Lucretius on Death: The Symmetry Problem | Philosophy of Death

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Thomas Nagel's Deprivation Account and Temporal Asymmetry

Thomas Nagel challenges Lucretius's symmetry argument by arguing that death and pre-natal non-existence are fundamentally asymmetrical. According to Nagel’s 'deprivation account,' death is bad because it deprives an individual of the ongoing goods of life they would have otherwise experienced. In contrast, pre-birth non-existence does not deprive us of anything, because a person could not have been born significantly earlier and still been the same individual; our identity is inherently tied to the specific time of our conception. Furthermore, philosophers like Derek Parfit highlight a natural psychological asymmetry regarding time: humans are inherently biased toward the future. We dread future non-existence because it lies ahead of us, whereas pre-natal non-existence is in the past. Consequently, fearing the future loss of life while remaining indifferent to pre-birth non-existence is a rational reflection of how humans experience time and personal identity, breaking the symmetry Lucretius proposed.

Understanding Epicurean philosophy, specifically the core tenet that 'death is nothing to us' because we do not exist to experience it.
Familiarity with the 'Deprivation Account' of death, which posits that death is bad because it deprives a person of the good things in life.
Basic concepts of personal identity and metaphysics, particularly what constitutes the self and its persistence through time.
An introduction to hedonism (the philosophical theory that pleasure is the highest good and pain the ultimate evil) as it relates to Epicurean ethics.
Thomas Nagel's critique of the symmetry argument, focusing on how the direction of time and past/future asymmetry affects our attitudes.
Derek Parfit's 'bias toward the future' theory, which explains why we care differently about past pleasures and pains versus future ones.
The Metaphysics of Time (A-theory vs. B-theory) and how different temporal ontologies impact our view of pre-natal and post-mortem nonexistence.
Bernard Williams's essay on the tedium of immortality, exploring whether an endless life would actually be desirable if death is not feared.
13.1K views820likes1:00@Philosophy_OverdoseOriginal Release: 2024-02-01

Lucretius argues that since we are not upset about the eternity we were never born into (pre-birth non-existence), we should not be upset about the eternity after death (post-death non-existence), because both periods involve the same non-existence.