Speech Acts Theory: Austin on Performatives and Constatives

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Derrida's Deconstructive Critique and Iterability

Jacques Derrida famously critiqued J.L. Austin’s Speech Act Theory in his essay 'Signature Event Context.' Derrida challenged Austin's reliance on the speaker's conscious intention and a stable, 'normal' context for a performative's success. Austin excluded 'parasitic' or non-serious speech acts (like theatrical acting, writing, or joking) as anomalies. Derrida argued this exclusion was a fundamental flaw, asserting that the defining feature of any speech act is 'iterability'—the capacity to be repeated, cited, and grafted into new, unpredictable contexts. For Derrida, a performative succeeds not because of an authentic, present consciousness or strict adherence to 'felicity conditions,' but because it repeats a pre-existing conventional formula. Thus, the risk of failure or 'infelicity' is not an external accident, but an essential, structural characteristic of language itself.

Traditional truth-conditional semantics (the view that the primary function of language is to make true or false statements about the world).
The concept of 'truth-value' in philosophy and logic, specifically how sentences are evaluated as true or false.
The historical context of Logical Positivism and Verificationism, which heavily influenced early 20th-century philosophy of language.
The foundational distinction between semantics (the literal meaning of words) and pragmatics (the study of language in use and context).
Austin's tripartite division of speech acts into locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary forces.
The concept of 'Felicity Conditions', which outlines the rules and contexts required for a performative speech act to be successful rather than 'unhappy'.
John Searle's taxonomy of speech acts, which systematized Austin's theory into distinct categories like directives, commissives, and declarations.
The application of Speech Act Theory to legal philosophy, gender studies (e.g., Judith Butler's gender performativity), and modern Natural Language Processing (NLP) in computer science.
3.7K views87likes16:08@davidboylanphilosophyOriginal Release: 2021-04-11

J.L. Austin distinguishes between constatives (statements that report facts and can be true or false, like 'Austin was a crabby Oxford don') and performatives (speech acts that do things rather than merely describe things, such as 'I hereby name this ship Beauty' or 'I declare you man and wife'), which have the remarkable property that saying them can make it so—creating new facts or states of affairs—but only when performed by individuals with appropriate social standing in proper circumstances.