Mackie's Queerness Argument & Error Theory Explained

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Moral Realism and the "Companions in Guilt" Argument

Moral realism directly opposes Mackie's error theory by asserting that objective moral facts and values do exist. A primary challenge to Mackie's "argument from queerness" is the "Companions in Guilt" objection. This argument suggests that if we must reject moral properties because they are metaphysically "queer" (i.e., objectively prescriptive and non-physical), we would also have to reject other indispensable concepts like epistemic reasons, logical laws, and mathematical truths, which share these same queer features. Because abandoning epistemic norms—such as the requirement to believe what evidence supports—is intellectually untenable, the objection concludes that the queerness of moral properties is not a sufficient reason to deny their existence. Additionally, moral realists argue that moral properties are either natural properties that can be scientifically understood (Cornell Realism) or self-evident truths accessible through rational intuition (Ethical Intuitionism), defending the validity of our everyday moral claims against the charge of systematic error.

The distinction between metaethics, normative ethics, and applied ethics.
The core tenets of Moral Realism (or Moral Objectivism), which is the primary target of Mackie's critique.
The metaethical debate between Cognitivism (the view that moral statements express beliefs capable of being true or false) and Non-cognitivism.
Basic metaphysical and epistemological concepts, particularly the nature of existence (ontology) and how humans acquire knowledge.
The 'Companions in Guilt' response, a major counterargument used by moral realists to challenge Mackie's premise of queerness.
Moral Fictionalism versus Moral Abolitionism, exploring the practical question of what we should do with moral language if error theory is correct.
Evolutionary Debunking Arguments in ethics, which build upon error theory using modern biological and psychological perspectives.
Alternative moral anti-realist theories, such as Simon Blackburn's Quasi-Realism and Allan Gibbard's Expressivism.
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John Mackie, a moral irrealist, argues that moral properties like rightness and wrongness are merely psychological or societal inventions rather than objective features of reality. His 'argument from queerness' contends that if moral values were objective, they would have to be strange entities containing motivation within facts themselves, which is implausible. His 'error theory' further argues that moral judgments fail to capture any actual moral dimensions because no moral facts exist in the universe, making moral claims false rather than merely subjective. This position differs from moral relativism by denying any moral framework exists, potentially leading to moral nihilism.