The Frege-Geach Problem: Non-Cognitivism in Metaethics

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Noncognitivism
The Problem
Embedding Flaw
Audience Q&A
Art Debate

Noncognitivism

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Playing Section
  • 1

    Explains noncognitivism: moral statements express attitudes, not facts.

  • 2

    Compares views of Ayer, Stevenson, and Hare on moral language.

  • 3

    Highlights that moral talk's key aspect is its function, not truth.

The fundamental distinction between cognitivism and non-cognitivism in metaethics.
Basic tenets of moral expressivism and emotivism (the view that moral claims express attitudes rather than factual beliefs).
Elementary formal logic, particularly the structure of valid deductive arguments such as Modus Ponens.
The philosophical concept of truth-conditions and how declarative sentences traditionally convey propositional meaning.
Simon Blackburn’s Quasi-Realism and his projective explanation of moral logic.
Allan Gibbard’s Norm-Expressivism and Plan-Expressivism as structural solutions to the embedding problem.
Hybrid Expressivism (or Ecumenical Expressivism), which merges cognitive and non-cognitive elements of moral language.
Minimalist and Deflationary theories of truth, and how they are utilized by contemporary non-cognitivists.
178.1K views3.5Klikes10:12@PhilosophyTubeOriginal Release: 2014-12-12

The Frege-Geach Problem demonstrates that non-cognitivism in ethics cannot adequately explain the logical properties of moral language, as it fails to account for how the meaning of complex moral sentences (like conditionals) can be derived from the meaning of their simpler components, thereby undermining the entire class of non-cognitivist views on moral language.