Speech Acts Theory: Austin on Performatives and Constatives

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Performatives vs. Constatives
Saying Makes It So
Not Just Statements
Grammatical Paradox
Limits of Speech Acts
Social Standing Needed
Neither True Nor False
Summary of Concepts

Performatives vs. Constatives

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    Introduces the core distinction between constatives, which report facts, and performatives, which enact actions.

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    Uses examples like naming a ship and declaring marriage to show how saying something makes it true.

Traditional truth-conditional semantics (the view that the primary function of language is to make true or false statements about the world).
The concept of 'truth-value' in philosophy and logic, specifically how sentences are evaluated as true or false.
The historical context of Logical Positivism and Verificationism, which heavily influenced early 20th-century philosophy of language.
The foundational distinction between semantics (the literal meaning of words) and pragmatics (the study of language in use and context).
Austin's tripartite division of speech acts into locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary forces.
The concept of 'Felicity Conditions', which outlines the rules and contexts required for a performative speech act to be successful rather than 'unhappy'.
John Searle's taxonomy of speech acts, which systematized Austin's theory into distinct categories like directives, commissives, and declarations.
The application of Speech Act Theory to legal philosophy, gender studies (e.g., Judith Butler's gender performativity), and modern Natural Language Processing (NLP) in computer science.
3.7K views87likes16:08@davidboylanphilosophyOriginal Release: 2021-04-11

J.L. Austin distinguishes between constatives (statements that report facts and can be true or false, like 'Austin was a crabby Oxford don') and performatives (speech acts that do things rather than merely describe things, such as 'I hereby name this ship Beauty' or 'I declare you man and wife'), which have the remarkable property that saying them can make it so—creating new facts or states of affairs—but only when performed by individuals with appropriate social standing in proper circumstances.