Philosophy of Language: Speech Acts & Performatives | Searle Lecture 2

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Two Strands of Language
Core Concepts
Use vs. Mention
Performative Utterances
Distinction Fails
Speech Act Theory
Act Types
Force and Content
Indirect Speech Acts
Context Dependency

Two Strands of Language

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Playing Section
  • 1

    Contrasts formalist vs. social views of language.

  • 2

    Argues language is fundamentally a human social activity.

J.L. Austin's pioneering work in 'How to Do Things With Words', which laid the foundational groundwork for speech act theory.
The traditional truth-conditional view of language, which assumes the primary function of sentences is to describe state of affairs (propositions) as either true or false.
The basic distinctions in linguistics and philosophy between syntax (structure), semantics (meaning), and pragmatics (language use in context).
Searle's taxonomy of illocutionary acts, which categorizes utterances into assertives, directives, commissives, expressives, and declarations.
The concept of 'Indirect Speech Acts' and how speakers communicate intentions that differ from the literal meaning of their words.
Searle's distinction between regulative and constitutive rules, and how they contribute to the construction of social reality.
Applications of speech act theory in modern fields, such as natural language processing (NLP), legal philosophy (e.g., defining hate speech or consent), and discourse analysis.
41.2K views310likes1:18:54@SocioPhilosophyOriginal Release: 2011-10-26

Language is fundamentally a human social phenomenon where speakers perform speech acts—actions like stating, questioning, ordering, or promising—rather than merely describing states of affairs; this challenges the traditional view that language only serves to make true or false claims, as demonstrated by performative utterances that create reality (like declaring war or adjourning a meeting) and the distinction between illocutionary acts (the action performed) and perlocutionary acts (the effects achieved).