The Symmetry Argument: Lucretius on Death's Harm

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The Deprivation Account and Temporal Asymmetry

The primary challenge to Lucretius's symmetry argument is the 'Deprivation Account,' championed by philosophers like Thomas Nagel. This view posits that death is harmful not because non-existence is inherently bad, but because it deprives an existing person of the future goods of life they would have otherwise experienced. This exposes a crucial asymmetry between pre-natal and post-mortem non-existence. While death deprives an established subject of their future, pre-natal non-existence does not constitute a deprivation. A person could not have been born much earlier than they actually were and still been the same individual, as identity is bound to a specific origin point in time. Consequently, pre-natal non-existence cannot be considered a loss for anyone. Therefore, our asymmetrical attitude is rational: post-mortem non-existence represents a tragic loss of life's possibilities, whereas pre-birth non-existence does not.

Introduction to Epicureanism and its materialist metaphysics, particularly the view that the soul is mortal and made of physical atoms.
The conceptual distinction between existence and non-existence in ancient philosophical traditions.
The Deprivation Account of death, which argues that death is bad because it deprives a person of the goods of life.
Basic principles of philosophical arguments by analogy and how symmetry is used to establish logical consistency.
Thomas Nagel's critique of the symmetry argument, focusing on the asymmetry between pre-natal and post-humous non-existence.
Derek Parfit's work on temporal asymmetry and why humans psychologically bias future experiences over past ones.
Epicurus's 'No-Subject' argument, which asserts that death cannot harm us because we do not exist to experience it.
Contemporary existentialist perspectives on mortality and how reconciling with non-existence affects existential dread and grief.
2.5K views31likes31:02@autodidactstoolkitOriginal Release: 2016-04-14

Lucretius's symmetry argument, an argument from analogy, holds that since we do not fear or regret our pre-birth non-existence, we should similarly not fear our post-death non-existence, because both states are relevantly similar as states of non-existence with no experience possible; however, critics like Thomas Nagel and Derek Parfit argue that pre-birth and post-death non-existence are not relevantly analogous because we lose nothing due to pre-birth non-existence but do lose something due to post-death non-existence, and because we have a bias toward the future that makes us think differently about past versus future non-existence.