Frankfurt's First vs Second Order Desires: Higher-Order Volitions

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Gary Watson's Valuational Account and the Regress Objection

Philosopher Gary Watson presents a major critique of Harry Frankfurt’s hierarchical model, identifying what is known as the 'regress' or 'authority' problem. Watson argues that simply having a higher-order desire (such as a second-order volition) does not automatically give it authority or make it speak for the agent's 'true self.' If a second-order desire is just another desire, we would logically require a third-order desire to validate it, leading to an infinite regress. To resolve this, Watson proposes an alternative compatibilist theory that distinguishes between an agent's 'motivational system' (what they desire) and their 'valuational system' (their rational judgments about what is good or valuable). According to Watson, free agency is achieved not by aligning desires hierarchically, but when an agent's motivational system aligns with their valuational system. This shifts the focus of free will from Frankfurt's purely desire-driven, psychological harmony to a framework of rational evaluation and moral judgment.

The fundamental debate between free will and determinism, including the core concepts of causal determinism.
The basic thesis of compatibilism: the philosophical position that free will and determinism can logically coexist.
Basic concepts of action theory and philosophical psychology, specifically how 'desires' and 'beliefs' motivate human agency.
Classical compatibilist definitions of freedom, such as Thomas Hobbes' or David Hume's view of freedom as merely the absence of external constraints.
Frankfurt's distinction between a 'Person' and a 'Wanton' (an agent who acts on first-order desires without reflecting on them).
Frankfurt-Style Cases (FSCs) and their challenge to the Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP) in theories of moral responsibility.
Major criticisms of the hierarchical model, such as Gary Watson's critique and the problem of infinite regress (e.g., why not third- or fourth-order desires?).
Practical applications of Frankfurt's framework to the philosophy of addiction, specifically analyzing the willing versus the unwilling addict.
Alternative contemporary compatibilist frameworks, such as Susan Wolf's 'Reason View' or John Martin Fischer's guidance control.
9.2K views287likes3:33@CarneadesOfCyreneOriginal Release: 2021-02-01

Harry Frankfurt's theory distinguishes between first-order desires (desires about external objects like food, exercise, or entertainment) and second-order desires/volitions (desires about one's own desires), which he uses to defend compatibilism—a position arguing that free will can coexist with determinism by emphasizing that our higher-order desires reflect our authentic self.