Frankfurt's First vs Second Order Desires: Higher-Order Volitions

This section presents an alternative approach to the free will debate through compatibilism and Frankfurt style cases. Frankfurt style cases challenge the Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP)—the view that moral responsibility requires the ability to do otherwise. In classic examples, agents are prevented from exercising alternative possibilities yet remain morally responsible. These cases motivate compatibilist views suggesting that what matters for responsibility is the causal history of one's actions rather than the presence of alternative possibilities. This provides an alternative framework for understanding freedom that does not require rejecting divine foreknowledge, offering a semi-compatibilist position that accepts theological fatalism while preserving meaningful moral responsibility.

The Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP) states that moral responsibility requires the ability to have done otherwise. This is considered a fundamental moral intuition. However, Harry Frankfurt challenges this principle, arguing that moral responsibility depends on whether actions stem from one's own will, not on whether alternative actions were possible. Frankfurt presents four hypothetical cases: Jones 1 (strong-willed robber) and Jones 3 (robber whose threatened action aligns with their desires) are morally responsible because their actions stem from their own will. Jones 2 (robber acting purely from fear) is not responsible because external coercion completely determined their action. Jones 4 (robber with an implanted chip that would force them to rob if they hesitated) is still responsible because the chip never actually intervened—their action was driven by their own motivations. These cases demonstrate that moral responsibility depends on internal motivation, not on whether alternative actions were physically possible.

This section presents Harry Frankfurt's influential challenge to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities through his famous Frankfurt Style Examples. The video explains the voting scenario where Jones votes Republican either on his own initiative or because Black intervenes to ensure he does so. Frankfurt argues that in cases where Jones acts freely without intervention, he remains morally responsible even though he couldn't have done otherwise. This challenges the PAP by showing that moral responsibility might not require alternative possibilities. Frankfurt responds to this challenge by developing a hierarchical model of desires, distinguishing first-order desires (motivating actions) from second-order desires (about what desires one should have). He argues that when there is conformity between these desire levels, moral responsibility exists without requiring the ability to do otherwise.

The Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP) asserts that moral responsibility requires the ability to do otherwise. Frankfurt cases challenge this by presenting scenarios where agents cannot do otherwise yet remain morally responsible. In the classic example, Jones plans to assassinate a prime minister while Green implants a device that forces Jones to shoot if Jones shows any inclination not to. Since Jones decides on his own to shoot, he seems blameworthy despite lacking alternative possibilities. This challenges compatibilism, as deterministic worlds would seem to preclude moral responsibility if PAP is true.

Frankfurt challenged the Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP)—the view that moral responsibility requires the ability to do otherwise. Through thought experiments involving neuroscientists implanting chips that can override decisions, he demonstrated that people can be morally responsible even without alternative possibilities. This supports compatibilism—the view that free will and moral responsibility exist even under determinism. However, critics argue Frankfurt's examples rely on intuitive judgments that don't provide independent justification for moral responsibility if determinism is true.

Phayer includes the infinite regress within his argument, specifically in premise 11 of his 49 premises. This has nothing to do with going back in time—Aristotle and Phayer have no problem with an infinite regress going back in time. The problem is with hierarchical infinite regress. It is an unfounded assumption to claim that a mirror can reflect a dog if there is no dog to reflect. Adding infinite mirrors doesn't magically give the infinite set of mirrors the power to reflect a dog that doesn't exist. Saying A exists because of B doesn't explain how A or B exist at all.

This section presents the solution to the regress problem through the distinction between object language and metalanguage. Rules of inference like Modus Ponens belong to the metalanguage and cannot be expressed within the formal system itself. The video demonstrates this by showing how specifying rules requires moving to a higher-level metalanguage, which in turn requires its own metalanguage, creating an infinite hierarchy. This hierarchical structure reveals that formal systems ultimately depend on natural language for their definition, and that no purely formal system exists independent of interpretive frameworks.

Active inference employs hierarchical motivated control, where policies are determined by precision-weighted preferences. Precision is the inverse variance of a probability distribution, representing the priority given to signals or beliefs. The problem is that precision weighting requires another policy, which requires another set of highly weighted preferences, leading to an infinite regress. This mirrors Aristotle's notion of unmoved movers and Whitehead's primordial nature of God, which serves as a ground norm that sets in place the precision weighting scheme.

Aristotle argues that if everything we desire is only desired for the sake of something else, then our desires would go on infinitely without ever reaching an endpoint. This would make our desires empty and vain because there would be no final thing we actually want for its own sake. Therefore, there must exist at least one thing that we desire for its own sake, which serves as the ultimate end of all our desires.

The hierarchical network model faced criticism. Lichtenstein and colleagues introduced semantic distance, showing response time depends on word association frequency rather than hierarchical position. Collins and Quillian modified their model in 1975 to incorporate semantic distance and allow properties to be repeated at multiple nodes.

Frankfurt proposes that what matters for moral responsibility is whether our actions align with our higher-order desires (desires about our first-order desires). Using addiction as an example: an unwilling addict neither wants to quit nor doesn't want to quit—they just act on impulses; a willing addict wants to quit but can't; a willing addict who decides to continue using has higher-order desires that align with their actions. Frankfurt argues that willing addicts are morally responsible despite lacking the ability to do otherwise.

Frankfurt contrasts two types of addicts to illustrate his theory. An unwilling addict has a first order desire to take drugs that conflicts with their second order desire not to take drugs. Despite identifying with the second order volition (not wanting to be an addict), they continue acting on the first order desire. A wanton, by contrast, is ambivalent toward their first order desires—they don't care whether they have desires for drugs or not. Both lack full personhood, but for different reasons: the unwilling addict has conflicting second order desires, while the wanton lacks any preference regarding their first order desires.

Frankfurt uses three addict types to illustrate his theory: (1) The unwilling addict possesses both a first order desire to take drugs and a second order desire to refrain, yet fails to act on the latter; he is still a person because he wants his will to be constituted by his second order desire. (2) The wanton addict follows impulses without caring what constitutes his will; despite potential intelligence, he lacks second order volitions and is not a person. (3) The willing addict possesses both first order desires and a second order volition to continue using drugs; though not free (corrupted by addiction), he remains a person and thus morally responsible due to possessing second order volitions.

Frankfurt distinguishes his concept of freedom of will from what others mean when discussing free will. Most people mean the ability to have had a different volition (could-have-done-otherwise), but Frankfurt's account doesn't require this—it only requires your actual volition is satisfied. This distinction matters because Frankfurt's account is entirely compatible with determinism. Using the willing addict example: someone whose addiction is so strong they would take drugs regardless of their volition. Despite being unable to do otherwise, they are morally responsible because they acted according to their volition. We should assess agents according to their volitions, not just their actions. Frankfurt acknowledges potential infinite regress problems with second-order desires but argues meaningful freedom requires at least second-order volitions. Without resolving conflicts in second-order desires, an agent has no clear preference about which first-order desire should be effective, thereby lacking freedom of will. Frankfurt's sophisticated compatibilism addresses criticisms that classic compatibilism fails to capture genuine freedom while avoiding libertarian mysteries of undetermined will.

The framework applies to addiction by viewing substance use as another threat response—people turn to substances when their lives are desperate and overwhelming and when they don't have other ways of dealing with their pain. Current stories about addiction are unhelpful: the shaming story ('it's your fault, why are you so weak-willed') and the medical story ('it's not your fault at all, it's an illness'). The framework offers a way in between, recognizing addiction as a response to difficult circumstances while acknowledging the effects of addictive substances.

Contemporary compatibilists include John Fischer, who argues that as long as we are rational or responsive to reasons, we will have the sort of free will required for deserved praise and blame. Dana Nelkin and Susan Wolf have also contributed important work on this view. They argue that free will is required for praise but not for blame, presenting an asymmetrical view on the requirements for moral responsibility.

Semicompatibilism is the philosophical view that causal determinism is compatible with moral responsibility without requiring freedom to do otherwise; instead, moral responsibility requires guidance control, which involves acting from one's own moderately reasons-responsive psychological mechanism, combined with mechanism ownership (the mechanism must be genuinely the agent's own rather than externally manipulated), thereby preserving our status as morally responsible agents regardless of whether determinism is true.

The reason view contrasts with two major alternatives: the autonomy view (requiring constant ability to do otherwise) and the deep self view (requiring acting from firmly held desires). Wolf argues these views focus exclusively on metaphysical concerns about control while neglecting the essential capacity to recognize what is truly good. Her counterexample involves a person raised with warped moral reasoning who acts according to their real self but lacks the ability to reason toward truth and goodness, demonstrating that acting from one's real self is insufficient for moral responsibility.

Reformed theology is a form of compatibilism that denies the sourcehood condition and the principle of alternate possibilities. Once these are denied, reformed theology enters the realm of compatibilism, where free will and moral responsibility are compatible with determinism. There are multiple compatibilist models available, and reformed theologians are not required to hold to Fischer and Ravizza's guidance control specifically. The goal is to show that reformed theology is compatible with contemporary philosophical discussions of free will and moral responsibility, helping theologians stay current with philosophical developments and effectively engage with contemporary audiences.

Philosophy is fundamentally about engaging in critical inquiry, questioning everything, and learning the tools for doing so. Semi-compatibilism (source compatibilism) is the view that moral responsibility is compatible with causal determinism. This view holds that moral responsibility does not depend on whether free will in the sense of freedom to choose and do otherwise is compatible with determinism. There are two distinct kinds of freedom: regulative control (freedom to choose or do otherwise) and guidance control (acting freely in the actual sequence). Moral responsibility does not require regulative control but does require guidance control. The consequence argument is a powerful argument for incompatibilism, relying on the fixity of the past and natural laws. Manipulation arguments challenge compatibilism by pointing out no principled difference exists between ordinary causal determination and covert manipulation. Frankfurt cases challenge the view that moral responsibility requires freedom to do otherwise. Reflective equilibrium is a methodological approach where one starts with judgments, intuitions, and reactive attitudes, then develops general criteria that accord well with those judgments. Thought experiments are essential for testing views but must be used carefully.