Three ancient philosophical arguments challenge the common-sense view (the harm thesis) that death is bad for the person who dies: (1) The hedonist argument claims death cannot be bad because only pain is intrinsically bad, and once dead, a person cannot experience pain; (2) The existence argument states that for something to be bad for a person, that person must exist at the time of the bad thing, and since death occurs when a person no longer exists, it cannot harm them; (3) The symmetry argument argues that prenatal non-existence and posthumous non-existence are symmetrical in all relevant respects, and since we do not fear prenatal non-existence, we should not fear posthumous non-existence either.
Death Is Nothing to Fear: Epicurean Arguments Explained
Added:hello YouTube in this video we're going to look at death in particular is death a bad thing for the person who dies does death harm us many people fear death pretty much all of us try to avoid it but is there really anything to be afraid of now first uh we're going to assume for the purposes of this video that death involves Annihilation so there is no afterlife once a person dies that's the end of them death is the permanent cessation of biological and psychological processes so when we ask is death bad what we're asking is is Annihilation bad obviously you know there can be plenty of debate about whether or not this is the right view of what happens after death again you know we're just going to take that for granted here okay so we're going to assume that death is Annihilation um right first of all then we can State uh the harm thesis uh the harm thesis says that death is sometimes bad for those who die um this is I suppose the common sense view uh of of death of the value of death now there are some important clarifications to the harm thesis so first of all the harm thesis specifically concerns being dead not the process of dying few people will deny that dying can be an extremely bad experience uh there can be plenty of suffering in the process of dying but once you're actually dead the suffering of course is over the harm thesis specifically claims that your non-existence is bad it's it's bad even when there is no more suffering um so you know this is what we're going to be talking about here is being dead not dying second the harm thesis of course concerns only the person who dies again few people will deny that a person's death can be bad for other people uh when you die your loved ones will experience a terrible loss that's going to be bad for them what's in question here is whether death is bad for the actual person who dies third uh an advocate of the harm thesis can grant that death is not always bad for the person who dies for instance if a person has a disease that causes severe disability and pain and it's incurable a person in that state might reasonably welcome non-existence of course even in this case it might well be that we view death as the lesser of two evils so it's not that their death is good for them really it's just preferable to continued suffering it's better for them to be dead but still not good um I mean we're going to put this kind of example aside though and consider you know an average adult human being who has a reasonably good quality of life the question is would you know would death be bad for that person the harm thesis says yes uh yes it would be okay so that's probably fairly common sensical now a classic argument against the harm thesis comes from epicurus According to epicurus death cannot be bad for the person who dies here's how epicurus States the argument he says that death is nothing to us for all good and evil consists in sensation but death is the deprivation of sensation the man speaks but idly who says that he fears death not because it will be painful when it comes but because it is painful in anticipation for that which gives no trouble when it comes is but an empty pain in anticipation so death the most terrifying of ills is nothing to us since so long as we exist death is not with us but when death comes then we do not exist it does not then concern either the living or the Dead said since for the former it is not and the latter are no more now there are actually two distinct arguments being made in this passage at least two distinct arguments there's the henst argument and the existence argument so let's start with the henst argument okay all good and evil epicurus tells us consists in sensation the idea here is um as hedonists would say uh well-being is simply a matter of Pleasure and Pain good and evil is just a matter of Pleasure and Pain right so the good is just what brings us pleasure the bad is what brings us pain in order to be harmed I must be subject to painful Sensations but once I'm dead well all of my Sensations all of my experiences will cease so all of my negative experiences will cease which is just to say that nothing will harm me so this argument can kind of be broken down into two steps the initial step of the argument is as follows um only pain is intrinsically bad sorry premise one only pain is intrinsically bad premise two when a person is dead she cannot experience pain so premise three being dead cannot be intrinsically bad for the person who dies it can't be bad in itself for the person who dies now um this is the the first step even if something is not intrinsically bad even if it's not bad in itself it might still be instrumentally bad so there are some things that are that are instrumentally bad because you know for something to be instrumentally bad is for it to cause things that are intrinsically bad so on a on a henst view all that is intrinsically good is pleasure all that is intrinsically bad is pain but there are various things that can cause pleasure or cause pain so we can say that these are instrumentally good or bad um something is instrumentally good or bad in so far as it leads to those things that are intrinsically good or bad so think about something like smoking every day in itself smoking every day might not be unpleasant indeed a lot of people seem to enjoy it but it causes lung cancer which then causes a great deal of suffering so we might think okay smoking is instrumentally bad smoking is something which is going to lead to various negative consequences so okay we can complete uh The Heist argument by continuing it as follows uh premise four something can be intrinsically bad only if it causes things sorry something can be instrumentally bad only if it causes things that are intrinsically bad premise five a person's death cannot cause any pain to her um and so the conclusion is a person's death cannot be instrumentally bad for her um now obviously my knowledge of my impending death might cause various negative experiences plenty of people fear death and fear is an unpleasant experience fear is a kind of pain in this respect death is connected to unpleasant experiences but note that it's it's not my death itself that is causing that fear rather it is my thinking about my death my knowledge of my death that's what causes the fear the fact that I expect to die in the future the fact that I'm thinking about it that's what's causally responsible for my fear of death so I mean assuming that causes have to precede their effects clearly my death cannot cause anything to happen to me because once I die I won't exist um so it so that the result is that a person's death is neither intrinsically bad nor instrumentally bad a person's death is not bad in itself because there's no pain and it's not instrumentally bad because it can't cause any pain uh at least not to the person who dies and so this is just to say it isn't bad period um so the argument that we've just given assumes a henst account of well-being right it assumes that you know the good is what is pleasurable the bad is what is painful there are many objections to Hedonism um I won't get into too much detail on the debate about the different theories of well-being but here's a a classic uh a classic kind of counter example to Hedonism so let's say that uh Verity and deia are in a relationship unbeknownst to Verity deia is seeing another woman Verity never finds out she never suspects deia of infidelity Verity's experiences are indistinguishable from what they would be if dilia were faithful but still we might think deia's infidelity is bad for Verity deia's infidelity makes Verity worse off we might even think that it would be good for Verity to learn the truth even though the truth is going to be very painful for Verity so the moral is if you if you accept all of that well not all that's good or bad for a person reduces to pleasure or pain um so Hedonism is wrong um for a bit more on the arguments concerning Hedonism uh I have a video on uh Robert noi's experience machine thought experiment I will put a link to that in the comments anyway what this example suggests is well an alternative view of well-being maybe well-being is a matter of Desire satisfaction so I'm better off when my my desires are satisfied and worse off when my desires are thwarted this is why Verity is worse off she desires that deia be faithful that deia be honest and that's not the case right Verity's desires are actually being thwarted even though she's not aware of this um now clearly many of my desires are going to be thwarted by death I have various plans and projects various things I want to achieve in the future if I was hit by a bus tomorrow all of that would would just be cut short um so on that kind of view death is going to be bad um okay so we might well uh reject reject the henst argument by simply rejecting Hedonism there is another difficulty for the hedonist argument though um which is going to hold even if we accept Hedonism so let's say we just accept Hedonism well there's a difficulty here which comes from a view known as deprivation ISM so we might say even if we're hedonists we might say that the harm thesis is still true because the problem is that once we die positive experiences are going to cease so we're harmed not by any particular negative experiences but by the cessation of positive experiences so this is deprivation ISM and it's a very popular account of the of what makes death bad what's bad about death according to the deprivation is that it deprives a person of the life she would have had had her death not occurred it deprives a person of the goods the good things that she would have had if her death had not occurred and uh we might add as well that the earlier a person dies the more good she is deprived of so the worse her death is and that seems to track with our ordinary judgments about death I mean dying is tragic in general but it very young person dying is more tragic than an older person dying and it's worse if like an 18-year-old gets hit by a bus than if an 80-year-old just kind of dies of old age um we feel that in some sense the young person has lost more and according to the deprivation that's that's exactly the case right like the young person has been deprived of uh more potential Goods so the deprivation view assumes a uh comparativist account of harm um According to which an event e is bad for a person P only if e makes P's well-being lower than it would have been had e not occurred so in general we are harmed by those events that make our lives worse than they otherwise would be I'm I'm harmed by an event just in case either it causes more suffering or it causes less pleasure than I otherwise would have experienced it's a fairly straightforward idea right like if I fall down and break my arm well the idea is is okay like had that event not occurred my well-being would have been greater all right I I would not have suffered so many pains I I would not have become disabled Etc so um now so so the idea is um I'm H by an event just in case it makes me worse off than I otherwise would have been but the idea is look this is clearly the case for death so Owen Luda died in 2021 had Owen lud's death not occurred in 2021 had it occurred later he would have had more positive experiences and so would have had greater well-being now here we're assuming Hedonism about well-being but we could frame this point in terms of other accounts of well-being as well so you know had Owen lud's death not occurred in 202 one who would have been able to fulfill more of his desires like so just in general had Owen Luda lived for longer than he did he would have received more Goods he would have been better off death is bad for us not because it causes us to suffer any specific evils but because it deprives us of various Goods it deprives us of the pleasant experiences we would have had if we hadn't died um indeed there can be no greater loss to a person than their death when a person dies they lose everything so you know deprivation of goods is bad and death is the worst deprivation that a person can possibly suffer that's why death is bad now I mean of course everything that is being said here assumes that the person who dies would have had a positive quality of life had they not died um I mean if what awaits a person is just Decades of suffering then even a deprivation might say that death is not bad for that person because they they're not being deprived of a good life again that seems to track with our intuitions um at least many people's intuitions um uh okay then so uh a quick advert if you like my channel you can support me on patreon where I upload bonus videos uh about once a week a one-off donation you can give on PayPal I also offer private tutoring in philosophy email if you're interested and join the Discord if you want to talk about any of this stuff uh all of the links there will be in the description okay then so so uh let's get back to it um so that's that's deprivation ISM there is however a very serious objection to deprivation ISM I mentioned that epicurus can be interpreted as forwarding at least two arguments well now it's time to turn to the second argument which I will call the existence argument so the idea here is that in order for something to be bad for a person that person must exist at the time at which the bad thing occurs uh but as epicurus says so long as we exist death is not with us but when death comes then we do not exist death can't harm me when I'm alive because when I'm alive death is death hasn't happened death can't harm me once I'm dead because at that point I I'm not there I no longer exist so there's nobody to harm um I mean I get you we can we can develop this idea behind the existence argument by by thinking okay so when exactly does the Badness of death occur like when does it happen um you know for most of the bad things that happen to us we can we can specify a time when the like when the Badness is like I fall down I break my arm my arm is broken so like I break I break my arm at 2:00 on such and such a day and then there's a period of my life where you know my arm is in a cast or whatever where I'm experiencing pain so we can sort of say ah the bad thing starts at 2:00 and then it continues for however many weeks um now when it comes to death like okay what do we say there I mean the most natural answer is that the Badness of death occur occurs as you die like so um so okay Owen Luda is dead his death is bad for him after he dies we can immediately see there's something fishy about this because we're attributing a harm to someone who no longer exists right like we're it's as if Owen Luder is this non-existent object to whom good or bad things might happen but of course the point is I mean it's it's like no he he he's just not there anymore nothing can happen to him one way or the other um so so I mean that's one sort of General issue here so to State the argument a bit more formally then this is this is how Steven rosenb in his article how to be dead and not care puts the argument um premise one a state of affairs is bad for a person P only if P can experience it at some time premise two so P's being dead is bad for p only if it is a state of affairs that P can experience at some time three p's being dead is not a state of affairs that P can experience at some time conclusion so P's being dead is not bad for p premise two here follows from premise one premise three is uncontroversial you can experience only those things that happen before you die uh and being dead does not happen before you die together the premises entail the conclusion so the controversial premise here is premise one uh it's important to clarify premise one because it might seem that this premise is again assuming Hedonism it's assuming that well-being is you know maybe just a matter of what I experience just a matter of Pleasure and Pain we've already seen a serious objection to these accounts of well-being with the case of verity and deia you Verity doesn't experience dealers infidelity but seems to be made worse off by it note however that premise one says not that a person must experience the State of Affairs in order for it to be bad but merely that a person can experience that State of Affairs something can be bad for me only if it's possible for me to experience it at some time well that deals with the infidel case perhaps Verity never discovers deia's betrayal even so deia's betrayal can still be bad for Verity under premise one because Verity could Discover it and could suffer as a result so premise one can be accepted under other accounts of well-being in any case we could actually weaken all of this because we you know we could say that a State of Affairs is bad for a person P only if P can be affected by it at some time um you don't need to frame it in terms of experiences um even under that framing the argument still goes through um but you know anyway look so premise one or something like premise one seems pretty plausible suppose you're not able to taste anything well in that case foul tasting food is not going to harm you at least not in virtue of producing a foul taste you know why right why why is it not bad well because you can't experience it since you don't have the sense of taste you are you are insulated as it were from unpleasant gustatory experiences and examples like that can be multiplied indefinitely now of course at this point a deprivation will say well hey you know if I can taste things and then I lose my sense of taste that seems like a harm so yes if I lose my sense of taste I will be insulated from the unpleasant gustatory experiences but you know we can still regret the many Pleasant experiences that are now cut off from me me you know and if I knew that I was going to lose my sense of taste in the future that seems like it would be reasonable to fear that okay so that's all fair enough but notice however that on dying it's not quite true that I lose anything I mean it's not that I have some property or some capability and then I lose it and I have to experience the consequences of losing it so you know that when I die there is in a sense a deiv because various properties and capabilities that I have will indeed be lost um but those properties and capabilities are lost in virtue of the fact that I cease to be so it's not it's not me that loses them when I'm dead I can't gain or lose anything so yes there is a deprivation but I am not affected by the deprivation that's the key point and so here's here's the challenge then to deprivation ISM what is it that makes losses bad well the fact that we're affected by them the fact that we experience them so as rosen born points out the typical situation with losses is and I quote a person P loses good G only if there is a time at which P has G and there is a later time at which P does not have G and it's this latter St that's problematic so the state of not having the good the later time at which P does not have G that's what's problematic during my life I will find that I am deprived of various Goods there are many things I don't have that would make my life go better if I had them you know if I lose my sense of taste or even if I just never had the sense of taste in the first place then I might think you know I'm deprived of the ability to taste Pleasant food and what a shame that is it prevents me from experiencing these Pleasures I have the property of lacking the ability to taste Pleasant food and that makes me worse off relative to people who can taste Pleasant food death is different when I die I cease to exist so it can't be said that I'm in a state where I do not have the various Goods associated with life I'm not in any kind of state I don't instantiate any properties I just I don't exist um it makes sense to say that an existing person can have Goods or be deprived of goods once a person ceases to exist they can neither have anything nor be deprived of anything so for any good thing once a person ceases to exist there is no time at which that person does not have that good um I I lose a good only if there's a time in which I have the good in a later time in which I don't have the good once I die it's true that various goods are lost but there's no time at which I don't have those goods I am not deprived of those goods so deprivation cannot be what makes death bad I mean I so okay the the general Point here is there is uh a difference so the argument goes Oro Rosen Bor argues anyway there is an important difference between ordinary loss and the kind of loss that's involved in death speaking colloquially we might well say you know oh yeah when I'm dead I'll be deprived of everything right you know yes I mean that's true in some sense right all of the positive qualities of my life are extinguished as the epicurian sees it though this is a somewhat misleading way to put it once I'm dead I'm not I am not deprived of anything because I'm not there at all it it it's it's true that with my death various things will be lost but it can't be me that sustains any of those losses I cannot be the subject of any of those losses and so that means that those losses cannot make me worse off so that's that's the argument uh that's the the epicurian argument for uh for the claim that death is not bad all right well we've examined two classic arguments from epicurus a final ancient argument against the harm thesis comes from lucretius uh this is the Symmetry argument and here's how lucretius puts it uh he says look back now and consider how the bygone ages of Eternity that elapsed before our birth were nothing to us here then is a mirror in which nature shows us the time to come after our death do you see anything fearful in it do you perceive anything Grim does it not appear more peaceful than the deepest sleep so when you cast your mind back over the many billions of years before your birth consider the wars the violence the all of the oppression and misery and human history well it's nothing to you you weren't there none of it harmed you um maybe the universe has always existed maybe there's been an infinite time before your birth that uh Eternal nothingness before your birth again just doesn't matter doesn't bother you but that's exactly what you should expect when you die Eternal nothingness it's going to be just like before you were born but you're not bothered by how it was like before you were born so there's nothing to bother you in what's coming when you die okay so the argument might be put like this premise one prenatal non-existence and posthumous non-existence are the same in all relevant respects so in all respect relevant to the value of these conditions premise two so if postum non-existence is bad then prenatal non-existence is bad premise three but prenatal non-existence is not bad so conclusion posterous non-existence is not bad prenatal non-existence and posterous non-existence are the same in all relevant respects they have the same intrinsic properties um if non-existence is bad my my non-existence prior to my birth is bad but of course that doesn't concern me um so I shouldn't be concerned about about death about non-existence when I die okay what might we say to this well I mean there are two options that we can take in response here the first option is to affirm the Symmetry to say that prenatal non-existence and postumus non-existence are symmetrical but then we might hold that prenatal non-existence is bad the second option of course is to deny the Symmetry to say there's something about potimus non-existence that uh makes it bad whereas prenatal nonexistence is not all right let's consider the first option um so we accept that prenatal and postumus non-existence are symmetrical but we hold that prenatal non-existence is bad prenatal non-existence is also bad uh contrary to how we might normally think about this so okay a crucial move here is that we have to distinguish the question of whether something is bad from the question of whether it is reasonable to fear something so we do not fear prenatal non-existence and indeed it would seem rather absurd for somebody to fear prenatal non-existence but it doesn't follow from this that prenatal non-existence is not bad there may be other reasons why it's you know it's it would be irrational to fear it so here's here's another explanation right another explanation is this PR atal non-existence is in the past and just in general we don't fear things that are in the past I've experienced many unpleasant things in my life that I certainly would not want to experience in the future but I no longer fear them you know I've had panic attacks in the past if you told me that I was going to have a panic attack later today I'd be quite worried about it but you know all the panic attacks I had in the past who cares doesn't matter it's in the past in general so just just in general the way that fear works is fear is uh fear is directed to or is a response to bad things that are coming um you don't fear stuff that's happened in the past so that's why we don't fear prenatal non-existence but prenatal non-existence May well still be bad um so I mean just to maybe illustrate this a bit further here's a famous case from Derek parfit you are in hospital you're about to have life-saving surgery unfortunately you unable to receive anesthetic maybe because you have an allergy to the anesthetic drugs however the doctors are able to give you an Amnesia drug you're going to have the surgery and you're going to experience excruciating pain but luckily you're going to have this Amnesia drug afterwards so you'll forget it you'll forget the experience now let's say that while you're waiting in the hospital you drift off to sleep okay and then you find yourself waking up on a hospital bed at this point you realize there's two possibilities possibility a is that the surgery has already happened but you were given the drug and you've forgotten about it possibility B the surgery is coming you're about to be taken into the theater now which option do you prefer I mean the same sequence of events is going to occur regardless of whether it's the past or the future right the same excruciating pain is going to happen but you probably have a very strong preference for the first option uh so that's that's the case for most people right you you're going to hope that the surgery has already happened um so in general if bad things are going to occur we prefer them to have occurred in the past we want to have good things to look forward to um so so yeah um the fact that it's irrational to that it would be irrational to fear our prenatal non-existence does not show that it is uh that it is not bad okay well that still leaves us with the question of well what exactly is the harm of prenatal non-existence well from a deprivation point of view it looks like we can give a fairly straightforward answer here from a deprivation point of view we might frame the harm of prenatal non-existence this way the fact that I wasn't born earlier deprived me of various Goods had I been born earlier I would have experienced various Goods that I did not in fact experience any delay in being born involves the loss of life that I otherwise would have had I would have been better off had I come into existence earlier now it's important to be clear about exactly what is being claimed in this argument when we imagine a person coming into existence earlier we usually hold fixed the average human life expectancy so I say well you know if I had been born in 1330 I probably would have died around the 1400s um if I was lucky of course I mean given the extremely high child mortality rates at the time maybe I would have died in like 1340 instead but anyway the point is in that sense obviously being born earlier would not bring any particular benefit um I'm I'm not worse off for existing now rather than existing in the past obviously this is the wrong way to interpret this argument instead what we have to think of is we have to think of taking a person's lifespan taking their actual lifeline and then just extending it into the past while holding the date of their death fixed um so uh Owen Luda was born in 1928 and died in 2021 hold the date of his death fixed at 2021 now imagine starting his life earlier say in 1828 assuming he has about the same quality of life so you know holding other things equal I mean isn't this additional 100 years much better better uh so Owen that is Owen Luda would have been better off had he lived from 1828 to 2021 well that seems perfectly plausible but in that case prenatal non-existence is bad the fact that he was born in 1928 rather than 1828 made him made him worse off made his life much worse off so it's bad it harmed him um so Thomas Nagel raised is a famous objection to this kind of deprivation account of prenatal harm um although Nagal defends a deprivation account of the harm of death overall he raises an objection to this account of prenatal uh the harm of prenatal non-existence so he puts it this way he says and I quote we cannot say that the time prior to a man's birth is a time in which he would have lived had he been born then but not had he been born not then but earlier he could not have been born earlier anyone born substantially earlier than he would have been someone else therefore the time prior to his birth is not time in which his subsequent birth prevents him from Living so Owen Luda could not have been born earlier because any person born substantially earlier would have been somebody else it wouldn't have been him it so it can't harm Owen Luda that he was born in 1928 rather than 1828 we we can't say Owen Luda would have been better off had he been born in 1828 because he couldn't have been born in 1828 the alternative to being born in 1928 is not a better life for Owen Luda it's no life at all he just wouldn't have come into existence on the other hand Owen Luda could have died later than he actually did so the idea is is that the time of a person's birth is essential to their identity the time of a person's death is not um so we kind of have to like you kind of have to hold fixed the time of a person's birth but like given that a person has been born they you know that there's an open Future right they they might die when they're 10 they might die when they're 100 um okay so right I mean one question here is well is it true that a person could not have been born earlier is it true that my time of birth is is an essential property of me I mean that's probably going to depend on our account of personal identity but let's just grant that for the sake of argument so we will grant that the time of a person's birth is an essential property of their is essential to their identity okay so what that means is that when we try to compare Owen lud's actual life with the life Owen Luda would have had were he born 100 years earlier we have a counterfactual with an impossible antecedent the counterfactual is if Owen Luda had lived from 1828 to 2021 he would have been better off and again we're assuming that the antient is impossible Owen Luder could not have been born in 1828 then the Assumption here must be that counterfactuals with impossible antecedants cannot be evaluated um I mean on the standard view counterfactuals with impossible antecedence are all vacuously true um so now certainly counterfactuals with impossible antecedence raise trouble for the standard tools that we have for analyzing counterfactuals so the most famous account of semantics for counterfactuals is what's known as the stall Neer Lewis possible World semantics and basically the idea here is um on this on this account the counterfactual if P had been then Q would have been that counterfactual is true just in case in the closest possible worlds where p is True Q is true so if you take the CL the counterfactual if I had dropped the glass then it would have shattered how do we evaluate this well the idea is we consider those possible worlds that have the same laws of nature as ours that have the same history as ours up to the point at which I'm carrying the glass and then imagine making a slight change so that I drop the glass and then you play out what happen the idea is that yeah I mean in in those worlds right in those close Worlds the worlds with the same laws and the same history and so on in those closest possible worlds when I drop the glass from such a height it hits the floor and it shatters the counterfactual is true because in the closest worlds in which I do drop the glass the glass Chatters okay that's the again standard account of counterfactuals and the trouble is when a counterfactual has an impossible antecedent are no worlds where the antecedent is true there are no like if p is impossible then clearly there are no possible worlds where p is true so there are no worlds where Owen Luda is born in 1828 so all counterfactuals with this antecedent um they they just come out as being vacuously true but it's you know we can't like all all of them you know whether we say if if Luda if ow and Luda had lived from 1828 to 21 he would have been better off you true vacuously true if if Owen Luda had lived from 1828 to 2021 he would have been worse off again vacuously true um so basically we just can't evaluate these these sorts of counterfactuals um okay so that's that problem of course by contrast there are worlds where Owen Luda lives longer than he actually did right so we can say well if own Luda had lived from 1928 to 2023 he would have been better off right that's fine um so so this is this is the claim right like uh there's some problem with evaluating these counterfactuals with impossible antecedence the issue here is that well it seems like I mean so we we might well argue that all this shows is that the standard semantics for counterfactuals is incomplete or it needs modification because it does seem as though we're a able to assess counterfactuals with impossible antecedants here's a famous example so compare these two counterfactuals number one if Thomas Hobbs had squared the circle he would have solved World poverty number two if Thomas Hobs had squared the circle people in Africa would not have cared the first counterfactual number one seems just false why well because while mathematical proofs are impressive um they're just not the sorts of things that solve World poverty there's no relevant connection between you know giving a mathematical proof and the kinds of social policies that would deal with poverty by contrast the second counterfactual seems true given the social organization at the time people in Africa wouldn't even have heard of Hobs as squaring the circle they wouldn't they would they wouldn't know about Hobs so of course they wouldn't care um I mean so look it would require a whole other video to get into this but there are proposals for how to deal with the semantics of counterfactuals with impossible antecedants I mean you know this is this is a whole thing um so with that in mind then I mean in the case of the counterfactual about Owen Luda I mean what we're asking is essentially whether it's better to have more life or less life other things being equal as far as a deprivation is concerned more is better um and more is better whether the more happens in the past or happens in the future um it may well be impossible for me to have existed earlier but still if this impossibility were realized somehow I would be better off um so okay um another possible response to lucretius's argument to his symmetry argument is to deny the Symmetry uh so we might well say that prenatal non-exist and post humous non-existence are relevantly different okay so how how might we how might we make this claim well one thing we might say is okay what exactly is it that awaits me in the future I mean it's not simply non-existence it's permanent non-existence non-existence in itself is not particularly troubling suppose I were to cease to exist for a period of time but then come into existence again I some people might argue that this happens every night when I go to sleep um I mean if personal identity is a matter of continuous conscious experience and conscious experience ceases during sleep something like that you know maybe I pop in and out of existence uh if uh if during sleep conscious experience ceases um the problem with death is that once I die I'm not coming back but in that case there is an important asymmetry with my prenatal non-existence I did not exist for some time before I was born but then I started existing so that's the difference that's the asymmetry does this work well here's a couple of possible responses one response uh perhaps lucretius could say well look if there's nothing bad about non-existence in itself what could be bad about the non-existence being permanent so you know 10 years of non-existence that's fine a billion years of non-existence that's fine a Graham's number years of non-existence that's fine none is worse than the other so a state that in itself is not bad becomes bad just by extending it forever I mean that seems odd especially given that nothing changes about the state so like you know okay I'm going to die soon um hopefully not too soon but you know relatively soon in Cosmic time okay so my non-existent in the year 3000 that's not bad and even I would admit that's not bad right um in itself in itself me not existing in the year 3000 not bad me not existing in the year 5 billion not bad me not existing in the year plug in any finite number at all that's not bad so for any finite number you select my non-existence at that year is not bad for me so how does it become bad then like what Point does it become back there doesn't seem to be a point here no matter how far you continue going into the future there's no point at which anything relevant changes okay um there's there's nothing that there's no difference right there's so it seems like there's just nothing that could make this bad there's no point at which this neutral state becomes a bad State it's not as though my non-existence is going to change I mean lots of things are going to be changing you know lots of things are happening in the universe but my the fact that I'm just not there anymore okay once I die that's it I'm just not there anymore and that just stays the same so if that's not bad in the year 3000 and it's not bad in the year 5 billion and it's not bad in you know any finite number why does it become bad when we say okay it's permanent um that seems again it just seems odd right so uh that might be one one kind of challenge right is okay explain explain how explain how it becomes bad um another Point lucretius might make is while it's true that prenatal non-existence is followed by existence that's not a feature of prenatal non-existence in itself it's not an intrinsic property of prenatal non-existence so I mean really all all it you know it's like when we when we're asking to identify a relevant difference between post humous non-existent and prenatal non-existence we're saying ah well prenatal non-existence was followed by existence but that's not a relevant that's not a difference between potimus non-existence and prenatal non-existence all we're doing there is just we're just pointing to a different state right like my existence is just a different state of affairs that follows the State of Affairs of me not existing prior to a certain time um the point is when I consider the time in the past at which I didn't exist there's nothing bad about that and that time when I didn't exist is symmetrical it does share all of the relevant the same features with the time when I won't exist in the future I mean maybe we could bring out this point a bit further by considering not the time before my birth but people who just never come into existence my mother could have gotten pregnant a third time um she might have given birth to a sister my sister but she didn't um so you know I like there is some possible world where I have a sister okay so is my merely hypothetical sister harmed in any way by the fact that she failed to come into existence has something bad befallen her well surely not um but her exist her non-existence has not been followed by existence so you know and so this might show that actually know prenatal non-existence is symmetrical in the relevant respects with postnatal non-existence um in which case the Symmetry claim stands all right then uh before ending I want to consider a final question here um what are the consequences of denying the harm thesis so we've just seen uh three arguments uh to the effect that the harm thesis is false that death is not bad for the person who dies so suppose we accept this suppose we say with the epicurian that death is never bad for those who die well good news the good news here is death is nothing to fear if the epicurian arguments are successful we are freed from our anxiety about our inevitable deaths but there are some strange results of this view so for example we normally take it that murder is a particularly awful crime but provided the victim is killed painlessly it's not going to be bad for them so we might argue well maybe what makes murder bad is the loss to those who know and love the victim I mean obviously you know if somebody if somebody murders my brother that's going to affect me very greatly and so that's you know I'm going to experience a great loss so you know maybe that's what makes murder bad so okay we can just suppose that the victim is a Hermit who's lived alone for decades nobody else even knows they exist well in that case if the epicurian is right nobody is H armed nothing bad is done there's no bad outcome if the hermit is painlessly killed and that just seems outrageous and you know look there are various things we're inclined to say here we say well you know the hermit doesn't want to die by killing him you're frustrating many of his Central desires similarly there are many potential Goods in his future that you will deprive him of if you kill him and so on the trouble of course is that if any of these ideas work as an explanation of why it's bad for the hermit to be killed well it looks like they also entail that it's bad for the hermit to die um you know so uh by killing the hermit you're frustrating many of his desires yeah but by dying many of his desires are being frustrated so you know uh okay another counterintuitive consequence of the epicurian view is we're often inclined to say that some deaths are worse than others so you know we might say dying at 80 is bad dying at 18 that is just an utter tragedy um but for the epicurian it seems that there's there isn't anything that could make an early death worse than a later death I mean again if we try to appeal to things like the loss of potential life or all of the positive Goods that the 18-year-old could have experienced well then that's just going to entail that death in general is bad that just going to play into the hands of the deprivation account uh moreover we sometimes want to say that a death might be good for the person who dies or at least better than their continued existence for a person with a severe disease who has only a future of extreme suffering death might seem to be a welcome release but the same reasoning that leads us to the conclusion that death is not bad will also lead to the conclusion that death is not good there are no positive Sensations in death uh after death there is no existing subject who could be the bearer of the good and of course there was nothing good in prenatal non-existence death might bring suffering to an end but you know strictly speaking there is no person who is freed from suffering there is no no subject there who can you know who can have the property of being released from suffering so I mean the point of all of this is just the epicurian view is often presented as a way of freeing ourselves from anxiety about death and maybe it does that but arguably accepting the epicurian view will lead to fairly radical changes in a moral framework in general it doesn't only bring about freedom from anxiety or so we might argue um and with that um that is that is all I have to say uh that is that is an introduction to the uh the epicurian case that death is not bad and at least not bad for the person who dies um and that's all for today so thanks for watching goodbye everybody
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