Sudan's RSF: A Coup-Proofing Legacy Explained

Following the 2011 split, Sudan's economy collapsed because oil was gone, leaving gold as the only valuable resource. However, much of Sudan's gold is located in RSF-controlled territory in Darfur. The RSF was originally established in 2013 as a cost-effective way for Sudan's president to police Darfur, loyal only to the president personally. After the 2019 coup, the RSF 'broke free' from central authority. By 2023, the RSF had become so powerful that they controlled Sudan's foreign policy because they guarded natural resources. The SAF, desperate for money after losing oil, tried to take gold from RSF territory without compensation, causing Darfur residents to feel betrayed. Russia supports both sides: the SAF has a major deal with the Russian government to build a warm water port on the Red Sea, while the RSF works with Russia's Wagner Group. The UAE sends more money to the RSF than ten multiple countries combined sent to the SAF. Combined with weapons smuggling, this transformed Sudan from having one powerful army and several poorly-armed rebel factions into two equally funded and powerful armed militias.

The UAE has been financing and arming the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) led by Muhammad Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti) in Sudan's civil war. Since 2014, a Dubai-registered joint Russian-Emirati company called Emiral Resources has been a major player in Sudan's gold mining sector. In late 2025, the RSF committed genocide in Darfur, resulting in over 15,000 Masalit tribe deaths and nearly 150,000 total deaths in El Fasher over an 18-month siege. At the beginning of this conflict, the UAE set up a hospital in eastern Chad to transport weapons to the RSF, marking boxes as humanitarian aid supplies while smuggling weapons to commit war crimes.

Sudan's civil war stems from deep ethnic divisions between the RSF (evolved from Darfur's Janjaweed pastoralist militia) and the Sudanese Army (dominated by Nile Valley agricultural populations). These groups have historical grievances dating to President Bashir's era, when RSF was used against protesters. Economic interests further fuel the conflict: Darfur's gold mining creates direct financial connections between RSF leadership and UAE markets, with gold smuggling sustaining military operations. External state support prolongs the conflict: Egypt, Turkey, and Iran back the Army, while UAE and Libya support RSF, with RSF fighters even supporting General Haftar in Libya. The potential for Sudan's partition mirrors South Sudan's 2011 independence, with RSF controlling Darfur and Army controlling Nile Valley regions. This case illustrates how ethnic tensions, resource economics, and international interventions create self-sustaining conflicts that resist resolution.

The Rapid Support Forces emerged as a counterinsurgency militia in 2005, regularized in 2013 under President Al-Bashir with border patrol and presidential guard duties. Primarily composed of Arab tribes, they control gold mines in resource-rich Darfur. After losing two-thirds of oil revenues with South Sudan's secession, Sudan increased gold exports as compensation. Rising gold prices enabled RSF economic independence, allowing them to establish connections with the Wagner Group for weapons and funding. This demonstrates how resource wealth can create autonomous military actors challenging state authority.

The fall of El Fasher to Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militias in Sudan represents a systematic ethnic cleansing campaign driven by resource control, where RSF forces have killed over 150,000 civilians in Darfur, including 2,000 on October 25-26 alone, to secure control over the region's gold mines that constitute 45% of Sudan's exports, with external actors funding the conflict through gold laundering networks.

Military interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrate that removing dictators does not guarantee stability. The 2003 Iraq invasion captured Saddam Hussein but created ISIS, requiring a global coalition to combat. Iraq remains under US occupation 20 years later. The 2001 Afghanistan invasion captured Bin Laden but left behind US equipment that now arms the Taliban. The 2011 Libya intervention removed Gaddafi but created a tribal civil war claiming 15% of the population. Venezuela's Maduro regime has no restraint on violence and does not fulfill its own 1999 Constitution. Capturing regime leaders is not a solution because the country faces immense economic and institutional crises. The Maduro apparatus includes 1.5 to 4 million people who would be arrested, creating chaos. Venezuela's opposition has protocols for violent response if they lose power. The involvement of mercenaries raises concerns because mercenaries can only be trusted if they can be killed, which only powerful entities can do.

Coup prevention involves balancing military effectiveness with political control. Coup-proofing techniques like weakening officer corps, random executions, and limiting military capabilities create significant risks - in Libya 2011 and Iraq 2014, these policies contributed to military collapse. Constructive engagement, adequate funding, and public recognition of military contributions are more sustainable approaches to maintaining civilian control over military forces.

The video describes the 1981 Panama coup where economic hitmen tried to bribe Omar Torrijos, who wanted to renegotiate the canal treaty to return it to Panamanian hands. When economic hitmen tried to bribe him, he refused, stating he needed the US to repay debts for destruction caused, wanted to help other Latin American countries achieve independence, and wanted the Panama Canal back in Panamanian hands. In May 1981, he was assassinated in an airplane crash. The video describes the 1998 Venezuela coup where Hugo Chávez was elected president following a line of corrupt presidents who destroyed Venezuela's economy. Chávez stood up to the US, demanding Venezuelan oil be used to help Venezuelans. In 2002, a coup was staged (the video states 'no question in my mind' the CIA was behind it). The video describes Iraq as a perfect example of the system: economic hitmen first tried to corrupt Saddam Hussein, jackals were sent but couldn't take him out, and the military invaded in 1991 and again in 2003.

Pol Pot, the architect of Cambodia's genocide that killed up to 2 million people, died on April 15, 1998, in a bamboo hut near the Thai border. He had been under house arrest by a splinter faction of his own former movement for nearly two decades. The timing was suspicious, as remaining Khmer Rouge leaders had agreed to hand him over for an international war crimes trial. The Khmer Rouge displayed his corpse to journalists to prove he was really dead, and his body was cremated on a makeshift pyre of tires and trash, avoiding accountability for his crimes. Saddam Hussein, the former dictator of Iraq, was executed on December 30, 2006, after a lengthy trial for crimes against humanity following the US-led invasion of Iraq. At dawn, the 69-year-old former dictator was led into an execution chamber at an Iraqi military base in Baghdad. Official protocol was supposed to keep things dignified, but someone in the room had a cell phone. As Saddam stood on the gallows with a noose around his neck, guards began taunting him with sectarian insults. Saddam responded with defiance, reciting prayers until the trap door opened and he dropped. The execution was captured on a grainy cell phone video that leaked online almost immediately. Muammar Gaddafi, who ruled Libya for 42 years, died on October 20, 2011, begging for mercy in a drainage pipe. During Libya's civil war, Gaddafi fled Tripoli as rebel forces closed in and made it to his hometown of Sirte, where he held out for weeks before NATO air strikes destroyed his convoy. Gaddafi escaped the wreckage and hid in a concrete drainage pipe with a few remaining bodyguards. When rebels found him, they dragged the 69-year-old dictator out into the open. Multiple cell phone videos captured his final moments, with Gaddafi appearing bloody, disoriented, and pleading. He was reportedly shot in the head and died shortly after his capture. His body was later displayed in Misrata, where locals lined up to see the corpse of their former dictator.

Effective post-conflict transitions require comprehensive state building across multiple interconnected dimensions. Security Sector Reform must encompass defense, police, intelligence, prisons, and non-state security providers—not just the military. DDR cannot succeed without accompanying SSR, yet international actors often fund these separately, undermining effectiveness. Criminal justice system reform—including police, courts, and corrections—is equally critical. Sustainable recovery requires expanding livelihood opportunities, particularly agriculture given Africa's demographic dependence on rural economies. Beyond technical reforms, organizational culture determines success—culture eats strategy for breakfast. DDR programs face verification challenges, with studies showing 85% of participants in some programs having no genuine combatant experience. Special needs groups including women, children, disabled persons, and psychologically traumatized ex-combatants require separate reintegration pathways for sustainable outcomes.

Stakeholders engaged in discussions on fostering the activities of the Commission for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR). The discussions drew the two arms of the government including executive and legislative. The Chairperson of the National Transitional Committee emphasized the importance of peace and stability as a catalyst for economic and political stability. The Chairperson of the DDR Commission described the commission as a major pillar of security sector reforms, calling on the government to support the commission to deliver needed services such as transformation of ex-combatants and skills training for running businesses. The commission aims to build a strong army while giving people skills and education, helping them understand that business can reward them better than military service.

Security sector reform in post-conflict contexts requires holistic approaches addressing former spoilers who were sources of insecurity. Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) programs are essential for rebuilding armed forces by reintegrating former combatants into civilian society. Successful DDR creates stable security services capable of fulfilling legitimate state functions, while failed reintegration allows former fighters to return to rebellion when new conflicts emerge. Nigeria's effective handling of Tamanrasset rebels contrasts with Mali's experience, demonstrating how complete societal reintegration prevents spoilers from exploiting new instability opportunities.

Sudan's peace agreements are not promising as they devolve from how Sudan should be governed to who will govern it, essentially a division of spoils. The structure limits transparency and participation, with armed group leaders in back rooms while decisions are made there. The old spoils system dependent on oil revenue is gone, requiring alternate economic structures. Power sharing means wealth sharing, but agreements leave Sudan with a massive unaffordable military and lack mechanisms for local accountability. The DDR process risks creating an arms market, and demobilization language assumes women won't be in the military. Pro-reform forces lack a common agenda, and civil society representation is absent from most agreements. The Eastern Agreement is the only one calling for civil society representation through a consultative process.