US-Israel vs Iran: Proxy Forces and the Regional War | Geopolitical Analysis

[00:00:03]This was never going to stay contained.

[00:00:06]The moment proxy forces began moving from Lebanon to Iraq and beyond, [music] the risk changed. It was no longer a war between states. It became a chain reaction.

[00:00:20]Rockets fired from southern Lebanon.

[00:00:22]Drones launched from the Iraqi desert.

[00:00:25]Tankers struck in the Persian Gulf.

[00:00:28]No single declaration of war, no single front line, just pressure applied from every direction at once.

[00:00:37]For decades, Iran did not need to fight directly. [music] It built something else, a network, careful, patient, distributed across borders. And when the strikes hit Tyrron [music] on February 28th, 2026, that network began to move.

[00:00:56]>> [music] >> But what happened next surprised even the intelligence agencies that had spent decades studying these groups. The question is not just what Iran [music] did next. The real question is once proxy forces activate across an entire region, who controls the pace of war.

[00:01:22][music] Iran's axis of resistance built over decades.

[00:01:29]Iran has not projected power in the Middle East primarily through conventional military force. Analysts at the Council on Foreign Relations describe Iran strategy as the axis of resistance, a loose network of armed groups spread across the Middle East. An informal network of armed proxy groups aligned with Thrron across the region.

[00:01:51]The CFR documents that the Kuds Force, the International Operations Arm of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, spent years arming and training Shia militants.

[00:02:03]This included providing advanced armed drones to Hezbollah in Lebanon, training more than 100,000 Shia fighters in Syria, supplying ballistic missiles and drones to Yemen's Houthis, and helping Shia militias in Iraq develop their own missile capabilities.

[00:02:21]As detailed by the Stimson Center and documented through CFR's conflict tracker, Iran historically maintained at least four main proxy fronts. Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Shia militias in Iraq, and the Houthis in Yemen.

[00:02:39]The strategic logic, analysts argue, was to compel Israel to defend on multiple fronts simultaneously, reducing its ability to focus on Iranian nuclear or military capabilities and creating indirect pressure without direct state-to-state confrontation.

[00:02:57]Iran spent decades quietly building this network of allied militias across the region. And it raises an uncomfortable question. Did Western governments underestimate how powerful that network had become?

[00:03:11]What do you think? Tell us in the comments.

[00:03:15]The direct confrontation begins.

[00:03:18]February 28th, 2026.

[00:03:21]According to the UK House of Commons Library research briefing on February 28th, 2026, the United States and Israel began a series of coordinated strikes against Iran, cenamed Operation Epic Fury.

[00:03:38]The stated aims included targeting Iran's nuclear program, its ballistic missile capabilities, and its military and political leadership.

[00:03:47]Among those killed in the initial strikes was Supreme Leader Ali Kamei.

[00:03:53]The ACLED March 2026 special issue confirms that the joint campaign rapidly evolved from initial strikes into sustained large-scale air operations recorded across at least 26 of Iran's 31 provinces.

[00:04:09]According to CSIS analysis from that same period, in the first hours, Iran's proxy network did not immediately mobilize.

[00:04:19]Analysts at CSIS noted that proxy groups, including Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Iraqi militias, had all previously vowed to retaliate if Iran came under attack. Yet, initial mobilization was delayed.

[00:04:34]That silence in the hours after the strikes was not the end of the story. It was the beginning of a different one.

[00:04:42]Because within 48 hours, the map of the conflict began to expand.

[00:04:48]For years, this network existed mostly in the background of Middle Eastern geopolitics.

[00:04:54]But once Iran itself was attacked, the network did exactly what it was designed to do.

[00:05:03]>> [music] >> Front one, Lebanon opens.

[00:05:11]According to ACLED's March 2026 special issue, Hezbollah waited 2 days before joining the conflict.

[00:05:20]On March 2nd, 2026, it launched strikes against Israel, citing the killing of Ham, [music] described as the most important religious leader for Shia Muslims in Lebanon, as the trigger.

[00:05:33]The 2026 Lebanon war documentation records that Hezbollah publicly framed its attacks as a defensive act, stating it was retaliating for over a year of ongoing Israeli strikes during a prior truce.

[00:05:48]Hezbollah's secretary general Naim Cassm had previously vowed to undertake the group's duty of confronting the aggression. By that point, Israel had already struck Hezbollah targets in southern Lebanon on February 28th, targeting tunnel shafts, rocket launching sites, and early warning equipment before the main Iran campaign had fully commenced.

[00:06:13]ACLED records Israel responding with over 250 strikes across Lebanon, resulting in at least 50 people killed and over 330 injured.

[00:06:26]Targets included Hezbollah's weapons depots, financial infrastructure, and senior leadership, including the group's head of intelligence, who was killed in Beirut's southern suburbs.

[00:06:38]The Washington Post reported that by mid-March 2026, the Israeli offensive had displaced approximately 800,000 people in Lebanon and killed more than 680.

[00:06:52]What does this mean strategically?

[00:06:54]Hezbollah opening a northern front forces Israel to divide attention and military resources.

[00:07:02]Lebanon ceases to be a neighboring observer and becomes a second battlefield.

[00:07:08]And critically, the Lebanese government, not Hezbollah, finds itself caught in an impossible position.

[00:07:16]Beirut had banned Hezbollah's military activities before the escalation, but the group retained its weapons and acted independently.

[00:07:25]The Lebanese state had no mechanism to stop it.

[00:07:30]Hezbollah entered the conflict despite being militarily weakened, which raises a deeper question.

[00:07:37]Was this about ideology or obligation to Tran?

[00:07:42]Ideology or obligation?

[00:07:45]Comment below.

[00:07:48]Front two, Iraq and the American bases.

[00:07:53]According to the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and the Long War Journal, Iranbacked Shia militias in Iraq began targeting US positions within hours of the February 28th strikes.

[00:08:07]These groups operate under the banner of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, [music] an umbrella network of militia factions with close ties to Thran.

[00:08:16]By March 1st, the group Sarah Aliyah Alam had claimed attacks on US military bases in Herbiel.

[00:08:25]Media reports confirmed explosions at Herbiel International Airport, which hosts US troops.

[00:08:32]By March 2nd, the same group claimed to have targeted Camp Victoria near Baghdad International Airport using what it described as a squadron of drones.

[00:08:43]The Islamic Resistance in Iraq umbrella announced on March 1st that it had carried out 21 operations using dozens of drones against US positions in Iraq [music] and across the region.

[00:08:57]US Central Command confirmed to the Long War Journal that six US service members had been killed and 18 wounded since the start of major combat operations.

[00:09:09]By March 12th, according to the Popular Mobilization Forces own statements to Iraqi state media, the United States had conducted 32 air strikes against PMF headquarters across seven Iraqi provinces since February 28th.

[00:09:26]The structural complexity inside Iraq.

[00:09:29]The PMF, the Popular Mobilization Forces, is officially an Iraqi State Security Institution that legally reports to the Prime Minister.

[00:09:40]But according to FDD analysis, in practice, its most powerful constituent groups take orders from Tran.

[00:09:48]The PMF receives an annual government budget of approximately $3.5 billion.

[00:09:55]This means the line between an Iraqi state security force and an Iranian proxy is not always visible from the outside.

[00:10:04]US Secretary of State Marco Rubio called Iraqi Prime Minister Sudani on March 9th, stressing that Iraq must take all possible measures to protect American personnel.

[00:10:18]Katab Hezbollah, one of the most powerful PMF factions and a US designated terrorist organization, publicly threatened a long war of attrition to remove all American presence from the region.

[00:10:32]But the most dangerous escalation wasn't happening in Lebanon or Iraq.

[00:10:39]It was happening in the Gulf. The global energy lifeline was about to be threatened.

[00:10:49]>> [music] >> Countries caught in the crossfire.

[00:10:55]The UK House of Commons library briefing documents that Iran launched strikes against Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Azerbaijan, and the Kurdistan region of Iraq, as well as the British overseas territory of Acriteri and Dilia in Cyprus.

[00:11:16]The UAE expelled a Qatar-based IRGC cell of 10 individuals who had been collecting intelligence on Gulf military infrastructure.

[00:11:27]Major shipping companies including Marisk, CMA, CGM, and Hapag Lloyd suspended transits through the Straight of Hormuz.

[00:11:37]According to the 2026 Straight of Hormuz crisis documentation, tanker traffic through the straight dropped by approximately 70% initially, then fell to near zero.

[00:11:49]The straight handles roughly 20% of the world's daily oil supply. Unlike the Red Sea, there is no alternative shipping route for Gulf oil exports heading to Asia.

[00:12:00]Insurance rates for shipping through the straight were reported to have increased by four to six times over the prior week by early March.

[00:12:08]IMF Chief Cristina Gorgiva stated that every 10% increase in energy prices is expected to raise global inflation by approximately half a percent.

[00:12:19]The Gulf States impossible position.

[00:12:22]Saudi Arabia and the UAE had not joined Operation Epic Fury. Gulf states had publicly stated they would not allow their territory or airspace to be used for strikes on Iran. Yet Iran struck them anyway.

[00:12:36]This positions these countries as passive targets of a war they declined to participate in a dynamic that created enormous diplomatic and security pressure on governments that had been pursuing economic diversification under vision 2030 and similar development strategies.

[00:12:53]Neutrality, it turned out, was not a protection. Geography and alliance structures made it irrelevant.

[00:13:01]The Gulf States tried to remain neutral, but geography has a way of making neutrality irrelevant, which raises a difficult question. In a proxy war like this, can any country truly stay out of the conflict?

[00:13:16]What do you think?

[00:13:19][music] The Houthis, the proxy that calculated.

[00:13:26]Not every proxy in Iran's network responded the same way. The Houthis in Yemen present a case [music] study in independent militia decision-making.

[00:13:35]According to both CSIS analysis and the Red Sea crisis documentation, the Houthis had previously paused their attacks on Red Sea shipping in October 2025 following the Gaza ceasefire proposal.

[00:13:48]When the February 28th strikes hit Iran, they announced they would resume attacks, but as of early March had not yet formally done so at full scale.

[00:13:59]CSIS analysis noted that Hezbollah's initial reaction to Kame's killing was remarkably muted despite deep ideological and religious bonds between Hezbollah leaders and the Ayatollas.

[00:14:12]The Atlantic Council's March 2026 analysis notes that the Houthis face their own internal calculations.

[00:14:19]Any full entry into the war would threaten a 4-year day tant with Saudi Arabia and could reignite the Yemeni civil war.

[00:14:28]According to an Axios report citing analysts at the project for Middle East integration, the new Supreme Leader Mushtaba Kam who succeeded his father publicly thanked Hezbollah, the Iraqi militias and the Houthis for their support in early March. Some observers interpreted this as a signal that he expected greater involvement from the Houthi front. This has not been independently verified as a direct operational order.

[00:14:57]Why does Houthi hesitation matter?

[00:15:00]It reveals something important about how proxy networks actually function. Iran's axis of resistance is not a single military command structure. Each group has its own battlefield conditions, [music] domestic politics, and survival calculations.

[00:15:17]The Houthi's threatening but not yet acting at full scale on the Red Sea while the straight of Hormuz was already near closed represents a distinct strategic choice, not an Iranian failure of control.

[00:15:31]If the Houthis fully entered the war, the combination of a closed Hormuz and a closed Bob Al- Manddeb [music] would cut off virtually all viable Gulf oil export routes simultaneously.

[00:15:45]>> [music] >> The sovereignty question in Iraq.

[00:15:52]The conflict generated a significant legal and diplomatic paradox specifically regarding Iraq. The PMF is formerly part of the Iraqi armed forces.

[00:16:03]When US and Israeli strikes targeted PMF positions across seven Iraqi provinces, they were, by one legal interpretation, striking the military of a sovereign state with which they are not formally at war.

[00:16:19]Some international law scholars argue that the strikes fall within the established doctrine of self-defense under UN Charter Article 51, given the PMF's documented attacks on US personnel and facilities.

[00:16:34]Others contend that conducting military operations inside a sovereign state without government consent [music] and against its official armed forces represents a violation of article 24's prohibition on the use of force against territorial integrity.

[00:16:52]Neither the United States nor Israel formally claimed the strikes inside Iraq.

[00:16:58]Iraq's government expressed sorrow over PMF losses while publicly committing to protect diplomatic missions, a carefully calibrated diplomatic position that avoided both condemning its US partner and endorsing militia attacks.

[00:17:14]International law experts remain divided. The ambiguity is not accidental.

[00:17:20]It reflects the deliberate structural opacity of proxy networks which operate in legal gray zones that international bodies were not designed to address cleanly.

[00:17:34][music] UNICEF reported on March 12th, 2026 that more than 1,100 children had been injured or killed since the start of the conflict.

[00:17:46]Behind those [music] numbers are classrooms that suddenly emptied.

[00:17:50]neighborhoods that became front lines and families forced to decide whether to stay or run.

[00:17:58]With an estimated 200 in Iran, 91 in Lebanon, four in Israel, and smaller numbers in neighboring states, hundreds of thousands of children had been displaced and millions were unable to attend school.

[00:18:12]The UNHCHR reported that by March 10th, approximately 700,000 Lebanese had been displaced by Israeli strikes in Lebanon.

[00:18:22]The Washington Post reported over 680 killed in Lebanon by mid-March.

[00:18:27]In the Kurdistan region of Iraq, [music] government authorities suspended school and university operations from March 1st through March 4th following militia attacks on the region.

[00:18:38]A missile struck an Italian military base in Erbil on March 12th. A separate attack on a French training camp that same day, killed one soldier and wounded six.

[00:18:49]Across Iran, reports emerged of civilians fearing to leave their homes as major cities appeared empty in the days after the strikes.

[00:18:58]Reports also emerged of prisoners in Evan prison receiving only limited food and water since the onset of hostilities.

[00:19:05]For populations in Iraq's Shia heartland, the conflict created a different kind of pressure.

[00:19:11]Militia members killed in strikes were mourned as martyrs with funerals attended by thousands and flags of [music] Iranianbacked groups displayed openly.

[00:19:20]The war was not an abstraction in Baghdad, Carbala, or southern Beirut. It was arriving in neighborhoods.

[00:20:16]What does winning look like against a network?

[00:20:20]CFR senior fellow Steven Cook posed a central question in his February 28th analysis. The stated objective of ensuring Iran would no longer support proxy groups may be the hardest war aim to achieve through air strikes alone. As Cook noted, as long as Iran retains the ability to export oil and generate revenue, it will have the financial capacity to support aligned groups regardless of leadership changes in Tran.

[00:20:48]The CSIS analysis frames the conflict as a hinge moment for the Middle East, a transformation of regional order [music] that was already accelerating.

[00:20:59]The decimation of Hezbollah's leadership in 2024, the collapse of the Assad government in Syria, and the direct strike on Iran's supreme leadership are all in CSIS's assessment elements of a shift from an old regional order to a new one whose shape is not yet determined.

[00:21:19]But the proxy dimension complicates this picture significantly.

[00:21:23]A change of government in Tran does not automatically dissolve armed networks that have been operating independently for [music] decades.

[00:21:31]Katib Hezbollah, Assai Al-Hak, and the Houthis all have organizational structures, funding streams, and local political influence that exist partially independently of direct Iranian direction.

[00:21:46]What happens to those networks if Iran's central government changes or collapses is genuinely unknown.

[00:21:54]A narrower question also lingers. Can air strikes permanently eliminate nuclear programs? Historical precedent, including the Iraqi Osirak strike in 1981 and the Syrian Alabar strike in 2007, suggests such operations can delay but rarely permanently end programs with determined state backing.

[00:22:17]Whether the 2026 campaign achieve different results will be a subject of intelligence analysis for years.

[00:22:28]>> [music] >> This conflict did not begin on February 28th, 2026.

[00:22:34]It accumulated decision by decision, proxy by proxy, front by [music] front.

[00:22:44]The architecture of Iran's influence across the region, built through Hezbollah, through the PMF, through the Houthis, was never simply a military tool. It was a strategic hedge, a way of fighting without fully fighting, of applying pressure without declaring war.

[00:23:05]When that hedge was tested directly, when the strikes hit Tyrron and the Supreme Leader was killed, the network moved.

[00:23:14]Not all at once, not perfectly coordinated, but enough.

[00:23:19]Enough to open a second front in Lebanon.

[00:23:23]Enough to threaten US positions across Iraq.

[00:23:26]Enough to shut the straight of Hormuz.

[00:23:30]Enough to put Gulf states under fire.

[00:23:33]States that never wanted to be part of this war.

[00:23:37]The lesson of proxy warfare is not that it makes conflict easier.

[00:23:41]It is that it makes conflict harder to end, harder to contain, harder to define as over.

[00:23:50]Because when a war has a 100 actors, even a ceasefire between the principles doesn't stop the proxies.

[00:23:58]And once escalation reaches this point, containment becomes a hope, not a guarantee.

[00:24:06]And in proxy warfare, wars rarely end cleanly.

[00:24:11]They spread, they linger, and sometimes [music] they outlive the governments that started them.

[00:24:20]If proxy warfare is the future of conflict, what actually prevents escalation, diplomacy, deterrence, something else entirely?

[00:24:33]Let us know your thoughts in the comments. If the untold stories behind global events fascinate you, don't forget to like, share, subscribe, and comment [music] your thoughts. Your front row seat to history starts here.

[00:24:48]Thank you for watching and I'll see you in the next