Strategic Stability and Missile Defense: The Golden Dome Debate

[00:00:00]Hello. President Trump's proposal for a missile defense shield to defend the United States homeland, the Golden Dome initiative, has sparked considerable debate. Is Golden Dome destabilizing as Russia and China have claimed? How should we evaluate the expansion and modernization of their own arsenals on the strategic balance with the United States? How should policymakers think about strategic stability in an era of rapid technological change and great power competition? I'm Carrie Bingan, director of the CSIS Aerospace Security Project. I'm joined today by Tom Carico, director of the Missile Defense Project, and Heather Williams, director of the project on nuclear issues. Welcome to HTK, a series devoted to the analysis of strategic forces issues of the day. HTK stands for Heather, Tom, and Carrie. But for defense wonks out there, you know that it also stands for hit tokill.

[00:00:54]Here's a clip of a Chinese spokesperson speaking on Golden Dome.

[00:01:10]While some critiques have focused on the feasibility and cost of such a project, our colleagues Clayton Swopee and Melissa Dalton with the Aerospace Security Project recently published a commentary on Golden Dome's role in strategic stability in an era of great power competition which I commend uh to you all to read. Our conversation today will unpack their arguments and consider how Golden Dome could influence the US relationship with Moscow and Beijing who have both decrieded Golden Dome as a threat. So Tom, let's kick off with you or I should say, Professor Carico, let's kick off with you. You know, the concept of strategic stability, this is very much an academic term. There have been books written about it for decades now, largely throughout the cold war period.

[00:01:55]So, what is strategic stability and what does it have to do with Golden Dome?

[00:01:59]>> Well, that's a good question, uh, Carrie, and I think it's without being semantic or perhaps by embracing, uh, being semantic, I think we we just got to break the the concept down, right?

[00:02:09]What is the word strategic mean and what is stability that we're that we're talking about here? And, you know, it is it's kind of a roar test. Everybody carries around uh strategic stability.

[00:02:20]Oh, that just means, you know, not big nuclear war, not big nuclear attack on the homeland. Uh I'm struck uh and I've said this before, just by uh the frequency that, you know, there's there's a lot of four for four for four stars out there that still walk around with the idea that strategic means big nuclear attack on the homeland as opposed to uh to as to other things. And so I I think that, you know, strategic just means the art of the general or the science of war or something like that.

[00:02:47]uh but I think it's important to to in fundamentally uh disentangle it from a particular technology or from a particular weapon and I think that kind of informs a little bit more uh intellectual clarity uh to get after it.

[00:03:01]uh you know to some extent the there is that that that Rosharks test that idea that oh golden dome uh is you know this perfect this perfect defense it's going to make nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete to to use a phrase and I want to read I want to read a couple comments from this joint statement by the uh people's republic of China and and Russia uh one of them uh is uh deeply destabilizing in nature is the golden dome for America a large-scale program designed to establish unconstrained global, deeply layered and multi-dommain missile defense system to protect against any missile threats. This means a complete and ultimate rejection to recognize the existence and inseparable relationship between strategic offensive arms and strategic defense of arms. Well, first of all, there's a lot of scary adjectives uh in there uh adjectives and adverbs. Uh and secondly, boy, they seem to have greater insight into the architecture uh than many of us uh do uh than Congress does uh frankly. And so I think there's there's a couple things going on there. One of which is uh this is just their playbook. This is just their talking points. I sometimes wonder, you know, who's the audience for this kind of a message? And then I think, oh, I know who the audience is.

[00:04:13]It's the college professors who will uh you know dutifully assign this long statement uh to their classes and say oh this this is right this is what you know the Trump administration is doing which is a little silly and we'll get into that kind of I would say some of the hypocrisy some of the contradictions uh about what they're saying as opposed to kind of what they're doing and whether that makes sense and whether it it makes sense to say that this is destabilizing you know I also want to read another statement from this u uh from or a section from this long statement which is the two sides Russia and China are convinced that the destinies of the peoples of all countries are interrelated. States and their association should not seek to ensure their own security at the expense and to the detriment of the security of other states. I mean really you know have you have you talked to Ukraine lately?

[00:05:04]>> It's laughable.

[00:05:05]>> Um I have this flash not seek their own security to the detriment of other states. Yeah, I have flashbacks of Nicholas Maduro swaying and seeing singing imagine, you know, the same guy who's who's running down his own people uh in the streets. Um, do they think we're going to fall for this? And I think the answer is yes. And I think some people uh some people probably will. It's it's a little bit like what uh you know, Angel called in over a century ago the great illusion.

[00:05:34]uh the sort of the the deceitful dream of a golden age that we can kind of you know hang on to the security blanket to protect us uh from a much more complicated political and geopolitical uh reality. And that's why I I'm I'm a little bit of a kromagin on this. I think it's really important to disentangle whatever it is that one wants to define as strategic stability from a particular weapon from nuclear weapons itself. uh and uh you know there's a there was a there's a report done a couple years ago kind of a compilation of a bunch of analyses about what does strategic stability even mean and I think there's just some uh some great essays in there including by Colin Gray and Ron Layman that just really disentangle this and and take it apart into into little small pieces and I I I commend Clayton and Melissa for that fine piece um really going after this and and let me just quote from that piece that they put uh put out recently as well is that you know if the litmus test for strategic stability was whether any was anyone was engaged in a full-scale nuclear war then yes the world is basking in a period of strategic stability. Uh but then they also go on to say that if you mean by strategic stability stability and not trying to upset the status quo and not trying to get new strategic weapons uh this sort of thing then actually no the actions of Russia and China not just invading their neighbors but the actions of Russia and China on a military basis on a weapon system development basis is very destabilizing. And so I look at this and I think about Golden Dome as uh again an initiative that is long overdue. It is much needed and that is stabilizing. And I' I've said this before, but you ask Ukraine, do they think that national missile defense is stabilizing or destabilizing relative to the, you know, effort of Russia to try to wipe them out and and and negate them. So uh I I I think that the the way in which we talk about Chinese and Russian missile defenses and air defenses is illuminating. We tend to talk about them in a different way than way we talk about kind of SDI or we talk about Golden Dome and this sort of thing. Uh it's it's sort of taken for granted that Russian and Chinese air and missile defenses. Well, that makes sense. It's it's A2AD, right?

[00:07:53]Anti-access area denial. But when we do it, when we treat North America as a region and we try to create some A2AD bubbles, oh, this is scary. This is destabilizing. Uh I think it's just kind of incoherent. Uh uh frankly, you know, China and Russia talk about the United States weaponizing space. Like are you kidding? Right.

[00:08:14]>> This this is all you Carrie, but like they're doing a lot in space.

[00:08:18]>> Absolutely.

[00:08:18]>> And this ridiculous statement about, you know, the Golden Dome is going to to weaponize space with Oh my goodness.

[00:08:24]couple spacebased interceptors. Uh it's just kind of ridiculous and I I'm going to get off my soap box here and and turn it over to you guys, but I think we really just got to call a spade a spade here and uh and not be uh not be bamboozled.

[00:08:37]>> Well, so then Heather, you know, Professor Williams, you're one of those academics that Tom referred to, [laughter] but you I mean you did your PhD in the in all of these areas is you know, arms nuclear arms control, nuclear deterrence, nuclear strategic stability.

[00:08:54]So I know you have a lot to say on what this concept means, but also how the conditions, you know, are the conditions that were present that then that led to those concepts, are they still in place today?

[00:09:06]>> I really like Tom's comment about how um the term strategic stability has become this roar test and I feel like I'm now going to reveal my own nuclear tendencies and um kind of predelections around this. And so I do want to just back up even a little bit more in terms of how we might define strategic stability. I don't think there's ever been an agreed to or consistent definition. It's a very contested term.

[00:09:28]I'll put out three definitions that I have heard that are probably the most popular. The most popular probably among the nuclear community is that strategic stability means survivable second strike. As long as you have a survivable second strike force, then you are able to retaliate against a nuclear first strike and that that will strengthen deterrence and that that will prevent nuclear weapons from being used at all.

[00:09:49]The second definition comes from Thomas Shelling, another great strategic stability thinker who defined it in terms of arms race stability. So, it's in a competition where neither side has incentives to do rapid strategic buildups and also crisis stability where you don't have incentives to do escalation. That's kind of where my uh that's probably the one that I lean towards. The last one that I think is a really interesting one is about the Russians have never really accepted our definitions or our approaches to strategic stability. For them, it was always broader. It wasn't just nuclear.

[00:10:20]It had a deep psychological component to it. And I I can see the US strategic studies community starting to kind of catch on to how the Russians have thought about this for a while. I think where I might have a very nuanced different take than Tom is on I do think there is still a value in um conceptualizing strategic stability as no incentives for nuclear weapons use.

[00:10:43]The goal here is that a nuclear weapon is never used in anger and that that creating that environment and those strategic conditions [clears throat] that that is what stability really should be all about in terms of the Russian and the Chinese claim. So I'm going to add another uh I have another quote here. This was from a Chinese statement at UN uh general assembly first committee where they uh accused the United States of turning outer space into a warfighting domain, the continued military buildup in outer space and tied all this to a golden dome. And you know what? I went back and looked through the statement. I didn't see any mention about Russia potentially deploying a nuclear weapon into space. And so there is clearly a double standard and some double speed going on for both China and Russia around this issue. But uh my colleagues on the pony team, Lel McKenzie and Raymond Wang, will have a piece coming out later today on Russian and Chinese perceptions. But to just hit some of their kind of main top points, uh the Russians and the Chinese are pushing back on Golden Dome. I think there's two big things going on here.

[00:11:45]One is that this is for from their talking points at least. This is just another US tool to try to seek strategic supremacy. The Chinese love to point out, oh, the US is in pursuit of strategic hegemony. And this just proves that even further. And for the Russians, the Russians has always hated our missile defenses. Like they've just always hated it. Whether it's theater or homeland, this has been the bug bear of so many arms control agreements, right?

[00:12:09]even a new start which you guys have worked on on the hill this um getting the language around missile defense has always been a real challenge uh for arms control agreements going forward and I think that is still true for the Russians. The second big point that they um that my colleagues are pointing to is um that Russia and China have highlighted uncertainty around Golden Dome and questioning can the US actually deliver this? Do they have the defense industrial base? What is this? Um, and so I want to I want to really plug a fantastic piece, Tom, that you wrote. I think it came out yesterday in [clears throat] breaking defense on what is it? Stop the gag order.

[00:12:44]>> Yeah. Loosen the gag order and stop start talking.

[00:12:46]>> Yeah. And in the absence of more information, not just our adversaries, but also our allies are going to have a lot of questions about what is Golden Dome? What does it actually do? and and Tom I would I would add to the audience on that not just college professors but also the wider international community in the glo and the global south they which have a tendency to pick up Chinese talking points and run with it and so that fir UN first committee statement I can envision a lot of global south or middle um middle ground countries picking that up and saying oh yeah golden dome is the thing that's undermining strategic stability right now you know in my opinion it's not undermining it any more than Russia or China's massive buildups and Russia's potential deployment of a nuclear weapon in space. Um, but I mean from the strategic stability perspective, how how are you thinking about it in the space context, Carrie?

[00:13:33]>> So, you know, it's it's I'm just very cautious about taking a nuclear concept and applying it to space. And so these these ideas like a survivable second strike, I just don't know that they I don't believe that they hold water in the space context. I mean, that presumes that the other side values space as much as you do. So I there there's some I think there's some differences there.

[00:13:56]The other piece that I think is really interesting is on this you know strategic stability. It also presumes symmetry. It presumes rough symmetry and nuclear one side's nuclear forces and another side's nuclear forces. What have we seen China in particular do over the last two decades? They have pursued asymmetric capabilities particularly in space and in cyerspace. And I'm glad you both raised uh what China and Russia are doing in space because we every year put out a space threat assessment on just the range of weaponization or counterpace weapons that both China and Russia are pursuing and frankly have been pursuing for decades. So let's not kid ourselves that that uh golden dome is something new with respect to space weaponization. They've been doing it for like long time and they demon they demonstrated fogs is a great example right fractional orbital bombardment system.

[00:14:46]>> Space is a warfying domain. I don't know if you've heard this, by the way.

[00:14:50]>> And it was it's been militarized from the get from the 1950s. Let's not get ourselves there. But, you know, on this asymmetric piece, I I think there's a really interesting dimension here that needs further scholarship and exploration is we're now at a point where you have with these new technologies and space and cyber come to mind where you have this class of weapons short of nuclear that can create mass strategic effect. So space, you know, targeting say GPS and having GPS uh uh uh uh go out say potentially worldwide. Um cyber attacks like the vault typhoon that targeted critical infrastructure in the US homeland. I mean those things are quite escalatory and significant. So how do we think about maybe rather maybe not strateg strategic stability as a concept but deterring those kinds of acts? Um, but let me let me go back to I mean I think this all comes full circle then is okay do the Russians and Chinese you know it sounds like well do the Russians and Chinese have a point here. What are your thoughts on Golden Dome undermining strategic stability? I think I know your answer but I'll throw that out.

[00:16:00]>> Yeah. So I look I I I think it's important especially for kind of the American uh strategic uh forces discussion is to keep in mind our particular political uh conversations.

[00:16:16]And a couple years ago I had over Representative Doug Lamour and Representative Seth Molton. It was I think it was the 40th anniversary of SDI. We did a little thing uh with the two of them. And you know, I I I want to I want to quote Representative Molton in particular, and you know, he kind of says there's different layers or different levels of missile defense. You got your rogue missile defense, Rogue State missile defense to kind of contend with the those guys. You've got kind of your regional uh your regional uh missile defenses against kind of shorter range stuff over there from regardless of who it is. And then you've kind of, you know, accidental launch things like that. And then you kind of got to get this this other thing, this sort of big strategic >> uh strategic missile defense to defend against everything. Kind of what the the the Russian and Chinese statement, any kinds of missiles, global, deeply layered, you know, to defeat everything.

[00:17:05]And I I think Mr. Bolton is kind of pointing to something that is an idea uh more than a feasibility. And if if that is the thing that we don't want from Golden Dome, well, well, the good news is it's not possible. All right, that's just not going to happen. And I think that when they get around to start talking about Golden Dome that I I predict that what you're going to see is something that is far more to use a word limited both in terms of the number of threats that are feasibly able to be stopped and also in terms of the area the defended asset list that is no kidding able to be defended against uh especially aerial threats uh for instance. And so I think when the information gets out there that I think we're going to see this for something that is far more tractable and far more uh doable and far less fanciful uh than I think a number of the commentators uh who in the absence of information folks are having to speculate >> uh in the think tanks and and this sort of stuff about what this might mean. So I think again I go back to the Ukraine thing. No, I think what this is, it's a long overdue effort that is going to prove stabilizing uh contrary to the uh you know the Chinese FOBs with all this other Russian and Chinese, you know, Dr. Evil uh weapons that they've been jinning up over the past decade or so. So, so my answer is no. It's it's not destabilizing. Turn that on its head.

[00:18:34]It's going to be stabilizing if we actually do even most of what we are expecting uh that they may do. Well, and and on that point and and both Clayton Swope and Melissa Dalton wrote this in their piece is they said, "Hey, there's no sign that Beijing is interested in balance." And so even you I I keep going back to is strategic stability really a nuclear concept and how do we think about it in this evolved world that we're in? Because Tom, to your earlier points, >> Golden Dome is and we need to see the details, but it is supposed to be this architecture to defend the homeland. you yes against nuclear threats but also this range of conventional threats and we talked about this at our last uh episode when we were talking about house of dynamite is you know if you see ballistic missile launch cruise missile aerial threats underwater >> do we know are they nuclear are they conventional so should we not have an ability as well to defend against those aerial and conventional threats against the homeland because to your point >> the Chinese the Russians have a whole array of air and missile defenses protecting their mainland I think this is a but Melissa and Clayton are hitting on such an important point which I I think needs to be getting a lot more attention. We seem interested in strategic stability. We seem interested in risk reduction and avoiding escalation. I'm not picking up that Russia and China are interested in the same things. They seem to be interested in manipulating risk. And so to your question, you know, is Golden Dome going to be destabilizing? I mean, my answer to that is I don't know because I still don't really understand. I don't know what Golden Dome is. And again, that's why I think Tom's point about how we just need more information. This information vacuum, I do not think is helping the program or the administration whatsoever.

[00:20:13]>> And it's letting Russia and China fill the vacuum drive the narrative. Exactly.

[00:20:17]And so, but if we can get a bit more information about it and find out, you know, in what ways might this be destabilizing? And I I want to make a little bit of a plug here for potentially creating opportunities for arms control. To be clear, I am not going to push for arms control for the sake of arms control right now. But historically, when you have these types of buildups and competitions that we're seeing, some ways to try to manage them have been arms control tools. The problem is we have zero leverage right now for arms control. You know, if we wanted to have a a negotiation tomorrow, I I don't know what we would put on the table, but also we don't have willing partners. The Chinese are just stonewalling any sort of arms control conversation. And so once we have a bit more information about Golden Dome, I'm wondering if that might create some incentives within Beijing to finally start talking to us to provide some transparency about what their arsenal is. Now, I'm I would not suggest building up just to create leverage for arms control. No, you build up and you do these things because it's the right thing for defense, deterrence, and national security. In the process, you might be opening creating some opportunities for dialogue and risk reduction. But again, to Melissa and Clayton's point, I don't see any interest in risk reduction coming from Beijing or Moscow.

[00:21:30]>> So, there's a great question here from the audience that I want to weave in because it builds exactly off your points, and it's will Golden Dome or any significant missile defense likely promote an arms race between the United States, Russia, and China, or will it lead to greater escalation risks in a crisis?

[00:21:51]So I I would say Russia and China have been building up for at least a decade right now. We have not. If you look at side by side qualitative quantitative expansions, you know, China's building their um nuclear arsenal at 20% a year.

[00:22:06]>> Yes, they still are not near our number, but that's a pretty rapid rate of buildup. If you look at the number of platforms, we had that discussion about China's military parade where they showcased all these new capabilities which are their new capabilities are as many as we have total. And you look at the expansion of Russia's dual capable intermediate range systems. Russia and China have been building up. We haven't you know our nuclear modernization program dates to 2010. The world is very very different since then. And so even if we were executing our nuclear modernization plan, which we have not been particularly successful at doing thus far, even if we were doing that, to me, this is not an arms race. Or if it is, we aren't racing. They are building up. You know what's what's that famous phrase? Um we build, they build, we stop, they build.

[00:22:54]>> Yeah.

[00:22:55]>> Um what was that?

[00:22:56]>> I think it was Harold Brown.

[00:22:57]>> I think it was Harold Brown. And we're still seeing I think that is the dynamic right now.

[00:23:01]>> Yeah. Yeah. No, I I think that's exactly right. takes two to tango, takes two runners to to race and and as you say, we're we're not really. Um, and you know, I I still think of strategic stability as not just about nuclear weapons. You know, I think I think about deterring nuclear use as nuclear deterrence. And I think of strategic stability as possible both with nuclear use and uh as broader than nuclear use to comprehend, as you said, Carrie, the the non-uclear strategic attack thing that I'm always going on about. Um, and and there's this beautiful quote from Colin Gray, the late Colin Gray. Nuclear weapons change the grammar of deterrence, not its character. And so, you know, I always kind of put that together with Margaret Thatcher talking about the uh the monuments all over uh England being uh the war memorials all over England being monuments to the failure of conventional deterrence. uh for example deterrence happens between uh between the ears and it's it's a phenomenon uh that is is is separate of course from uh from nuclear weapons but you know going back to you know the beginning I think it was Albert Volsteader's 1958 article on the delicate balance of terror who who talks in there about hey we've got to do all these things we've got to have that that secure retaliatory capability and then he goes on to say but you also might want to have missile defenses to protect your cities uh in case deterrence fails.

[00:24:23]Like that's been there from the beginning. And I think what's interesting and fascinating to me is >> that yeah, strategic stability does have a very close association with with nuclear weapons, especially in the 1960s onward, this kind of thing. But um it's also become so cramped and unimaginative and we kind of uh recite these incantations you know from Thomas Shelling from yesterday year and all this sort of stuff without I think sufficient thought about them and we've we've riffed on Heather about the lack of imagination the lack of new ideas >> yes in arms control and I would just say in strategic thought broadly um where's the where's the the new thinking no kidding uh that is coming up with something uh new and different given the massive technological changes uh that you know all the emerging technologies and this kind of stuff that aren't just about nuclear weapons.

[00:25:17]>> I mean just in the course of this conversation we've been quoting Brody Woolsteader Shelling Colin Gray I >> use the 21st century version of >> exactly and I mean you know in the arms control community arms control ideas and policies and concepts are still being driven by a book written in 1960. We need we really need fresh ideas. And I I know that all three of our programs try to do a lot to bring in early and mid-career folks. And this is an appeal that I I think we all can keep making to people who are thinking about coming into the field. We really need new ideas. We need people who are not totally like I want someone who is not yet indoctrinated into Shelling's way of thinking. I want somebody who can think creatively. I mean eventually we'll get them to shelling because everyone should reach Shelling at some point. But this really is an important moment and opportunity for some fresh thinking on these issues. Well, and you know, back to this question on would would something like Golden Dome or other missile defenses lead to greater escalation, restoring or crisis. I mean, I I you know, heck, if Russia or China decided to launch several hundred nuclear weapons at the United States, I mean, we given even though we don't know the details uh of the Golden Dome architecture, you know, that's going to be that will be hard for missile defenses to stop. I mean, let let's not kid ourselves there, right? But if you can take off the table and remove that class of coercive threats, um other types of threats of nuclear use or even some of the these exotic or novel uh conventional capabilities, that's what you want to take off the table and defend American uh you know critical assets uh infrastructure against.

[00:26:52]I you know in in some respects is if you take those off the table you're forcing your adversary to you are forcing them to escalate. That's not a bad thing is I'd rather increase the cost to them and force that that leader to to decide if I'm going to launch these weapons I can't just get away with a couple although I mean that's still really really bad day but I'm now forced to make an even worse decision of launching hundreds. I'd much rather them be in that position and complicate that decision than to give them these coercive opportunities.

[00:27:25]It's not a bad escalation isn't a bad thing.

[00:27:26]>> And that's what the ch I mean that's basically the Chinese strategy right now, right? In Fiona Cunningham's book, she's outlined how China's strategy is putting the escalation onus onto the US where they are forcing us onto the escalation ladder and the only option is for us to go up. It's not a it's not a bad strategy. Like it's deeply uncomfortable as we're all still trying to figure out new deterrence and escalation management strategies in the Indoacific. But Carrie, I think you're really on to something which is what are some strategies and tools that we can use to put them on the back foot, put the escalation onus onto the other side.

[00:27:58]>> Exactly. Exactly. Well, so there's a couple other questions here on Golden Dome in general. So let's take the opportunity to tackle that and Tom, I'll I'll look to you here. um particularly questions on how allied capabilities can contribute to Golden Dome um particularly uh uh involving the Japanese but but other NATO and other allies as well. So um first of all uh the most uh obvious or one of two of the most obvious uh pieces of that are first the US uh and Japanese cooperation on standard missile uh 3 block 2A that's been going on for over a decade and that is now we've added to that with the cooperative development of the glidephase interceptor the hypersonic uh missile killer uh for instance that's that's great to see uh but I think uh the the former prime minister and and President Biden a couple couple years ago uh announced that the United States and Japan would be cooperating on space sensors. That's all for the good.

[00:28:57]Sensors attribution uh so you don't miss uh where something was launched from and and that sort of thing. Uh that's that's hugely important. Uh uh space sensors, the HBTSS program was explicitly called out in the in the executive order. We need to get get after that. uh and to the extent that we can work with our allies whether it's focal plane array production or launching the stuff into space information sharing uh look we are a little bit cautious about sharing cyber data you know dayto-day and that's that that makes sense but on a bad day in a time of conflict we would want at least uh domain awareness at least uh early warning of various missile trajectories and so that space sensor piece is important but the other thing uh and this is why I keep abstracting from the nuclear to talk about deterrence and to talk about uh stability uh more broadly. The thing that the Japanese are doing that is historic. Uh that is uh I think impressive uh and that is just conventional strike. You know the fact that they go out and get what is it 500 or so uh block four tomahawks. And why did they get the block fours? Because they didn't want to wait for the block fives.

[00:30:04]>> Uh I put up the flags over the you know the Japanese flag over that. That's dang important to me that if you want to not get to that point of the nuclear escalation, first you need to deter at the at the conventional level that as to paraphrase Clayton and Melissa again, you know, they need to wake up every day and say today is not the day to to pick a fight with with Japan and uh and the United States and at the very least that they're going to have a conventional uh response that that will make it unpleasant. So I I I I would say on that front the Japanese uh uh the counter strike or what we would just call strike capability uh is is dang important and I'm looking forward to uh some of our other European friends uh getting such capability. I am delighted to see we are far from the 1980s. Let me put it this way that when the Germans are out there saying we want some ground launch tomahawks. I'm like nice. [laughter] >> Thank you very much. I'm glad to see that you are, you know, you figured out what what what time it is uh in terms of what Russia's up to, for instance, and a lot of other countries are are pursuing that. It just makes sense. It's a positive development. And so I think about the missile offensive strike capability as super important for this cooperative deterrence stuff as well.

[00:31:19]>> Yeah. I I one of the the messages I keep conveying to to the Japanese is you are very well positioned to contribute to Golden Dome. Exactly. In the areas that you mentioned in space sensors uh the the missile missile detection and tracking architecture PWSA proliferated warf fighting space architecture was explicitly mentioned in the president's executive order. You mentioned SM3 Egyp you know which they already operate.

[00:31:45]There's co-development programs in the work as well. So they're very well positioned to contribute as well as the ISR intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance relationships. Um it was encouraging that the initial executive order on Iron Dome now Golden Dome had an explicit call out to allied cooperation in this area. I suspect it's you know there I think that the program office probably so focused on getting the architectural details and the strategy in place. The allied piece will will come here. So there's probably a little bit of patience required. But I'd also just mention with Secretary Hexest's acquisition reform announcements earlier this month, you know, there was a a nod to uh, you know, greater engagement with our with our allies, FMS, foreign material sales reforms. So, there's a lot of pieces I hope that this administration is putting in place to enable that cooperation.

[00:32:33]>> Well, two things real quick. Uh, one is that that executive order said called for an Allied and the missile defense review. It was due May 15, right? It's it's it's the homework's a little overdue. Um, I suspect that you look, we're probably going to get the national security strategy soon, then we'll get the national defense strategy, and so it'll probably be nested under that kind of package of things, which which kind of makes sense. Um, and that's fine, but I have two beasts. One, >> none of the allies that I've talked to have even talked to uh OSD about this allied theater missile defense review. I think it would be a good idea to, you know, check in with them, talk about what we can be doing more on the Allied and Theater Missile Defense piece. Uh, they've got some ideas. I've got some ideas uh about uh like no kidding programmatic and and reducing barriers and things like that. Second thing you mentioned the HEG said acquisition speech >> and I was a little bit surprised that he was you know calling Golden Dome as moving out on a wartime pace, a wartime footing. I'm like >> not quite. I I wish that that were true.

[00:33:32]Uh but second, he called out that um in general for acquisition that that contractors are guessing rather than building, right? So that's where we need to get out more information about Golden Dome, about all kinds of stuff because companies and allies, they're sitting there and they don't know what to invest in. Hundreds of millions of dollars, hundreds of millions of dollars have been spent by contractors jinning up, >> uh, getting ready, springloading >> and nothing has been put on contract yet.

[00:34:01]>> Yeah, exactly. And we'll dive more into those topics tomorrow at CSIS on a at a space event on delivering space capabilities for the war fighter. But we'll also have a panel diving into HEX's uh acquisition reform announcements and what they mean for the industrial base. How do you send a better demand signal by the government etc. So I'd like to end on this if we can cue up uh we came across a Reagan era image. Uh he was holding a bumper sticker that said SDI could ruin a nuclear bomb's whole day. I think we'll have to figure out, you know, we'll have to update that bumper sticker for Golden Dome and start passing those out.

[00:34:43]>> Um but you know, I I back I I want to end where we started with uh Clayton Swopee and Melissa Dalton's piece. And there's a quote they they include a quote there from General Earl Wheeler who served as Army Chief of Staff from 1962 to 1964. or the quote goes, I know of no way to design parody of military power. It certainly is contrary to any military precept that I know of because you try to design superiority. And just, you know, as I think about China and Russia, you know, they've where they lacked superiority, they went asymmetric. So they have they are clearly developing these advanced capabilities to try to gain a strategic advantage in areas you know at at the expense of us and it's our obligation it's our American interest to protect our our citizens our homeland to also develop our own uh strategic advantages.

[00:35:38]So I guess bringing this back you know full circle uh you know is is there a way to design strategic stability going forward? What do you think?

[00:35:48]>> Well I I'll I'll answer that. Um and and I'll pose it back to you all with you know what is the thing if it's not shelling that you would assign in your classes to help people think uh think about this and I'll tell you what I usually are used to put first in a in a reading list and that's federalist 6 >> by Alexander Hamilton and I paraphrased it earlier that is it not time to awaken from the deceitful dream of a golden age. I mean, that's good oldfashioned American realism. And he kind of talks in there about how the uh the Confederate uh uh or the Articles Confederation is not going to work. We need a different form of government. And I think there were just so many deceitful dreams to the uh to the Wheeler quote that you you you say there about a security blanket or something like that. So I I would kind of leave it there. I I don't think it is possible to design. That's in the that's in the nature of things. uh it's it's in the nature of uh of human history that we're going to have this offensive defensive thing until you as I think the strategic posture commission from what 10 years ago said you know until you fix the underlying problems of human nature >> you're not going to be able to get rid of nuclear weapons or the need for nuclear weapons for instance so I guess that that's how I think about it >> u I I would also pick a reading assignment um I would pick TZ del Pesh's savage century which looks at the conflicts of the 20th century and says are we being a little hubristic and thinking that the 21st century won't have the same challenges and thinking about, you know, I think you guys might be convincing me a little bit that maybe we should talk about strategic stability beyond nuclear. So, I don't quite have an answer to what should it be and what should be the reading assignment. Um, maybe the three of us have to do more episodes and write and have to write that ourselves. But, uh, it is thinking back to that there was an era when there weren't nuclear weapons. That wasn't so stable either. and thinking about stability beyond capabilities and more to those types of relationships. So again, all to say, I think there's some really important strategic thinking to be done here.

[00:37:42]>> Yeah, I think that's well said. Well, on that note, I think that's a great place to end. Thank you for tuning in. Thanks to our missile defense project team, our project on nuclear issues pony team, and our aerospace security project, as well as our streaming and broadcasting team.

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