Thomas Nagel on Death: The Deprivation Account

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The Epicurean "No-Subject" Objection

The primary challenge to Thomas Nagel’s deprivation account comes from the Epicurean "No-Subject" objection. Epicurus famously argued that "death is nothing to us," because where death is, we are not, and where we are, death is not. Critics defending this view argue that for something to be bad or harmful, there must be an existing subject who suffers the harm. Since a deceased person does not exist, they cannot be the subject of any deprivation, disadvantage, or misfortune. From this perspective, Nagel’s account fails because it treats deprivation as a harm that can exist without a subject to experience it. Furthermore, defenders of Lucretius's symmetry argument assert that our indifference toward the eternity of non-existence before our birth (pre-natal) should logically match our attitude toward the eternity of non-existence after our death (post-mortem), directly contesting Nagel's insistence that post-mortem non-existence is uniquely harmful.

Epicurus's view on death: Understanding the Epicurean claim that death cannot harm us because we do not exist to experience it ('death is nothing to us').
Lucretius's symmetry puzzle: The philosophical challenge of why we fear post-mortem non-existence but do not care about pre-natal non-existence.
Theories of well-being: Basic familiarity with hedonism, desire-satisfaction, and objective list theories regarding what makes a life valuable.
The concept of harm in philosophy: Distinguishing between experiential harm (direct suffering) and non-experiential harm (being harmed without experiencing it directly).
Bernard Williams on immortality: Exploring 'The Makropulos Case' and whether an eternal life would eventually become meaningless or boring.
Derek Parfit's Personal Identity: Investigating how psychological continuity affects our rational attitudes toward our future survival and death.
Contemporary solutions to Lucretian Symmetry: Analyzing modern debates (e.g., Shelly Kagan or Frances Kamm) on why our attitudes toward pre-natal and post-mortem non-existence differ.
Applications in Bioethics: Evaluating how the deprivation account shapes ethical perspectives on euthanasia, abortion, and radical life extension.
2.6K views104likes10:59@bydavideganOriginal Release: 2024-01-30

Thomas Nagel argues that death is intrinsically bad because it deprives us of life, which is intrinsically good; he responds to Epicurus' objection that death cannot be bad since we don't experience it by showing that death is bad in contrast to the alternative of continued life, and he addresses the symmetry argument by distinguishing between extending life forward (which preserves our identity) and backward (which would not be 'us'), ultimately concluding that death is always a deprivation regardless of when it occurs.