Negligence vs. Strict Liability in Product Liability Lawsuits

Negligence defenses include Good Samaritan statutes (protecting emergency helpers), assumption of risk (voluntary engagement in known risks), superseding cause (unforeseeable intervening events), and comparative negligence (apportioning damages based on fault). Comparative negligence reduces plaintiff damages by their percentage of fault, replacing harsh contributory negligence rules. Strict liability applies to abnormally dangerous activities and defective products regardless of negligence. For products, plaintiffs must prove defect, unreasonably dangerous condition, harm, causation, and substantially unchanged condition. Three defect types exist: manufacturing (defective components), design (inherently unsafe), and failure to warn (inadequate instructions). Product misuse defenses limit liability to foreseeable uses. Two conditions must be met: seller acting in business and product not substantially modified. This strict liability policy spreads costs to manufacturers with resources and insurance, protecting consumers who cannot prove manufacturer negligence.

Several defenses limit or bar strict liability claims: generally known dangers (manufacturers not liable for inherent risks of proper use), abnormal misuse (injuries from using products outside intended purposes), supervening events (post-sale modifications causing injury), assumption of risk (voluntary acceptance of known dangers), and contributory/comparative negligence (plaintiff's own fault affecting recovery). These defenses recognize that manufacturers cannot control all circumstances after product sale and that some injuries result from user choices rather than product defects.

This section covers the defenses available to manufacturers and the time limits for bringing claims. Manufacturers can be exempted from liability by proving: the product was never put into circulation; the defect appeared after circulation; scientific knowledge at the time couldn't detect the defect; the defect resulted from complying with mandatory regulations; the victim was at fault; or force majeure occurred. Notably, third-party fault cannot be invoked as an exemption. The regime has two limitation periods: ten years from product circulation, and three years from when the victim knew or should have known about the damage, defect, and manufacturer.

Defenses to product liability include: (1) Generally known dangers - you don't need to warn about things everyone should already know (e.g., not standing in front of a gun), (2) Abnormal misuse - if a product is used in a way it wasn't designed for, the plaintiff cannot recover, (3) Supervening events - if the product is modified after leaving the manufacturer, they cannot be held liable, (4) Government contractor defense - government contractors are often protected by statute if they meet government standards.

Products liability defenses mirror negligence principles but apply to the unique context of defective products. Contributory or comparative negligence examines whether the plaintiff's own conduct contributed to or increased their injuries, potentially reducing or eliminating defendant liability. Assumption of risk requires proving the plaintiff knew or should have known of the danger and voluntarily accepted it. These defenses must be analyzed systematically after establishing products liability applies. Common scenarios involve plaintiffs modifying products (removing safety guards) or using products in unintended ways, requiring careful evaluation of whether the plaintiff's actions created or exacerbated the risk.

On January 24, 1963, the California Supreme Court decided Greenman v. Yuba Power Products. A man was injured by a malfunctioning workshop tool. Justice Traynor wrote that a manufacturer can be held strictly liable for injuries from a defective product without proof of negligence and without a direct contract with the injured party. The reasoning was that the cost of injuries from defective products should be borne by manufacturers who put them on the market. For a power tool sold to a consumer last year, this was reasonable, but when applied to aircraft built decades ago, it created a system with no ceiling or end date.

Strict products liability holds manufacturers liable when defective products cause injury, regardless of negligence. A defect exists when a product malfunctions and fails to perform its intended function safely. The Greenman case established that plaintiffs can sue in tort rather than contract, eliminating requirements for contractual relationships or written notice. This doctrine emerged from historical principles of strict liability for contaminated food, which existed since medieval times due to difficulties proving food contamination negligence. The American Law Institute adopted this rule into the Restatement Second of Torts around 1964-1965, and within ten years, courts nationwide adopted it, citing Greenman as precedent.

In MacPherson v Buick Motor Co (1916), Justice Cardozo of the New York Court of Appeals held that a manufacturer owes a duty of care to a remote purchaser of their product, even when the product was purchased from a dealer. The plaintiff's wheel collapsed due to a defect that could have been discovered by inspection. Justice Cardozo approved Lord Brett's dictum from Heaven v Pender, stating that if a thing is made negligently it is likely to place life and limb in peril and will be used without further test or inspection, then the manufacturer is under a duty to make it carefully.

In McPherson v. Buick (1916), the New York Court of Appeals, led by Judge Cardoza, established that manufacturers have a duty to inspect all parts placed on their finished products, even components they did not manufacture, thereby extending product liability to cover dangerous parts regardless of original manufacturer; this ruling created an efficiency in the legal system by allowing plaintiffs to recover directly from the final manufacturer rather than tracing liability through multiple parties, though critics note this may reduce incentives for intermediate manufacturers to conduct safety inspections.

In the famous case of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Company (1916), Judge Benjamin Cardozo for New York's highest court pulled a broader principle out of predecessor cases. The facts were almost identical to Cadillac—a year earlier—a wheel from a wheel manufacturer was sold to Buick to a dealer to MacPherson and the wheel failed, injuring MacPherson. Judge Cardozo held that a new rule exists in no prior case but is inferable as a synthesis of the thing of danger principle stated in them, merely extending it to foreseeable danger even if the purposes for which it was designed were not themselves a source of great danger.

Compliance with government regulations or inspections is not a complete defense to liability. The court noted that defendants cannot argue that they complied with regulations or inspections to avoid liability. However, facts about inspections and compliance may still be relevant and admissible. The court distinguished between using compliance as a defense versus presenting relevant facts.

Companies must balance regulatory documentation with product liability protection. While FDA requirements are important, product liability attorneys can impose significantly more damage than the FDA ever could. In litigation, courts care less about FDA regulatory compliance and more about whether companies did what they should have done from an engineering perspective. Over-documenting for regulatory purposes may expose companies to liability concerns, while under-documenting may create regulatory issues. This creates a complex balancing act requiring careful consideration of both regulatory and legal perspectives.

Pharmaceutical companies employ various defense strategies in vaccine liability cases, including arguing that authorization status protects them from liability, denying causation between the vaccine and adverse events, and claiming that risks from the disease itself exceed vaccine risks. The case discusses how companies may argue that their authorization status means they could not have been negligent, and how they may minimize the significance of adverse events by emphasizing that the disease poses greater risks.

Compliance with regulatory requirements (such as CPSC, NHTSA, or FDA regulations) does not necessarily provide a defense in product liability cases. These are independent areas of law, meaning that even if a company follows all government regulations, they can still be sued for selling defective products or failing to warn adequately after the sale.

In personal injury lawsuits, compensatory damages reimburse plaintiffs for actual losses such as medical expenses and pain and suffering, while punitive damages serve to punish defendants who have demonstrated conscious disregard for public health and safety, and are typically awarded when a company knowingly sells dangerous products that cause harm.

The jury awarded $3 million in compensatory damages (intended to compensate the victim for actual losses) and $3 million in punitive damages (intended to punish the defendant and deter future misconduct). This distinction between types of damages is fundamental to understanding how courts assign financial responsibility in civil cases involving product liability.

In the Batchelder v. Malibu case, the jury awarded $200 million total, broken down into $80 million in compensatory damages and $120 million in punitive damages. Compensatory damages are meant to compensate victims for their losses, while punitive damages are meant to punish the wrongdoer and send a message to the industry. The punitive damages portion is specifically designed to make it more expensive to do the wrong thing than the right thing, thereby deterring future misconduct.

This segment establishes the foundational framework for understanding damages in product liability cases. Compensatory damages compensate victims for actual losses including medical expenses, pain and suffering, and disability. Punitive damages are separate and intended to punish wrongdoers and deter future misconduct. The speaker explains that compensatory damages require finding a specific number based on evidence, while punitive damages require a separate determination. The discussion emphasizes that these are distinct legal concepts with different purposes and calculation methods.

Compensatory damages are awarded to make the injured party whole by compensating for actual losses such as lost wages, lost earnings, and other financial harm. Punitive damages serve a different purpose - they are meant to punish the defendant for their wrongdoing and deter similar conduct in the future. The key distinction is that compensatory damages compensate for harm, while punitive damages punish and deter.