and didn’t want to honour the pre-war agreement. Bulgaria and Greece were also still in conflict over Salonika. Russia tried to mediate between Serbia and Bulgaria, but the two rivals could not agree, and the Russians were still nervous about Bulgarian troops so close to Constantinople. The Bulgarian army was in a fragile state, as many soldiers were exhausted from the war, and some were willing to split Macedonia with their allies if it meant peace. General Savov told the government to either send the men home or go to war now. Without strong Russian backing, Sofia feared it might lose Macedonia for good, so the Tsar ordered an attack against Serbia and Greece on June 29 – although it’s not clear how much the government knew about this before the shooting started. The Second Balkan War had begun.
The Bulgarian Prime Minister tried to stop the fighting in Macedonia, but it was too late. The Greeks and Serbs could claim Bulgaria was the aggressor and agreed to divide Macedonia between them. Montenegro joined to stay in Serbia’s good graces. On the Bulgarian side, the sudden attack had confused communication and hampered operations. Their attack was uncoordinated and the Serbs eventually stopped it, and defeated the Bulgarians at Bregalnitsa by July 8. The Greeks defeated a smaller Bulgarian army around Kilkis and Doiran at around the same time, and eliminated isolated Bulgarian units at Salonika. Bulgarian Mihail Madjarov’s son was killed in the fighting: “I lost my very last hope. From that moment forth I became a man haunted by grief. All around me seemed to go dark. All the misery and all the sorrow of Bulgaria appeared to me to be twice as great. Each and every object in my home served as a reminder to me of my lost happiness.” (Kolev 117) On July 11, Greek and Serb forces met and the front stabilized. Retreating Bulgarians attacked Greek, Turkish, and Serbian civilians, and advancing Greek and Serbian troops committed atrocities against Bulgarian civilians, again after claims of attacks against their troops.
Turkish civilian Ibosh Agha felt empathy for Bulgarian refugees: “A Bulgarian peasant was leading a scrawny donkey on the wooden saddle of which sat a child, her bare legs dangling on one side. […] The misery, the look of a dread and utter agony in the small blinking eyes of the pockmarked face with the yellow straggly beard were the very embodiment of human fear and despair. No, not human. It was the animal dread of cattle at the slaughterhouse, the wild glassy stare of terror in a cornered animal. It was a look which, once perceived, made one cringe with shame and humiliation, the shame of its having been in a human eye.” (Kolev 119) Meanwhile, Romania saw its chance and entered the war on July 10 to take all of Southern Dobrudja.
A quarter of a million Romanian troops of the Army of the Danube entered Bulgaria and moved towards Sofia. The Bulgarians decided not to offer organized resistance. Advancing Romanian troops, however, rode straight into a cholera epidemic due to unsanitary conditions. Chaplain Dumitru Brumușescu complained bitterly about the army’s lack of medical care: “In the hospital, there are no beds, so the men lie on the floor in their uniforms. They’ve barely the strength to moan or ask for water. Some are delirious, with spasmodic movements of their arms and hands, some vomit onto the floor while others relieve themselves where they lay. […] The lack of furniture, dishes, linens, medical devices, medicine, and antiseptic rendered the presence of army doctors useless. I’ve seen a lot of messes, but this one topped them all.” (Vada 305) About 2700 Romanian soldiers died of cholera in summer 1913.
The Ottomans saw their opportunity to recover parts of Thrace, so crossed the Catalca line on July 12. The few Bulgarian troops left in the area could offer only token resistance, and the Ottomans re-captured the fortress without firing a shot on July 23. Many Bulgarian civilians fled, creating a new wave of refugees, and another outbreak of cholera killed 4000 Ottoman troops.
As Romanian troops got closer to Sofia and Russia refused to intervene to help Bulgaria, the pro-Russian Bulgarian government resigned. It was replaced by a pro-German government under Vasil Radoslavov, but fighting continued. Bulgarian forces recovered to win a defensive battle against the Serbs and Montenegrins at Kalimantsi, and a successful counterattack against the Greeks at Kresna Gorge. The Greeks asked for an armistice, and Sofia ordered a stop to operations since even a Bulgarian victory could not reverse the tide of the war. The peace treaties signed in August and September 1913 ended the Second Balkan War and redrew the map of the Balkans yet again, this time to Bulgaria’s disadvantage. Romania got Southern Dobrudja. Austria-Hungary and Russia refused to support Serbian maximalist demands in Macedonia so they could retain some influence with Bulgaria. Serbia did get most of Macedonia, but Bulgaria kept a part and Greece kept Salonica. The Ottomans regained Eastern Thrace despite their defeat in the first war.
The Balkan Wars left a lasting impact on the region and Europe as a whole. The fighting and the cholera were deadly: 125,000 Ottoman soldiers died, along with 65,000 Bulgarians, 36,000 Serbs, 9500 Greeks, and 3000 Montenegrins. After more than 600 years, the Ottoman presence in the Balkans was nearly gone. Albania was independent but its neighbours claimed its territory. Many Balkan Christians saw the change as the end of foreign domination and oppression. For more than 300,000 Balkan Muslims, the changes meant expulsion from their homes and an uncertain future in Anatolia – and for some Young Turks, radicalization against Christians still in the empire. Enver Pasha, who hailed from the Balkans and would later play a key role in the Armenian genocide and killing of Ottoman Greeks in the First World War, shared his anger: “How could anyone forget the plains, the meadows, watered with the blood of our forefathers; abandon those places where Turkish raiders had stalled their steeds for a full four hundred years, with our mosques, our tombs, our dervish lodges, our bridges and our castles, to leave them to our slaves, to be driven out of [the Balkans] to Anatolia: this is beyond a man’s endurance. I am prepared to sacrifice gladly the remaining years of my life to take revenge on the Bulgarians, the Greeks and the Montenegrins.” (Ungor 85) The events of 1912-13 helped to create the conditions for the catastrophe of 1914 as well. Bulgarian resentment at the lack of support from Russia caused it to drift closer to Austria-Hungary and Germany. Tensions between Austria-Hungary and a much larger Serbia increased. With Serbia as Russia’s only remaining Balkan ally, Russia would be under more pressure to support Serbia in future conflicts. And in October 1913, Austria issued an ultimatum to Serbia, with German support, to force Belgrade to remove its troops from northern Albania. A similar ultimatum in 1914 would transform the Third Balkan War into the Great War.
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