The Frege-Geach Problem: Non-Cognitivism in Metaethics

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Quasi-Realism

Quasi-realism, pioneered by philosophers like Simon Blackburn, is a prominent counterpoint to the claim that the Frege-Geach problem fatally undermines non-cognitivism. Instead of abandoning expressivism, quasi-realists argue that non-cognitivists can explain how moral language behaves like factual proposition-based discourse without committing to objective moral facts. By adopting a deflationary or minimalist theory of truth, quasi-realism suggests that concepts like 'truth' and 'falsity' can be legitimately applied to moral claims as expressions of endorsement or rejection. To solve the embedding problem, quasi-realists develop a 'logic of attitudes,' wherein conditional moral statements express higher-order attitudes of disapproval toward holding inconsistent moral stances. In this way, quasi-realism attempts to 'earn the right' to realist-sounding language—including logical embedding and truth conditions—while remaining fundamentally non-cognitivist, offering a robust defense against the Frege-Geach challenge.

The fundamental distinction between cognitivism and non-cognitivism in metaethics.
Basic tenets of moral expressivism and emotivism (the view that moral claims express attitudes rather than factual beliefs).
Elementary formal logic, particularly the structure of valid deductive arguments such as Modus Ponens.
The philosophical concept of truth-conditions and how declarative sentences traditionally convey propositional meaning.
Simon Blackburn’s Quasi-Realism and his projective explanation of moral logic.
Allan Gibbard’s Norm-Expressivism and Plan-Expressivism as structural solutions to the embedding problem.
Hybrid Expressivism (or Ecumenical Expressivism), which merges cognitive and non-cognitive elements of moral language.
Minimalist and Deflationary theories of truth, and how they are utilized by contemporary non-cognitivists.
178.1K views3.5Klikes10:12@PhilosophyTubeOriginal Release: 2014-12-12

The Frege-Geach Problem demonstrates that non-cognitivism in ethics cannot adequately explain the logical properties of moral language, as it fails to account for how the meaning of complex moral sentences (like conditionals) can be derived from the meaning of their simpler components, thereby undermining the entire class of non-cognitivist views on moral language.